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INTRODUCTION

Our previous decisions have not specified the
source or defined the content of the requirement that
the first adjudication offer a full and fair opportunity to
litigate. But for present purposes, where we are bound
by the statutory directive of [28 U.S.C.] § 1738,1 state
proceedings need do no more than satisfy the minimum
procedural requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause in order to qualify for the full
2
faith and credit guaranteed by federal law.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Kremer v. Chemical Construction
Corp.3 is but one of twenty-one 4 handed down since 1979 where it
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982). The statute provides in pertinent part:
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State,
Territory or Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted
in other courts within the United States and its Territories and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and seal of the court annexed, if a
seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge of the court that the
said attestation is in proper form.
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so
authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court
within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they
have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession
from which they are taken.
Id.
2. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481 (1982).
3. Id. In Kremer, the Court addressed the issue of whether a federal court in
a title VII case should give preclusive effect to a decision of a state court upholding a state administrative agency's rejection of an employment discrimination
claim, when the state court's decision would be res judicata in that state's own
courts. Id. at 463.
4. Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank, 106 S. Ct 768 (1986); Marrese
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83

has grappled with the doctrines of issue and claim preclusion, 5
both in the intra- and intersystem contexts. 6 During the 1983
Term alone, no less than seven full-dress opinions were written
on one aspect or another of this area. 7 While in some instances
the Court has rejected efforts to preclude litigation of matters, 8
on balance the trend has been in favor of preclusion, 9 which is not
v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 105 S. Ct. 1327 (1985); Cooper
v. Federal Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867 (1984); Limbach v. Hooven & Allison
Co., 466 U.S. 353 (1984); McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284
(1984); United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984);
Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984); United
States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154 (1984); United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co.,
464 U.S. 165 (1984); Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983); Haring v.
Prosise, 462 U.S. 306 (1983); Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983); Kremer
v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982); Underwriters' Nat'l Assurance
Co. v. North Carolina Life & Accident & Health Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 455 U.S. 691
(1982); Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981); Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980); Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S.
261 (1980); Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10 (1980); Brown v. Felson, 442
U.S. 127 (1979); Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979). Cf. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,
105 S. Ct. 1238, 1243-44 (1985) (though discussed in light of McDonald v. City
of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984), question of preclusive effect of prior arbitration proceeding was not before Court and was not decided).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 142-45. "Claim preclusion," or res
judicata, is present where a final judgment on the merits bars further claims by
parties or their privies on the same cause of action. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

JUDGMENTS §§ 17-29 (1982). "Issue preclusion," or collateral estoppel, is present where, once a court has decided an issue of fact or law that is necessary to its
judgment, the decision is conclusive in a subsequent suit based on a different
cause of action involving any party to the prior litigation. Id. But see infra note 12
("res judicata" used to refer to both claim and issue preclusion).
6. As used in this article, intrasystem preclusion refers to preclusion by
judgment when the second or subsequent actions are brought in the courts of
the same jurisdiction that rendered the initial judgment. Intersystem preclusion
refers to preclusion by judgment when the second or subsequent actions are
brought in the courts of a jurisdiction different from that rendering the initial
judgment, such as when the first suit is in state court and the second in the court
of another state or in federal court.
7. See Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867 (1984); Limbach v.
Hooven & Allison Co., 466 U.S. 353 (1984); McDonald v. City of West Branch,
466 U.S. 284 (1984); United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S.
354 (1984); Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984);
United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154 (1984); United States v. Stauffer Chem.
Co., 464 U.S. 165 (1984).
8. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (labor
arbitration is not "judicial proceeding" within meaning of § 1738 and does not
warrant preclusive effect); United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 165 (1984) (doctrine of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel does not extend to United
States).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165 (1984) (doctrine of mutual defensive collateral estoppel is applicable to United States); Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983) (doctrine of res judicata applied
against United States and second party).
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surprising given the concerns expressed both in formal opinions I0 and in other contexts" by various members of the Court
regarding docket congestion.
While the recent decisions range over many of the disparate
2
problems encompassed within the broad areas of res judicata'
and full faith and credit,13 a very large proportion of them focus
in significant degree, though in different contexts, on the concept
of "opportunity to be heard."' 4 As a general proposition, "due
process," whether embodied in the fifth amendment' 5 or the
fourteenth amendment, 16 guarantees a civil litigant at least one
opportunity to litigate all matters that are relevant to his claim or
defense. 17 Once that opportunity is given, however, a further attempt to litigate that claim or defense, or issues relating thereto,
may in many instances be foreclosed without contravention of
federal constitutional or federal nonconstitutional standards.' 8
10. See, e.g., Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 517 (1982) (O'Connor
& Rehnquist, JJ., concurring) (acknowledging increasing number of § 1983 actions and effect on courts that are already heavily burdened).
11. See, e.g., Rehnquist, Overdelegation of Authority, Prolification of Judges Could
Harm the Judiciary, 14 THIRD BRANCH, Oct. 1982, at 2.
12. The term "res judicata" has been used to refer to both claim and issue
preclusion. See A. VESTAL, RES JUDICATA/PRECLUSION V-13 to 14 (1969).
13. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, provides:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts,
Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.
Id. This constitutional provision is implemented through 28 U.S.C. § 1738
(1982). For the pertinent language of § 1738, see supra note 1.
14. See, e.g., MacDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 285 (1984)
(at issue was whether federal court can base preclusion on unappealed arbitration award in case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979) (at issue was whether party that has had issues
of fact decided against it in equitable proceeding is precluded from relitigating
same issues in subsequent legal proceeding instituted by another party).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
16. Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
17. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306
(1950). The Mullane Court noted:
Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of
the Due Process Clause but there can be no doubt that at a minimum
they require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication
be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the
nature of the case.
Id. at 313.
18. See, e.g., Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948). In Sherrer, a Massachusetts woman left her husband and established residency in Florida with the intention of getting a divorce. Id. at 345. After meeting the Florida residency
requirement, she filed a complaint. Id. Her husband received notice and appeared at the divorce hearing with counsel. Id. The husband's attorney neither
cross-examined nor introduced any evidence and a divorce decree was entered.
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In other instances, an additional opportunity to be heard might
be required by these standards.' 9
The analysis that follows focuses on the extent to which and
the manner in which federal law dictates the opportunity to be
heard as a prerequisite to a state's ability to invoke the doctrines
of merger, 20 bar,2 1 and issue preclusion, 22 whether against the
24
parties to the original litigation 23 or in favor of non-parties.
These limits have their origin in both constitutional and nonconstitutional sources. They constitute the principal federal procedural control over the parameters of state preclusion law. 2 5 They
operate "internally" on the law of each state; that is, they condition the effect of a state court judgment in the courts of the state
which rendered it. Moreover, under the full faith and credit
clause 2 6 and its implementing statute,2 7 when an attempt is made
to rely on the judgment of a sister state, those limits generally
circumscribe the preclusive effect of the judgment in the courts of
other states and the federal courts.
In this way the pertinent federal definition of "opportunity to
be heard" operates similarly in both the intra- and intersystem
Id. at 346. At a subsequent probate proceeding in Massachusetts, the ex-husband collaterally attacked the Florida decree on jurisdictional grounds. Id. at
347. Relying on the doctrine of preclusion, the Supreme Court upheld the decree. Id. at 348. It saw "nothing in the concept of due process which demands
that a defendant be afforded a second opportunity to litigate." Id.
19. For a discussion of circumstances in which an additional opportunity to
be heard may be required, see infra notes 220-347 and accompanying text.
20. For a statement of the general rule of merger, see infra notes 142-45
and accompanying text.
21. For a statement of the general rule of bar, see infra note 144 and accompanying text.
22. For a statement of the general rule governing issue preclusion, see infra
text accompanying note 220.
23. For a discussion of the application of merger and bar to parties to the
original action, see infra notes 140-65 and accompanying text. For discussion of
issue preclusion as it relates to parties to the original action, see infra notes 22070 and accompanying text. For discussion of federal nonconstitutional limitations on state preclusion law as they pertain to parties to the original action, see
infra notes 308-347 and accompanying text.
24. For discussion of issue preclusion as it applies to non-parties, see infra
notes 271-306 and accompanying text. For a discussion of federal non-constitutional limitations on state preclusion law as they pertain to non-parties, see infra
notes 308-347 and accompanying text.
25. See generally 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 4467 (1981) (effect of federal law on intersystem preclusion,
e.g., between state courts) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL PRACTICE].
26. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. For the text of the full faith and credit clause,
see supra note 13.
27. For the pertinent language of § 1738, see supra note 1.
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contexts. 2 8 Certain circumstances may arise, however, in which
the rendering state's internal application of its preclusion doctrine, although otherwise within applicable federal constraints,
may be inconsistent with the federal law of "opportunity to be
heard" as it operates in the intersystem context. In such circumstances, as we shall see, other courts, state and federal, may be
permitted to disregard what would appear to be their full faith
and credit obligations with respect to the judgment of the render29
ing state.
The Supreme Court's opinion in the Kremer case 30 purports
to deal with only a limited aspect of the complex interaction of
federal and state law in the area of intra- and intersystem preclusion. 3 1 The excerpt quoted above 32 attempts to put to rest one
question, though as we shall see, the answer may be based on
33
mistaken assumptions.
The following discussion will focus on the federal controls
that impinge on state domestic preclusion law and upon problems
encountered when recognition or enforcement of a state judgment is attempted in a federal court in the state of rendition or
elsewhere, or in a court of a sister state. It should be noted, however, that much of the same general analysis applies in those instances where all courts involved are federal, and also where a
federal judgment is relied upon in a later state court
34
proceeding.
In order to supply necessary background, the introductory
section of this article will discuss the constitutional parameters of
the opportunity to be heard in the initial adjudication. This material is also relevant to the topic under examination because, absent compliance with the applicable constitutional procedural
28. For the distinction between intersystem and intrasystem preclusion as
employed in this article, see supra note 6.

29. See, e.g., Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980)
(notwithstanding Virginia award of workers' compensation to plaintiff under
state law excluding "all other rights and remedies," District of Columbia was
entitled to award additional relief in subsequent supplemental action). For a
more detailed analysis of Thomas and a discussion of federal exceptions to intersystem preclusion, see infra notes 484-534 and accompanying text.
30. 456 U.S. 461 (1982). For an explanation of the issue addressed in
Kremer, see supra note 3.
31. For an analysis of Kremer, see infra notes 453-83 and accompanying text.
32. See supra text accompanying note 2.
33. For discussion of the apparent basis of the Kremer decision, see infra
notes 453-71 and accompanying text.
34. For discussion of the preclusive effects of federal judgments, see infra
notes 577-83 and accompanying text.
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constraints in the original proceeding, any judgment resulting
from that proceeding may be invalid in the state of rendition and
not entitled to recognition or enforcement elsewhere. That is, no
35
preclusive effects would attach to the original judgment.
II.

A.

INTRASTATE PRECLUSION

The Opportunity to be Heard in the Initial Adjudication

1. The Relation of Substantive Law and Procedure
Generally, nonconstitutional federal and state law, statutory
and common, defines the "substantive" 3 6 elements necessary to
37
obtain the various judicial remedies. Many of the "procedural "
limitations on or conditions for obtaining relief from a particular
judicial tribunal, such as venue and subject matter jurisdiction,
38
are similarly of nonconstitutional origin.
However, once the relevant body of federal or state law
makes a particular element in a cause of action essential to recovery or lays down a particular procedural restriction, the due process clauses of the federal Constitution ensure the parties an
adequate opportunity to be heard.39 The plaintiff, in such a case,
may attempt to establish that the necessary substantive and proce35. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 104 & com-

ment a (1971). See also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) (because Florida

court had no in rem jurisdiction over corpus of trust, and no personal jurisdiction
over trust company, its judgment as to validity of trust was invalid and sister
state was under no obligation to afford such judgment full faith and credit).
36. "Substantive" is a chameleon-like adjective that draws its meaning from
context. Unless otherwise indicated, during the course of this article it is generally employed in the common sense fashion defined by Professor, now Dean,
John Hart Ely:
We have, I think, some moderately clear notion of what a procedural
rule is-one designed to make the process of litigation a fair and efficient mechanism for the resolution of disputes ....
The most helpful
way, it seems to me, of defining a substantive rule--or more particularly
a substantive right, which is what the [Rules Enabling] Act [28 U.S.C.
§ 2072 (1982)] refers to-is a right granted for one or more nonprocedural reasons, for some purpose or purposes not having to do
with the fairness or efficiency of the litigation process.
Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REv. 693, 724-25 (1974) (footnotes
omitted).
37. Indeed, a rule may be both procedural and substantive. See Ely, supra
note 36, at 726.
38. But see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (enumeration of cases and controversies
within federal judicial power).
39. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (due process clause applicable to federal government requires that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law"); id. amend. XIV, § 1 (due process clause applicable
to states provides that "[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law").
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dural preconditions have been met and the defendant may seek to
counter the plaintiff's presentation. 40 State law may require more
protection than this federal constitutional minimum but may not
mandate less.
The case law is replete with the efforts of the courts to define
the constitutional adequacy of the "opportunity to be heard" in
the context of challenges by one or the other of the litigants in the
42
initial litigation. 4 ' In recent years, starting with Goldberg v. Kelly,
most of the Supreme Court's opinions dealing with this problem
40. See, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982). The
Logan Court noted:
Each of our due process cases has recognized, either explicitly or implicitly, that because "minimum [procedural] requirements [are] a matter of federal law, they are not diminished by the fact that the State may
have specified its own procedures that it may deem adequate for determining the preconditions to adverse official action."
Id. at 432 (quoting Vitek v.Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980)). The Logan Court
reasoned:
Indeed, any other conclusion would allow the State to destroy at will
virtually any state-created property interest. The Court has considered
and rejected such an approach: " 'While the legislature may elect not
to confer a property interest .... it may not constitutionally authorize
the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards .... [T]he adequacy of statutory procedures
for deprivation of a statutorily created property interest must be analyzed in constitutional terms.' "
Id. (quoting Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. at 490-91 n.6 (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy,
416 U.S. 134, 167 (1974) (Powell & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part))). The
Logan Court added:
As our decisions have emphasized time and again, the Due Process
Clause grants the aggrieved party the opportunity to present his case
and have its merits fairlyjudged. Thus it has become a truism that"some
form of hearing" is required before the owner is finally deprived of a
protected property interest.
455 U.S. at 433 (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 n.8
(1972) (emphasis in original)). See also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill,
105 S.Ct. 1487, 1492-93 (1985). For discussion of the circumstances in which
due process protection attaches and the extent of such protection, see infra
notes 41-55 and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 538-40 (1981) (availability of
post-deprivation remedies can satisfy due process in some circumstances); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (three factors should be considered
in determining whether due process is satisfied: private interests implicated; risk
of erroneous deprivation and probable value of additional safeguards; and public interests and administrative burdens the added procedures would involve);
Fuentes v. Shevins, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972) (opportunity to be heard must be
provided before deprivation takes effect); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545,
552 (1965) (opportunity to be heard must be afforded "at a meaningful time and
in a meaningful manner"); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (due process requires that hearing be "appropriate to the
nature of the case").
42. 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of public assistance payments).
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have come in the area of nonjudicial decision-making. 43 However, this modem "due process explosion" had its counterpart in
the civil litigation context with Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.44 as
the first case, predating Goldberg by one year. In Fuentes v.
Shevin, 4 5 perhaps the most radical of the cases following Sniadach,
Justice Stewart noted:
The constitutional right to be heard is a basic aspect of
the duty of government to follow a fair process of decisionmaking when it acts to deprive a person of his possessions. The purpose of this requirement is not only to
ensure abstract fair play to the individual. Its purpose,
more particularly, is to protect his use and possession of
property from arbitrary encroachment-to minimize
substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations of property
46

In deciding challenges to the adequacy of the opportunity to
be heard in both the judicial 4 7 and nonjudicial contexts, 4 8 the
Court has adopted a two-level approach. The Court first considers whether the interest at stake is "life, liberty, or property"
within the meaning of the fifth or fourteenth amendments. 4 9 The
43. See, e.g., Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979) (suspension of horse trainer
license); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (suspension of students from high
school).
44. 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (summary wage garnishment).
45. 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (prejudgment replevin). See also Mitchell v. W.T.
Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974) (upholding prejudgment sequestration of personal property); North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601
(1975) (prejudgment garnishing of bank account violated due process clause of
fourteenth amendment).
46. 407 U.S. at 80-81.
47. See, e.g., id. at 84-87.
48. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572-74 (1975) (students facing
temporary suspension from a public high school pursuant to Ohio statute have
property and liberty interests that qualify for protection under due process
clause of fourteenth amendment).
49. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). Decided the same day, Roth and Perry are
seminal cases dealing with this first level. Both of these cases involved the nonrenewal of college teaching contracts. In Perry, the plaintiff alleged that his failure to be rehired was in retaliation for his public criticism of administration
policies. Id. at 595. He further alleged that the administration's failure to provide him with an opportunity for a hearing violated his fourteenth amendment
guarantee of due process. Id. The Court noted that a person's interest in a
benefit such as re-employment is a "property" interest for due process purposes
if there are rules or mutually explicit understandings with his employer that support his claim to entitlement to the benefit. Id. at 601. The Court remanded the
case to the district court to enable the plaintiff to demonstrate that the denial of
re-employment implicated such a property interest. Id. at 602-03.
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protections of the due process clauses attach only if the Court
determines that the interest meets this qualification. 50 The parameters of that protection vary depending on the results of a trifactor balancing analysis which, for both judicial5 l and nonjudicial
proceedings, 52 considers: the weight or importance of the (1) private and (2) public or governmental interests at stake, along with
(3) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of protected interests
through the procedures actually utilized and the probable value
53
of added or substitute procedural safeguards.
In the typical judicial proceeding, where either a monetary
award or an order prohibiting or mandating the taking of certain
action is sought, there is generally no question that constitutionally protected liberty or property interests are at stake. 54 Presumptively, the balancing analysis to determine the type of
process due in the initial adjudication would at a minimum mandate: notice of the proceeding and the grounds asserted for it; an
impartial decision-maker; the opportunity for each side to present
effectively evidence favorable to it and to know and rebut the evidence against it, including the right to cross-examination where it
might elicit relevant information; and a decision based solely on
the evidence except where judicial notice is appropriate. 55
50. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). Before due process requirements are held applicable the court must make a threshold determination of whether the nature of the interest at stake is within the realm of due
process protection. Id. In Roth, the lower court had mistakenly appraised the
weight of the interests at stake in deciding whether due process requirements
applied in the first place. Id. at 570. The Supreme Court opinion pointed out
that consideration of the weight of the interest involved is relevant to the form
of the hearing required by due process, but only after it has first been established that the nature of the interest is one protected by due process. Id. at 57071 & n.8.
51. See, e.g., United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 677 (1980) (involving
challenge to constitutionality of Federal Magistrates Act, which permits district
judge to make de novo determination of contested credibility assessments without personally hearing live testimony).
52. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (constitutionality of procedures for terminating Social Security disability benefits).
53. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 341 (1976); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972). For a discussion of the important
distinction between the "weight" and "nature" of the interests at stake, see supra
note 50.
54. Cf. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 677-81 (1980) (criminal proceeding where interests implicated in motion to suppress were adequately protected by statute).
55. Friendly, "Some Kind of Heating", 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1277-87
(1975). Judge Friendly also examines availability of counsel, opportunity for judicial review, public attendance, and the efficacy of keeping a formal record. Id.
at 1287-95.
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The Opportunity to be Heard as it Relates to Various Aspects of the
Initial Adjudication

With respect to the initial adjudication, the Supreme Court
has dealt with the requirement that there be an "opportunity to
be heard" in several discrete contexts.
a.

56
Territorial Jurisdiction

The fourteenth amendment, through its due process
clause,5 7 regulates the location of litigation among the fifty
states. 5 8 It insures that the forum chosen for the litigation is a
minimally "fair" one for both parties.5 9 The constitutional test
for territorial jurisdiction 60 is whether the defendant has sufficient
"minimum contacts" with the forum state. 6 ' Absent actual or
constructive waiver by the defendant, 62 federal constitutional law
makes establishment of territorial jurisdiction a condition precedent to the maintenance of a suit in the courts of a particular
63
state, notwithstanding state law to the contrary.
Both parties, therefore, must have an opportunity to be
heard on the issue of territorial jurisdiction. 64 However, because
the constitutional limitations on state territorial jurisdiction are
56. Territorial jurisdiction has been defined as "the connection between
the territorial authority of the court and the action that has been brought before
the court." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS ch. 2 introductory note, at 22
(1982).
57. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
58. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877) (dictum). See generally Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In PersonamJurisdictionof State
Courts, 23 U. Cm. L. REV. 569, 572-74 (1958) (judgment entitled to full faith and
credit only after due process requirements are satisfied).
59. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2181-85 (1985).
60. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 315-16 (1945).
61. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207-12 (1977). This notion of
"minimum contacts" is derived from Chief Justice Stone's seminal opinion in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See also Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S.
220 (1957) (interpreting the "minimum contacts" requirement).
62. See, e.g., Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982). Because the requirement of personal jurisdiction
flows from the due process clause rather than from article III, it is a personal
right that can be expressly or constructively waived. Id. at 702-05.
63. A state's law, statutory or common, may more restrictively limit the territorial jurisdiction of its courts. See, e.g., R. CRAMPTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY,
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONs 523-25 (3d ed. 1981) (discussing limitations on exercise of jurisdiction, such as doctrine of forum non
conveniens).
64. For a discussion of the constitutionally mandated safeguards of the
"opportunity to be heard," see supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
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intended in part to protect the defendant "against the burdens of
litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum", 6 5 the defending
party is given the choice of either appearing in the original proceeding to raise and litigate the jurisdictional issue 66 .or waiting,
for example, until an action is brought in another state seeking
the enforcement or recognition 6 7 of a default judgment. 68 In the
later proceeding the defendant can contend that it did not have
minimum contacts with the original forum and that the judgment
is therefore void. 69 In some cases this choice can adequately protect the defendant's interest in avoiding the burden of litigating in
the courts of a distant state. This is the case where, for instance,
the judgment is a money award that can be enforced only in the
65. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
The Woodson Court noted:
[T]he Due Process Clause "does not contemplate that a state may make
binding a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations." . . .
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from
being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State, even if the
forum State has a strong interest in applying its law to the controversy,
even if the forum State is the most convenient location for litigation,
the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid
judgment.
Id. at 294 (citations omitted). The sovereignty/federalism element was no
sooner rediscovered than almost immediately interred. See Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2181-82 & n.13 (1985); Insurance Corp. of Ireland,
Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702-03 & n.10 (1982).
66. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 10(1) (1982). The common law mechanism for objecting to territorial jurisdiction was the "special appearance." Id. comment b. The "special appearance" entailed an appearance
by the defendant at the threshold of litigation solely to contest the validity of
jurisdiction of form of process. Id. If the defendant objected to anything further, his appearance was termed a "general appearance" thereby subjecting him
to the court's jurisdiction. Id. While all states now provide at least for special
appearance, many go further and adopt a procedural scheme similar to that prescribed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b). Id. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
67. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 92 introductory
note, topic 2 (1971), The introductory note provides:
A foreign judgment is recognized, as the term is used in the Restatement of this Subject, when it is given the same effect that it has in the
state where it was rendered with respect to the parties, the subject matter of the action and the issues involved. A foreign judgment is enforced when, in addition to being recognized, a party is given the
affirmative relief to which the judgment entitles him.
d.
68. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 81 (1982). For the modern
rationale for the permissibility of collateral attack in the state of recognition, see
id. comment b at 254.

69. Id. § 81 & comment a at 251-53. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
§ 104 (1971) (judgment rendered without in personam juris-

CONFLICT OF LAws

diction will not be recognized or enforced in other states).
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defendant's home state because that is where the defendant's only
property is located.
However, the defendant may, for example, own property in
the original forum. If a default judgment is rendered there, the
only way the defendant can protect its interest in that property is
either to make a post-judgment motion in the original proceeding
or to utilize whatever collateral proceedings are available in that
state to set aside the judgment. Either way, the defendant must
appear in what may be an inconvenient forum for it to litigate the
territorial jurisdiction issue. The existence of the property might
be considered, however, in a balance of the constitutionally relevant factors, of which inconvenience to the defendant is only
one, 70 as a sufficient constitutional nexus to the forum to justify
requiring a defendant to appear to litigate at least the issue of
7
jurisdiction in the enforcement proceeding. '
It is also true that the choice given the defendant of attacking
a court's territorial jurisdiction directly or collaterally may not in
all instances be necessary to further the concerns of the due process clause regarding litigation burden. For instance, the burden
of litigating the jurisdictional issue in the plaintiff's chosen forum
may not be substantial in some cases.
As long as the opportunity to be heard on the issue of constitutional territorial jurisdiction satisfies constitutional standards 72
and is made available at "a meaningful time,"' 73 and in an appro70. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292
(1980). Other relevant factors include the forum state's interest in adjudicating
the dispute; the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient relief-at least when
that interest is not adequately protected by the plaintiffs power to choose the
forum; the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining efficient dispute resolution; and the shared interest of the states in furthering substantive social policies. Id.
71. Cf.Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 210 & n.36 (1977) (once defendant
is adjudicated to be debtor of plaintiff, no unfairness results in allowing action
on the debt in state where defendant has property even if that state would not
have jurisdiction to initially adjudicate existence of debt). See generally Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33, 71-79 (1978).
72. For a discussion of these constitutional standards, see infra notes 76-96
and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (opportunity to
be heard in adoption proceeding must be granted at meaningful time and in
meaningful manner). For purposes of this article a "meaningful time" refers to:
1) the period before liberty or property is taken by the governmental instrumentalities of the judgment-rendering state; or 2) where the person or property of
the defendant is not present in the rendering state and defendant does not appear in the initial proceeding, before liberty or property is taken by the instrumentalities of the enforcement or recognition state.
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priate forum7 4 the failure to take advantage of that opportunity
can be deemed to be a valid constructive waiver of any otherwise
75
sustainable objection to territorial jurisdiction.
Regardless of whether the defendant chooses to utilize it,
however, the Supreme Court requires that the opportunity to be
heard be a "full" one.7 6 Unfortunately, the Court has not elaborated on what procedures are constitutionally required in the
usual case where the territorial jurisdiction defense is raised.
In the area of divorce jurisdiction, 77 however, the Court has
been more explicit.7 8 Arguably, the same dictates apply generally
to matters of territorial jurisdiction, whether constitutional or
statutory in origin. 79 In Sherrer v. Sherrer,s0 for instance, where it
was successfully contended that Massachusetts had failed to ac74. For discussion of the defendant's options with respect to the appropriate forum, see supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
75. Cf. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703-05 (1982) (requirement of personal jurisdiction is
individual right and therefore may be expressly waived or treated as such in
variety of circumstances).
76. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 526
(1931) (res judicata should apply "where one voluntarily appears, presents his
case and is fully heard").
77. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 7 & comment b at
80-81 (1982) (discussing jurisdiction to terminate marital status with respect to
"migratory divorce," that is, divorce by one who establishes temporary residence in jurisdiction with liberal rules of domicile and permissive grounds for
divorce).
78. See, e.g., Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S.
343 (1948). Coe and Sherrer involved collateral attacks on migratory divorce decrees rendered in Nevada and Florida respectively. Coe, 334 U.S. at 381-82;
Sherrer, 334 U.S. at 346-48. In both cases, the defendant spouses appeared at the
divorce proceedings. Coe, 334 U.S. at 380; Sherrer, 344 U.S. at 346. The Court in
Sherrer noted that
the requirements of full faith and credit bar a defendant from collaterally attacking a divorce decree on jurisdictional grounds in the courts of
a sister state where there has been participation by the defendant in the
divorce proceedings, where the defendant has been accorded full opportunity to contest the jurisdictional issues, and where the decree is
not susceptible to such collateral attack in the courts of the State which
rendered the decree.
334 U.S. at 351-52 (citation and footnote omitted). The Court applied its reasoning in Sherrer in Coe. See Coe, 334 U.S. at 384 (citing Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343).
79. Where state law restricts the exercise of territorial jurisdiction more
than required by the fourteenth amendment, there is a right to be heard in the
initial action with regard to compliance with those limits. For discussion of state
law requirements in conjunction with federal due process requirements, see
supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
However, the availability of a collateral attack on a default judgment based
on these state limitations is purely a question of the law of the rendering state.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 4 comment d at 59-60 (1982).
80. 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
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cord full faith and credit to a Florida divorce decree, the defendant in the initial divorce proceedings had in a perfunctory fashion
contested and lost in the original forum on the issue of the plaintiffs domicile."' The Court noted at the outset of its discussion
that the proceedings in Florida prior to the entry of the divorce
decree had been consistent with the dictates of procedural due
process in all respects.8 2 Had the defendant not been given a
constitutionally adequate opportunity to be heard on the issue of
domicile, the original Florida decree would have been invalid in
Florida and not entitled to full faith and credit in any other
83
state.
However, in examining the proceedings in Florida, the Court
noted: "It is not suggested that [defendant's] rights to introduce
evidence and otherwise to conduct his defense were in any degree
impaired; nor is it suggested that there was not available to him
the right to seek review of the decree by appeal to the Florida
Supreme Court."8 4 In these circumstances, the due process
clause did not require a second opportunity to litigate.8 5 Furthermore, the full faith and credit clause8 6 did not permit relitigation
of the issue of domicile where the requisite "full opportunity to
81. A state may constitutionally grant a valid divorce based solely on the
domiciliary status of the plaintiff regardless of the defendant's lack of contacts
with the forum state. See, e.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 297-99
(1942). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 71 & comment a (1971).
The defendant in Sherrer appeared at the Florida proceedings with counsel,
but the attorney neither cross-examined the plaintiff nor introduced any evidence in rebuttal. 334 U.S. at 346. Sherrerhas been classified as a case involving
an issue of subject matter jurisdiction. See Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 112
(1963). However, it is more appropriately seen as presenting an issue of territorial jurisdiction. For discussion of the appropriate classification of Sherrer and
Durfee, see infra note 118.
82. Sherrer, 334 U.S. at 348. Indeed, the defendant/respondent had not asserted anything to the contrary. Id.
83. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 25 & comments b, h
(1971); id. § 104. At the least, adjudication of the issue of domicile would not
prevent further litigation of that issue even if relitigation of the merits would be
foreclosed.
84. 334 U.S. at 348.
85. Id. If there were an adequate opportunity to raise, litigate, and obtain
appellate correction of any constitutional defects in the trial court procedures,
an argument could be made that a collateral attack on the judgment need not be
permitted within or without the forum state. But cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAws § 95 (1971) (issues determined by valid judgment are determined by law of state where judgment is rendered, subject to constitutional
limitations).
86. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. For the text of the full faith and credit clause,
see supra note 13.
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litigate" previously had been afforded.8 7 As to this latter holding,
the Court largely reiterated what it had said in connection with
the due process clause,8 8 though it omitted reference to the right
of review and added that "It]here is nothing to indicate that the
Florida court would not have evaluated fairly and in good faith all
relevant evidence submitted to it."89 In concluding, the Court
noted that where "findings of jurisdictional fact [are] made by a
competent court in proceedings ... consistent with ... due process," full faith and credit does not permit relitigation. 90 Recently, the Court confirmed that Sherrer stands for the proposition
that an opportunity to be heard on the issue of territorial jurisdiction which satisfies the requirements of due process is all that is
necessary to trigger the full faith and credit obligations of other
states. 9 1
In sum, the constitutional opportunity to litigate the issue of
territorial jurisdiction appears to include at the least these rights:
1. the right to introduce relevant evidence and effectively counter that of the other side;
2. the right to an impartial tribunal; and
92
3. the right to appeal.
There are no surprises here,9 3 except perhaps with respect to the
87. Sherrer, 334 U.S. at 352. The Court added that the defendant's "dereliction" should not be a basis for a subsequent attack on the valid decree. Id.
88. Id.

89. Id.
90. Id. at 356. The Court added: "That vital interests are involved in divorce litigation indicates to us that it is a matter of greater rather than lesser
importance that there should be a place to end such litigation." Id. (footnote
omitted). But cf. supra text accompanying note 78 (constitutional procedures required in divorce litigation arguably apply to matters of territorial jurisdiction in
general).
91. See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481-83 & n.24
(1982). Cf. Underwriters Nat'l Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Life & Accident
& Health Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 455 U.S. 691, 719 (1982) (White, J., concurring) (decision involving subject matter jurisdiction must be given res judicata effect by
North Carolina court with respect to Association, unless Indiana court failed to
follow procedural requirements of due process clause). The law of the rendering state may require more than due process and permit (or forbid) collateral
attack for a failure to comply with any such additional procedures. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

ch. 3 introductory note b at 101 (1971); id.

§ 105 comment b (1971).
92. The fact that due process is satisfied by a certain procedural scheme, of
course, does not necessarily suggest that due process requires all the procedures
which comprise that scheme. However, the language of the Sherrer opinion is, on
balance, more susceptible to this interpretation. For a discussion of the Sherrer
Court's opinion, see supra notes 80-92 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text. The procedures constitu-
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97

last right, which the Court has not in other circumstances seen as
94
required by due process.
This is not an overly specific statement of the constitutional
requisites for a hearing, but it does clear away some of the fog.
As long as such an opportunity to litigate jurisdiction is afforded,
it is irrelevant whether the defendant takes full advantage of it, if
he does appear to contest the issue. 9 5 The determination of the
issue can be valid for domestic purposes, and enforcement and
recognition of the judgment may not be resisted by means of a
collateral attack on the finding of the original forum. 96
The commentary to section 10 of the Second Restatement of
Judgments,97 which adopts the traditional position that a determination of an objection to territorial jurisdiction precludes later relitigation of the issue, 9 s suggests at one point that such preclusion
might be subject to the general exceptions to issue preclusion
found in section 28 of the Restatement.99 At least with regard to
the matter of territorial jurisdiction, these exceptions appear intionally required in order to afford an opportunity to litigate the territorial jurisdiction issue are largely the same as those which appear to be required by due
process for litigating the merits of a case. For discussion and analysis of the
Court's appraisal of an "opportunity to be heard," see supra notes 47-55 and
accompanying text. As resolution of the issue of territorial jurisdiction in favor
of the party invoking the judicial authority of a tribunal is a condition precedent
to a judgment, validly disposing of the plaintiffs and defendant's stakes in the
original proceeding, the later discussion of the due process tri-factor calculus, as
it applies to issue preclusion generally, confirms that this equivalence is not coincidental. For an analysis of those instances in which this due process tri-factor
calculus seems to limit application of issue preclusion, see infra notes 239-64 and
accompanying text.
94. See, e.g., Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 STAN. L. REV. 937, 94547 (1975) (analysis of proposition that right to appellate review is not constitutionally guaranteed).
95. See, e.g., Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 352 (1948) ("If respondent
failed to take advantage of the opportunities afforded him, the responsibility is
his own.").
96. Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 96 (1971)
(law of state where judgment was rendered, subject to constitutional limitations,
determines whether judgment may be collaterally attacked for want of personal
jurisdiction). Of course, forum state law could require more than due process
and a failure to comply with those requirements could render the judgment subject to collateral attack in the state of rendition, in other states and in federal
courts. Id. ch. 3 introductory note b at 101; id. § 25 & comment c; id. § 105 &
comment b.
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 10 (1982).
98. Id. § 10(2). The Second Restatement of Judgments purports to "restate"
largely, though not entirely, the law of res judicata as it operates within a single
legal system, that is, the internal law of preclusion. Id. ch. 1 introduction at 2-3.
99. Id. § 10 comment d. Section 28 provides:
Although an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid and
final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, re-
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tended to apply not when an attempt is made to upset a judgment
but when the same issue arises in a suit based on a different cause
of action or in another entirely separate proceeding. 0 0 However,
if in fact it was contemplated that these exceptions might apply to
attempts to upset judgments, some exceptions do relate to the
matter under examination here since preclusion may be avoided
where appellate review has been precluded as a matter of law' 01
or there has not otherwise been an opportunity for a full and fair
adjudication in the initial action. 10 2 Even if these provisions were
not intended by the drafters to reflect only constitutional concerns, they do, at least in part, track existing due process constraints.' 0 3 The origin and effect of the other exceptions as they
litigation of the issue in a subsequent action between the parties is not
precluded in the following circumstances:
(1) The party against whom preclusion is sought could not, as a matter of law, have obtained review of the judgment in the initial action; or
(2) The issue is one of law and (a) the two actions involve claims that
are substantially unrelated, or (b) a new determination is warranted in order to take account of an intervening change in the
applicable legal context or otherwise to avoid inequitable administration of the laws; or
(3) A new determination of the issue is warranted by differences in the
quality or extensiveness of the procedures followed in the two
courts or by factors relating to the allocation of jurisdiction between them; or
(4) The party against whom preclusion is sought had a significantly
heavier burden of persuasion with respect to the issue in the initial
action than in the subsequent action; the burden has shifted to his
adversary; or the adversary has a significantly heavier burden than
he had in the first action; or
(5) There is a clear and convincing need for a new determination of
the issue
(a) because of the potential adverse impact of the determination
on the public interest or the interests of persons not themselves
parties in the initial action,
(b) because it was not sufficiently foreseeable at the time of the
initial action that the issue would arise in the context of a subsequent action, or
(c) because the party sought to be precluded, as a result of the
conduct of his adversary or other special circumstances, did not
have an adequate opportunity or incentive to obtain a full and fair
adjudication in the initial action.
Id. § 28.
100. Id. § 28 & illustration 5.
101. Id. § 28(1).
102. Id. § 28(5)(c).
103. Compare id. § 28 with infra text accompanying notes 239-41 (Restatement
exceptions may reflect constitutional concerns even when original judgment is
valid and binding for some purposes) and infra notes 249-70 and accompanying
text (in addition to due process requirements, preclusion exceptions as stated in
§ 28 reflect nonconstitutional policy concerns).
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apply to the issue of territorial jurisdiction is more problematic.
b.

Territorial Jurisdiction from Another Perspective

The constitutional limitations on state territorial jurisdiction,
as they have been explained by the Supreme Court in and subsequent to InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington,'0 4 incorporate a concern regarding the opportunity to be heard. In Chief Justice
Stone's now famous words,
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present
within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and
0 5
substantial justice." 1
The Chief Justice added that "[a]n 'estimate of the inconveniences' which would result to the corporation from a trial away
from its 'home' . . . is relevant in this connection."' 0 6 Thirty-five
years later Justice White noted that the concept of minimum contacts "protects the defendant against the burdens of litigation in a
distant or inconvenient forum."' 10 7 In part, the Court appears to
be concerned with the fact that if litigation in a particular state is
"burdensome" from the defendant's point of view, then the opportunity to be heard on the merits of the plaintiff's claim may not
be a real or at least a fully adequate one.' 0 8 While the Court's
opinions over the years have not elaborated to any great degree
what types of "burdens" are relevant, 0 9 certainly the cost of
travel for the defendant and witnesses favorable to defendant's
104. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
105. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
106. Id. at 317 (quoting Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 129, 141

(1930)).
107. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292
(1980). Recently, the Court has indicated that, where the defendant has "purposefully directed" its activities at residents of the forum and the litigation results from alleged injuries arising out of those activities, the burdens on the
defendant of litigating in the plaintiff's chosen forum may play only a modest
part in the minimum contacts analysis, although they are important where the
plaintiff's choice of forum may "make litigation 'so gravely difficult or inconvenient' that a party unfairly is at a 'severe disadvantage' in comparison to his
opponent." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2182-85 (1985)
(quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 18 (1972); McGee v.

International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223-24 (1957)).
108. Compare text with Gottlieb, In Search of the Link Between Due Process and
Jurisdiction, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 1291, 1317-21 (1983).
109. See, e.g., Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 97 (1978) ("substantial
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case, the ability to subpoena unwilling favorable witnesses, and
the location of immobile evidence must be considered."l 0 These
factors may counsel against any appearance by the defendant or
prevent defendant from putting on an adequate case at the trial
on the merits.
The distinction between notice and territorial jurisdiction
purportedly drawn by the Court in Mullane v. CentralHanover Bank
& Trust Co."'I is, therefore, not quite as clear as is generally supposed. 1 2 Both serve quite similar purposes. Notice of the commencement of a proceeding is essential in order to ensure that
13
affected parties can take advantage of their right to be heard.,
Location of the litigation in a minimally convenient forum assures
that an adequate opportunity to be heard is realistically available.
Moreover, the Court's concerns in this regard are not limited
to defendants. In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 114 Justice White noted that "the burden on the defendant, while always
a primary concern, will in an appropriate case be considered in
light of other relevant factors, including ... the plaintiff's interest
financial burden and personal strain of litigating a child-support suit in a forum
3,000 miles away").
110. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 301 (1980)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in World-Wide
Volkswagen explained:
Due process limits on jurisdiction do not protect a defendant from all
inconvenience of travel . . . and it would not be sensible to make the
constitutional rule turn solely on the number of miles the defendant
must travel to the courtroom. Instead, the constitutionally significant
"burden" to be analyzed relates to the mobility of the defendant's defense. For instance, if having to travel to a foreign forum would hamper the defense because witnesses or evidence or the defendant himself
were immobile, or if there were a disproportionately large number of
witnesses or amount of evidence that would have to be transported at
the defendant's expense, or if being away from home for the duration
of the trial would work some special hardship on the defendant, then
the Constitution would require special consideration for the defendant's interests.
Id. (citation and footnote omitted).
111. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
112. Id. at 311-13. The issue in Mullane was the constitutional sufficiency of
the notice given to the beneficiaries by the trustee on settlement of a common
trust fund. Id. at 307.
113. Id. at 314. Adequate notice "is notice reasonably calculated, under all
the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action."
Id. (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U'S.
385 (1914); Priest v. Las Vegas, 232 U.S. 604 (1914); Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S.
398 (1900)). The Court added that "when notice is a person's due, process
which is a mere gesture is not due process." Id. at 315.
114. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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in obtaining convenient and effective relief.'" 1 15 Earlier, in McGee
v. InternationalLife Insurance Co., 11 6 one of the factors favoring jurisdiction in California, the plaintiffs chosen forum, was that
"[w]hen claims were small or moderate individual claimants frequently could not afford the cost of bringing an action in a foreign forum-thus in effect making the company judgment
proof."' "1 7 In short, in deciding issues of territorial jurisdiction
the Court is concerned that plaintiffs have a realistic opportunity
to have their claims heard on the merits.
c.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Limitations on the subject matter jurisdiction of the state
courts are generally" 18 the creation of state constitutional or statutory law"

9

or federal statutory law. 12 0 As a precondition to the

power of a court to deal with a particular dispute, litigants have a
right to a hearing on the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. 12 Since these limits, unlike those relating to territorial jurisdiction, do not have their origin in constitutional concerns
22
regarding the fairness of the forum for litigation of the dispute,'
115. Id. at 292. The Court added that the plaintiffs interest is especially
relevant when such interest is "not adequately protected by the plaintiffs power
to choose the forum." Id. (citation omitted).
116. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). In McGee, a resident of California bought a life
insurance policy from an Arizona corporation whose obligations were later assumed by a Texas corporation. Id. at 221. The second company subsequently
offered a policy to the California resident on the same terms as his original policy. Id. He accepted the offer and paid the premiums to the Texas Company by
mail until his death. Id. at 221-22. The litigation arose when the Texas company failed to pay the benefits. Id. The California judgment in favor of the beneficiary was upheld as consistent with due process since the suit was based on a
contract which had a "substantial connection" with the forum state. Id. at 22324.
117. Id. at 223.
118. But cf.Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963). Here the presence of land
in the forum state in a quiet title action was classified as an issue of subject matter jurisdiction of the state court. It is more accurately viewed, however, as a
matter of territorial jurisdiction, just as is the question of domicile in divorce
cases. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11 comment b (1982) (contrasting territorial and subject matter jurisdiction).
119. See R. CASE & P. SIMON, CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES AND MATERIALS 186
(1984). The authors note that "[a]ccording to traditional doctrine if a court
should entertain a case that is not within the constitutional or statutory provisions defining its subject matter jurisdiction, its acts would be wholly ineffectual
and any resulting judgment would be void." Id.
120. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1982) (granting federal courts exclusive
subject matter jurisdiction in patent litigation).
121. For a discussion of the constitutionally mandated "opportunity to be
heard," see supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
122. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11 & comments a-
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there should be no federal constitutional requirement that the defendant be permitted to attack collaterally a default judgment on
the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This is so whether
the attack is launched in the courts of the state rendering the
judgment, 23 in another state, or in federal court where enforcement or recognition of the original judgment is sought. 12 4 If the
defendant appears in the action, whether or not the issue is in fact
litigated at the trial or appellate level, generally state law can, but
does not necessarily have to, foreclose further litigation domestically.' 25 If it does, however, the full faith and credit clause will
prevent other states and the federal courts from permitting the
issue to be raised to invalidate the judgment. 26 The foregoing
discussion assumes, of course, that the opportunity to litigate the
issue of subject matter jurisdiction in the original action meets
27
due process requirements.1
f (1982) (discussing origin and scope of, and challenges to, subject matter jurisdiction; distinguishing subject matter jurisdiction from territorial jurisdiction).
123. Id. § 12 & comment f. Indeed, a default judgment may be construed
as "implicitly adjudicating the question of subject matter jurisdiction." d. § 12
comment f.

124. See generally

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 105 &

comments a-b (1971) (judgment subject to collateral attack in state of rendition
for want of competence by rendering court will not be recognized or enforced
elsewhere). However, if the limitation on the state court's subject matter jurisdiction is based on federal law, the federal law of preclusion, statutory or common, may permit a collateral attack whether or not the issue is litigated in the
first action. See, e.g., Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 438-40 (1940) (effect of
filing of petition for extension of time under § 75 of Bankruptcy Act on state
court's jurisdiction over pending proceeding to foreclose mortgage on petitioner's property). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12(2) (1982)
(parties can litigate subject matter jurisdiction after judgment has been rendered
if"[a]llowing the judgment to stand would substantially infringe the authority of
another tribunal or agency of government"). For a discussion of the effect of
federal nonconstitutional limitations on state preclusion law, see infra notes 30847 and accompanying text.
125. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12 & comments c-d
(1982). But see supra note 124 (if limitation on state court's subject matter jurisdiction is based upon federal law, relitigation may be permitted-whether or not
state law would otherwise allow it).
126. If consistent with due process limitations, a state may insist that parties protest subject matter jurisdiction in the original court or on appeal from
the initial judgment. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 97 comment b (1971). If the parties are precluded from collaterally attacking the subject matter jurisdiction in the rendering state, they will "[a]lmost invariably ..
be [so] precluded by full faith and credit from . . . attacking the judgment in
sister states." Id. But see supra note 124 (if limitation on state court's subject
matter jurisdiction is based on federal law, collateral attack may be permittedregardless of state law).
127. For discussion of the procedural protections necessary to meet due
process, see supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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Section 12 of the Second Restatement ofJudgments advocates preclusion of collateral attacks on the subject matter jurisdiction of
the rendering court-subject to certain exceptions. 128 The only
exception relevant for current purposes appears, at least in part,
to track the constitutional requirement that there be a full and fair
opportunity to litigate 129 the issue in the initial action.1 3 0 Section
28, which sets forth the general exceptions to issue preclusion, 13'
1 32
may also be applicable to issues of subject matter jurisdiction,
but as in the case of territorial jurisdiction, 3 3 the exceptions relevant here either seem duplicative of constitutional procedural requirements for preclusion or appear problematic in effect.
The procedural opportunity to litigate issues of subject matter jurisdiction, which is required to satisfy constitutional due
process concerns and to entitle ajudgment to full faith and credit,
is arguably the same as that applicable to issues of territorial jurisdiction.' 3 4 In the most recent Supreme Court opinions dealing
with collateral attacks on judgments for what was classified as lack
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12 (1982). Section 12
provides:
When a court has rendered a judgment in a contested action, the judgment precludes the parties from litigating the question of the court's
subject matter jurisdiction in subsequent litigation except if:
(1) The subject matter of the action was so plainly beyond the court's
jurisdiction that its entertaining the action was a manifest abuse of
authority; or
(2) Allowing the judgment to stand would substantially infringe the
authority of another tribunal or agency of government; or
(3) The judgment was rendered by a court lacking capability to make
an adequately informed determination of a question concerning
its own jurisdiction and as a matter of procedural fairness the
party seeking to avoid the judgment should have opportunity belatedly to attack the court's subject matter jurisdiction.
Id.
129. See infra text accompanying notes 239-70 (examination of nonconstitutional policy based, as well as constitutionally based reasons for allowing exceptions to general preclusion rule).
130. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 12(3) & comment e (1982)
(stressing ability of original judge to "grasp the intricacies of jurisdictional issues" and opportunity for appellate review). Compare id. with infra text accompanying notes 239-70.
131. For the text of § 28, see supra note 99. For an analysis of the exceptions to the general rule of issue preclusion set forth in § 28, see infra notes 24870 and accompanying text.

132. See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §

12 comment c (1982).

133. For a discussion of the general exceptions to preclusion of the issue of
territorial jurisdiction adopted in the Second Restatement of Judgments, see supra
notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
134. For a discussion of the procedural requirements necessary to provide
an opportunity to litigate issues of territorial jurisdiction, see supra notes 93-94
and accompanying text.
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of subject matter jurisdiction,1 3 5 the Court has reemphasized the
need for a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue. 136 In one
37
instance subject matter jurisdiction had in fact been contested,
while in the other this was not the case.' 38 What was important
was that an adequate opportunity to litigate was made available in
the first forum, irrespective of whether the interested party took
t 39
advantage of that opportunity.
B.

The Opportunity to be Heard and the Doctrines of Merger and Bar

1. The Effects on Parties
Since the direct effect on the defendant of the successful
135. See Underwriters Nat'l Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Life & Accident & Health Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 455 U.S. 691 (1982) (North Carolina court's
refusal to treat as res judicata Indiana rehabilitation court's adjudication of
rights to insurance company's deposit in North Carolina held to be violative of
full faith and credit clause); Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963) (full faith and
credit required for state judgment quieting title to land where there was dispute
over the land's location as between two states). For an assertion that Durfee v.
Duke was incorrectly viewed as involving subject matter jurisdiction, see supra
note 118.
136. Underwriters Nat'l Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Life & Accident &
Health Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 455 U.S. 691, 706-07 (1982); Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S.
106, 111-14 (1963). In Underwriters, the Court stated the general rule that "a
judgment is entitled to full faith and credit-even as to questions of jurisdiction-when the second court's inquiry discloses that those questions have been
fully and fairly litigated and finally decided in the court which rendered the original judgment." 455 U.S. at 706 (citing Durfee, 375 U.S. at 111 (footnote
omitted)).
137. See Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 107-09 (1963). The respondent in
Durfee made an appearance in the Nebraska court, contested the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter, and fully litigated the issue. Id. at 108.
138. Underwriters Nat'l Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Life & Accident &
Health Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 455 U.S. 691, 707 (1982). When approving the Rehabilitative Plan in 1976 the rehabilitative court in Underwriters clearly stated that it
was asserting subject matter jurisdiction over all pre-rehabilitation claims
against Underwriters, including those of the North Carolina Association. Id.
The North Carolina Association intervened and was therefore obliged to advance its argument to the rehabilitative court concerning lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Id. at 709-10. The Association, however, failed to advance any such
argument. Id.
139. Id. at 710. The law of the rendering state might require more than
due process. For a discussion of such requirements concerning territorial jurisdiction, see supra notes 91 & 96 and accompanying text. Failure to observe
those more rigorous procedures could under state law render the judgment subject to collateral attack both within and without the state.
Moreover, where a federal statute imposes limitations on state subject matter jurisdiction, federal law, statutory or common, could require more than due
process or purely state law as a condition of preclusion. Compare infra notes 30847 and accompanying text (discussing federal nonconstitutional limits on state
preclusion law) with supra note 124 and accompanying text (there should be no
federal constitutional limits on state's ability to preclude collateral attack of default judgment on basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
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prosecution of a lawsuit may be the taking of his possessions or
the ordering of his activities in a particular way, it is not difficult
to see why the due process clause applies 40 and mandates an opportunity to be heard in the initial action. 14 1 However, there are
other consequences of litigation, including the effects of the preclusion doctrines.
The general rule of merger is that where a valid and final
judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff, he or she cannot
thereafter maintain an action on the original claim or any part
thereof.14 2 The defendant is precluded from reliance, in any subsequent action on the judgment, upon defenses which he or she
might have interposed or did interpose in the first action.' 43 The
general rule of bar is that a valid and final personal judgment in
favor of the defendant bars another action by the plaintiff on the
same claim. 14 4 Because of the broad definition of "claim" employed by many courts today, the effects of merger and bar may
14 5
be even more extensive than was traditionally the case.
140. For a discussion of guidelines concerning the application of the due
process clause, see supra notes 47-50 & 54 and accompanying text.
141. For a discussion of the ramifications of the due process clause's mandate of an opportunity to be heard in the initial action, see supra notes 39-40 &
54-55 and accompanying text.
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 18(1) (1982).
143. Id. § 18(2).
144. Id. § 19. For a general discussion of the rules of "merger" and "bar,"
see Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng'g & Mach., Inc., 575 F.2d 530 (5th Cir.

1978); F.

JAMES

& G.

HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE

532-33 (2d ed. 1977); C.

680 (4th ed. 1983).
145. In the nineteenth century, a fairly narrow definition of "claim" or
"cause of action" was used, reflecting the policy then extant of limitingjoinder
of causes of action. F.JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 144, at 541. For example,
a definition of claim for purposes of preclusion involved whether the party to an
action was pleading the same "substantive right." Id. at 541-42. Thus, in a car
accident there would be individual substantive rights to recovery for physical
injury, pain and suffering, and property damage. Id.
The modem definition of "claim" is much broader. The new Restatement
provides the following definition of "claim" for purposes of merger or bar:
(1) When a valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes the plaintiffs claim pursuant to the rules of merger or bar
(§§ 18, 19), the claim extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to
remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the
transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action
arose.
(2) What factual grouping constitutes a "transaction," and what
groupings constitute a "series" are to be determined pragmatically,
giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related in
time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial
unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business understanding or usage.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982). Given the breadth of this
WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
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First in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 14 6 and
again recently in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 14 7 the Supreme
Court confirmed that a state-created cause of action or part
thereof is property within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause.' 48 Accordingly, if state law, statutory
or common, purports to extinguish all or part of a claim, there is a
deprivation of property that must comport with due process of
law. 14 9 Thus, in order for the doctrines of merger and bar to apply, the party asserting the claim in the later proceeding must
have had a prior adequate opportunity to be heard on the
50
merits.'
In Mullane, where the Court confronted a challenge to a state
law that provided for the settlement of common trust fund accounts, the effect of the proceeding was to terminate "every right
which beneficiaries would otherwise have against the trust company . . . for improper management of the common trust
fund."' 5 1 This allegedly deprived the beneficiaries of property
by, for example, "cut[ting] off their rights to have the trustee aninterpretation of "claim," the plaintiff can be precluded from bringing suit
"even though the plaintiff is prepared in the second action to present evidence
or grounds or theories of the case not presented in the first action, or to seek
remedies or forms of relief not demanded in the first action." C. WRIGHT, supra
note 144, at 681.
146. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). For a discussion of the Court's holding in Mullane, see supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text. For an analysis of the holding, see infra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
147. 455 U.S. 422 (1982). In Logan, an employee was discharged by his
employer allegedly because his short left leg made it impossible for him to properly perform his job as a shipping clerk. Id. at 426. The employee filed a charge
with the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission alleging that his employment had been unlawfully terminated because of his physical handicap. Id.
However, the Commission scheduled a statutorily mandated factfinding conference on a date five days after the expiration of the 120-day statutory period. Id.
The Commission denied the employer's motion to dismiss for failure to hold a
timely conference but the Illinois Supreme Court reversed and granted the motion to dismiss. Id. at 427. The Supreme Court reversed and held that the employee was deprived of his rights under the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 93738.
148. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313; Logan, 455 U.S. at 428-29. The same analysis
would apply under the fifth amendment with regard to federally created causes
of action. See Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958) (dismissal of
complaint because of plaintiffs inability to comply with pretrial production order raises fifth amendment due process question).
149. For a discussion of the parameters of the due process requirement, see
supra notes 39-40 & 50-53 and accompanying text.
150. See Logan, 455 U.S. 422; Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); Best v.
Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334 (1963); Mullane, 339 U.S. 306.
151. 339 U.S. at 311.
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swer for negligent or illegal impairments of their interests."' 152
Thus, the beneficiaries were entitled to the protections of the due
process clause, specifically the opportunity to be heard.' 53 The
efficacy of this opportunity, however, presupposed reasonable notice of the commencement of the proceeding conveyed reasonably to the affected parties. In Mullane, such notice
was not
54
parties.
affected
these
of
certain
to
adequately given
The doctrines of merger and bar preclude litigation not only
of matters previously litigated, but of unlitigated matters as
well.' 55 However, these doctrines can constitutionally apply to
the latter only to the extent that in the initial action there was a
sufficient opportunity to raise and litigate those matters purportedly precluded. 56 In other words, the permissible breadth of
merger and bar is tied directly to the parameters of the procedural framework applicable to the original proceeding. 57 If, for
example, the applicable procedural scheme did not authorize the
plaintiff in the first action to plead and prove a particular theory
of the case or to ask for a particular remedy, then the doctrine of
merger could not constitutionally operate to preclude the plaintiff
in a subsequent action-where the same procedural constraints
did not apply-from relying on that theory or seeking to obtain
that remedy. This, of course, assumes that applicable state substantive law recognizes the existence of the theory as a valid basis
152. Id. at 313. Many beneficiaries in Mullane were also deprived of their
property rights in another sense when the New York court appointed a special
guardian and attorney for all beneficiaries who did not appear at the settlement
of accounts. Id. at 310. The interests of the beneficiaries were "presumably subject to diminution in the proceeding by allowance of fees and expenses to one
who, in their names but without their knowledge, may conduct a fruitless or
uncompensatory contest." Id. at 313.
153. Id. at 313.
154. Id. at 314-20.
155. A defendant, for example, cannot assert defenses in a subsequent proceeding that he or she could have raised in the initial action. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 18(2) (1982). The plaintiff cannot "split" his claims
so that one right is asserted in the initial action, and a second right arising from
the same "transaction" or "series" is asserted in a subsequent action. See id.
§ 24. The Restatement also provides:
The rule of § 24 applies to extinguish a claim by the plaintiff against the
defendant even though the plaintiff is prepared in the second action
(1) To present evidence or grounds or theories of the case not
presented in the first action, or
(2) To seek remedies or forms of relief not demanded in the first
action.
Id. § 25.
156. Cf., e.g., Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313-14.
157. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 comment a at 198
(1982); id. § 26 comment c at 236.
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for relief or affords the type of remedy sought.' 5 8
While not expressly relying on a constitutional rationale, the
Second Restatement of Judgments acknowledges this limitation in its
exceptions to the general rule of bar 59 and to the rule against
splitting a cause of action, 60 noting that it is "unfair to preclude
[plaintiff] from a second action in which he can present those
phases of the claim which he was disabled from presenting in the
first."16'
158. For a discussion of the relationship between substantive law and procedure in this context, see supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
159. Section 20 of the Restatement provides in relevant part:
(a) A personal judgment for the defendant, although valid and final,
does not bar another action by the plaintiff on the same claim:
(a) When the judgment is one of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for nonjoinder or misjoinder of
parties ....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 20 (1982). See Hughes v. United States,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 232 (1866) (decree dismissing suit on any ground which did
not go to merits is no bar to subsequent suit); American Nat'l Bank v. Federal
Deposit Ins. Corp., 710 F.2d 1528 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (dismissal of damages action
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction does not constitute final judgment on merits and therefore res judicata does not apply to bar claims that were or should
have been raised in initial action); Schiff v. Kennedy, 691 F.2d 196 (4th Cir.
1982) (state court action brought for violation of state wiretap statute was not
resjudicata on merits of subsequent claim brought under federal wiretap statute
since state action was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction); Lindy v. United States,
546 F.2d 371 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (order dismissing plaintiffis claim not on merits, but
rather without prejudice to renew in proper forum, has no res judicata effect).
160. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26 (1982). Section 26
provides in relevant part:
(1) When any of the following circumstances exists, the general rule
of § 24 does not apply to extinguish the claim, and part or all of the
claim subsists as a possible basis for a second action by the plaintiff
against the defendant:
(c) The plaintiff was unable to rely on a certain theory of the case or
to seek a certain remedy or form of relief in the first action because of
the limitations on the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts or restrictions on their authority to entertain multiple theories or demands
for multiple remedies or forms of relief in a single action, and the plaintiff desires in the second action to rely on that theory or to seek that
remedy or form of relief ....
See Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 575 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1978) (since claims were
split in Indian land dispute due to statutory restriction on court's jurisdiction in
initial action, res judicata does not apply to foreclose litigation of remaining
claim in subsequent action); United States v. Pan-American Petroleum Co., 55
F.2d 753 (9th Cir.) (rule against splitting causes of action applies only to claims
then capable of resolution in initial action), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 612 (1932);
Lower Sioux Indian Community v. United States, 626 F.2d 828 (Ct. Cl. 1980)
(res judicata does not bar subsequent action for accounting of claims due to
Indian tribe which could not have been raised in previous action because of jurisdictional restrictions in force at time).
161. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 26 comment c at 236 (1982).
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These observations should be qualified in one particular,
however. If the procedural limitations applicable to the first action could have been avoided by the plaintiff by suing in another
tribunal in the same jurisdiction where all aspects of the claim
could have been adequately pursued, then of course preclusion of
further suits would be permissible.' 62 Constitutionally, the plaintiff then does have a full opportunity in some forum to litigate all
1 63
his contentions and this is what counts.
Whether the purported effect of the merger and bar doctrines in a particular instance is to prevent contest of previously
litigated matters or rather to foreclose unlitigated matters, the focus of the constitutional due process inquiry is the same: What, if
any, barriers existed in the original proceeding to the effective
presentation of whatever was put forth in the initial action or now
is sought to be raised for the first time? In this sense a restriction
on the type of evidence that can be introduced or on the manner
of its presentation is analogous, for example, to statutory limitations on the subject matter jurisdiction of a particular local tribunal. There would seem to be, however, a difference in the type of
due process analysis that would be employed to determine if
there has been a sufficiently adequate opportunity for a hearing in
these instances. As to certain limitations or barriers the courts
can easily employ the tri-factor balancing analysis previously discussed.' 6 4 This would be the case, for example, if no cross-examination were permitted in the original action. If, on the other
hand, the specific barrier in the initial action was a statutory limit
on the subject matter jurisdiction, or a restriction on the type of
remedies the original court could award, it seems unlikely that a
court would engage in this type of analysis. Rather, it would note
the existence of the restriction and find that since the plaintiff did
not have an opportunity to request all the relief to which he was
entitled under the applicable substantive law in one tribunal, he is
162. Id. at § 24 comment g. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 144, at
556; Bestal, ResJudicata/Claim Preclusion: Judgmentfor the Claimant, 62 Nw. U.L.
REV.

357, 374-86 (1967).

163. The same general approach applies where there are both federal and
state grounds for relief. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 25
comment e (concurrent jurisdiction) with id. § 26(c)(1) comment c(l) and id.
§ 86(1) comment f (exclusive federal jurisdiction). For a discussion of the application of federal exceptions to intersystem preclusion, see infra text accompanying notes 508-39, infra note 537, and infra text accompanying notes 540-71.
164. For a discussion of the tri-factor balancing analysis used to decide
challenges to the adequacy of the opportunity to be heard, see supra notes 47-53
and accompanying text.
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entitled to seek any available additional relief in a court of competent jurisdiction of the state, assuming of course that there was no
16 5
one court where all the relief was available at the outset.
In short, as to matters that have been previously litigated, the
court would apply the functional due process analysis to determine the adequacy of the opportunity to be heard in the initial
action and thus the constitutionality of the application of merger
and bar principles. Such an approach would appear to be less
than satisfactory where matters were not previously litigated because they could not have been given certain procedural
restrictions.
2.

The Effects on Non-Parties

Generally speaking, state law doctrines of merger and bar
can have no legal effect within the rendering state on non-parties
to the original litigation. 166 Neither does the full faith and credit
clause 16 7 command enforcement of these doctrines in other states
against non-parties. 168 Since the non-party has never had an opportunity to be heard, it would be violative of due process to hold
69
the non-party bound by a judgment in the original litigation.'
Where, however, the non-party is adequately represented by a
party to the litigation, the preclusion doctrines may be applied
because the person is vicariously afforded the opportunity to be
heard. 170 Hansberry v. Lee 17 1 recognized this proposition. 17 2 Fed165. For a discussion of the problem arising where the plaintiff brings separate actions based on the same "claim" in separate courts, see supra notes 15563 and accompanying text. Compare id. with infra notes 508-39 and accompanying text (discussing the application of federal exceptions to intersystem
preclusion).
166. See, e.g., Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Gaudit, 414 U.S. 573, reh'g denied, 415
U.S. 986 (1974) (wife's wrongful death action not barred by decedent's recovery
for personal injury damages during his lifetime); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969) (defendant not bound by judgment in
personam resulting from litigation in which he was not designated as party);
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940) (defendant not bound by judgment in
personam in litigation to which he is not party). For a discussion of Hansberny,
see infra notes 172-77 and accompanying text. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS § 34(3) (1982).
167. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
168. See, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940). Cf. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 94 comments a-g (1971) (discussing, inter alia,
binding effect of valid judgment upon non-parties to the suit).
169. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); BlonderTongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971); Hansberry
v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
170. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 41 comment a (1982);
FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 25, §§ 4408-4409.
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i11

eral constitutional standards determine the adequacy of the representation l7 3 as well as the adequacy of the procedural
opportunities afforded the representative party to present its
case. 174 Failure to meet either standard prevents the application
of the merger and bar doctrines both within and without the state
75
of rendition.'
171. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
172. Id. at 41-43. Hansberry involved a suit brought to enjoin the breach of
a restrictive covenant against selling land to black persons. Id. at 37-38. The
covenant by its terms was not effective unless it had been signed by 95% of the
owners of the land to which the covenant would apply. Id. at 38. The defense to
the suit to enjoin the breach was that the required 95% had not signed. Id. The
plaintiffs argued res judicata based on an earlier suit against four lot owners in
which an Illinois state court had held that the covenant was enforceable. Id.
The defendants, who had purchased the land from an owner who had signed the
agreement, were not parties to the earlier suit. Id. However, in the later action
to enjoin the breach, the Supreme Court of Illinois held that the earlier suit was
a "class" or "representative" suit and that all members of the class were bound
by the decree. Id. at 39-40. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed,
holding that under the facts of the case there was no "class" since all persons
concerned did not have the same interest. Id. at 44. However, the Court recognized that "there is scope within the framework of the Constitution for holding
in appropriate cases that a judgment rendered in a class suit is resjudicata as to
members of the class who are not formal parties to the suit." Id. at 42.
In a recent Supreme Court case, the question was left open as to whether
due process demands both notice to class members and adequate representation
in order for binding effect to attach to a class judgment. See Eisen v. Carlisle
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176-77 (1974). During the 1984-1985 Term the Court
handed down an opinion that could be interpreted to suggest that due process
requires both notice and adequate representation in class actions. See Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 105 S. Ct. 2965 (1985). Shutts, however, was a multistate plaintiff class action, and the focus of the Court was on the question of
territorial jurisdiction. See id. The right to "opt out" of the action was relied
upon, in part, to sustain the assertion of jurisdiction there. See id. at 2975-77.
The Court presumably considered notice to class members as crucial to their
ability to exercise this option. Id.
For a discussion asserting that notice to a party represented is unnecessary,
see Note, CollateralAttack on the Binding Effect of Class Action Judgments, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 589, 605 (1974). But see Comment, Can Due Process Be Satisfied by Discretionary
Notice in Federal Class Actions?, 4 CREIGHTON L. REV. 268 (1971) (notice is
necessary).

173. See, e.g., Hansberry, 311 U.S. 32. State law may be more demanding and
thus may condition the effect of the judgment both within and without the state
of rendition. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws ch. 3 introductory note, § 25 comment c, § 94 (1971).
174. For a discussion of the analysis used to decide the adequacy of the
procedural opportunities afforded a party to the original litigation, see supra
notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
State law may be more demanding in this regard and thus may impact upon
the effect of the judgment both within and without the state of rendition. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws ch. 3 introductory note at 101,

§ 25 comment c, § 105 comment b (1971).
175. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT

OF LAWS §§ 25, 94, 95, 104
(1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 42 reporter's note (1982). Cf
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In Hansberry, a conflict of interest between the class representative and members of the class prevented state law from ascribing a binding effect to the original judgment. 7 6 The conflict
made the representation inadequate and therefore deprived the
non-parties of a constitutionally sufficient opportunity to be
heard.' 77 In other cases the representative's failure to prosecute
or defend the action with due diligence may result in a finding of
inadequate representation and therefore a conclusion that the op178
portunity to be heard did not satisfy constitutional standards.
On the one hand, it is easy enough to see why the conflicting
loyalties of the representative or its failure to fully utilize all available procedures might be conceptualized as resulting in the lack
of a sufficient opportunity to be heard. At the same time, outside
the context of expressly representative litigation, it would seem
unlikely that any conflict of interest of the party's representative
(his attorney), with respect to the matter at issue, would be seen
as a constitutional ground for refusing to ascribe binding effect to
any resulting judgment. Similarly, the attorney's failure to utilize
all available procedural opportunities in support of the claim or
defense of the client would not be seen as raising any barrier to
the binding effect of the judgment. 179 The client's recourse,
Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 42, 43 (suggesting that inadequate representation of nonparty class members' interests or adoption of procedures which do not fairly
insure protection of their interests will prevent judgment against party class
members from being res judicata as to such non-party class members). But see
infra note 185 (once constitutional right to be heard regarding adequacy of representations is exercised, that issue may not be open to further litigation).
176. 311 U.S. at 44-45. For a discussion of the facts of Hansberry, see supra
note 172.
177. 311 U.S. at 44-45. In addressing the conflict between owners of lots
who wanted to enforce the agreement and owners who did not, the Court stated
that "[t]hose who sought to secure its benefits by enforcing it could not be said
to be in the same class with or represent those whose interest was in resisting
performance." Id. at 44. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 42(d)

(1982).
178. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973) (although
representative's actions at trial were adequate up to time of final order, his failure to prosecute appeal on behalf of class rendered his representation inadequate). Compare id. with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 42(e) &
comment f (1972) (suggesting that adversary of class action must have been on
notice of such inadequacy).
179. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 71(2)(c) & comment g (1972) (conditioning relief in such a way as to suggest that this section is
not based on constitutional consideration). Compare id. with notes 75, 95 & 139
and accompanying text (failure of parties to take advantage of available procedures may result in waiver). See generally Note, supra note 172, at 594 n.37 (party
to non-class action suit is bound by any gross error).
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other than possible post-judgment motions for relief, would be
confined to a suit for malpractice against the attorney.
This apparent distinction between the treatment of expressly
representative suits and other actions might be explained by the
fact that the party consents to the attorney's representation and
has some control, theoretical though it may be, over the attorney's activities. With regard to some representative actions there
may be de facto consent to the representation,18 0 though effective
control is probably absent. 8 1 Alternatively, the availability of a
tort claim against the attorney, which affords the client an opportunity to remedy the damages caused by the judgment of the first
adjudication, insures that no property is irrevocably taken without
some opportunity for hearing. 8 2 The Supreme Court has held in
various contexts that the requisite opportunity to be heard can be
postponed and due process requirements satisfied by a later tort
action that can substantially undo the effects of the action with
18 3
respect to which an adequate hearing was not initially given.
180. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(A) (opting out permitted in certain
class actions after notice is given).
181. Cf. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982) (dismissal of
action overturned). In Logan the agency responsible for the failure to comply
with the statutory time limitations was not under the control of the complainant
whose claim was extinguished. For a discussion of the facts in Logan, see supra
note 147.
Scrutiny of the activities of his attorney by a party in nonrepresentative litigation may be more likely than in, for example, class actions. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 71(1) (1982) (conditioning relief from
judgment on party's having exercised due diligence during action to discover
insufficient representation).
182. But see Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972) ("no later hearing
and no damage award can undo the fact that the arbitrary taking that was subject
to the right of procedural due process has already occurred").
183. See Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S.Ct. 3194 (1984) (intentional destruction
of prisoner's property by prison guard is not violative of due process because of
availability of post-deprivation action in tort); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527
(1981) (negligent loss of prisoner's property does not violate due process because of availability of tort claim); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (corporal punishment inflicted on students by school officials is not violative of due
process in light of post-deprivation ability to recover damages).
Recently the Court overruled Parratt to the extent that the case found a
mere negligent act of an official causing loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property constituted a "deprivation" within the meaning of the due process clause.
See Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 106 S.Ct.
668 (1986).
Since entry of the judgment against the party represented by an attorney is
intentional, though perhaps traceable to the negligence of the attorney, there
would apparently be a "deprivation" within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Daniels, 106 S.Ct. at 666. But see Logan, 455 U.S. at 435-36
(suggesting that post-deprivation remedies do not satisfy due process where
deprivation of property is caused by negligent conduct implicating "established
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When it comes to representative litigation, however, the alternative of a subsequent tort action generally may not be seen as sufficient.' 8 4 For example, any remedy against the representative may
be purely illusory or otherwise substantially inadequate to undo
the damage caused by the first judgment. The constitutional
mandate of an opportunity to be heard requires, therefore, disregard of the preclusive effect of the judgment. 8 5
It is clear, however, after Nevada v. United States,' 86 that an
apparent conflict of interest may not be sufficient to foreclose application of the merger and bar effects of a judgment in a representative action. A suit was brought by the United States in
federal court in 1913 to adjudicate water rights to the Truckee
River in Nevada for the benefit of the Pyramid Lake Indian Reser87
vation and the then-planned Newlands Reclamation Project.
In 1944 the district court finally entered its decree, pursuant to a
settlement agreement, regarding various water rights of the Reservation and the Project.' 8 8 Thirty years later, the United States
filed another action in the same district court on behalf of the
Reservation seeking additional rights to the Truckee River. The
Pyramid Lake Tribe was permitted to intervene in support of the
plaintiff.' 89 The defendants relied on the doctrine of merger. 190
state procedures"). However, in Nevada v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2906, 2925
n.16 (1983) the Court explained Logan as based on the lack of a remedy. See
infra note 202.
184. For a discussion of recognized constitutional protections available to
the non-party subject to potential claim preclusion, see supra notes 173-75 and

accompanying text. But see

FEDERAL PRACTICE,

supra note 25, § 4454, at 470

n.34; infra note 202 and accompanying text (suggesting that subsequent tort
remedies against representative may ensure that non-party class has sufficient
recourse; preclusive effect of prior judgment should therefore attach).
185. There is a constitutional right to be heard regarding the adequacy of
the representation, but once it is exercised, that issue, like others, may not be
open to further litigation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 42 comment b (1982). Where a later tort action is seen as sufficient to warrant preservation of the preclusive effect of a judgment in a representative action, that
judgment would be valid within and without the state of rendition.
186. 463 U.S. 110 (1983).
187. Id. at 113-15.
188. Id.
189. Id. The issue was whether res judicata prevented the Tribe from litigating their claim, given the 1944 decree. Id.
190. Id. at 114-21. The district court on the basis of the doctrine of merger
held that all parties to the present action were parties or in privity with parties to
the original action in 1913. Id. The Ninth Circuit concluded, however, that even
though the causes of action were the same and the United States and the original
defendants could not relitigate this cause of action, the original decree did not
conclude any dispute between the Tribe and owners of the Newlands Project
land. Id.
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The Supreme Court in Nevada held that the Tribe, whose interest
was allegedly represented in the first litigation by the Government, was bound by the merger effects of the earlier decree. 19 1
The Tribe attempted to rely on Hansberry to avoid this result, arguing that the Government's primary interest in the earlier litigation was to obtain water rights for the Newlands Reclamation
Project and that by definition any water rights given the Tribe
would conflict with the interest. 192 The Court rejected that contention, reasoning, in part at least, that "the Government stands
in a different position than a private fiduciary where Congress has
decreed that the Government must represent more than one interest."' 9 3 The Court added that "[w]hen the Government performs such duties it does not by that reason alone compromise its
obligation to any of the interests involved." 1 9 4 In short, the mere
fact that the interests might, in some circumstances, conflict in
practice was not sufficient to justify an exception to the ordinary
merger rules, at least here where the Court was reluctant to impose limitations on Congress' allocation of decision-making
authority. 195
In this case the Secretary of the Interior, who had been
vested with potentially conflicting duties, 19 6 had been repre9 7
sented in the original litigation by the Department of Justice.1
In looking closely at the actual representation of the Tribe's interest, the Court seemed to find that in fact the Indians had received
representation through the Bureau of Indian Affairs and that the
Bureau's decisions in connection with the litigation were not influenced by other conflicting interests.1 9 8 Moreover, to the extent the ultimate settlement in the first case represented a
191. Id. at 125, 145.
192. Id. at 135 n.15. For a discussion of Hansbery, see supra notes 171-72
and accompanying text.

193. 463 U.S. at 136 n.15.
194. Id. Accord Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 627-28 (1983) (United
States has full authority to bring water rights claim for Indians and bind them to

results of litigation despite Government interest in reserving water rights for
other federal property); Colorado River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 424
U.S. 800, 805-06 (1976) (United States pursued adjudication of United States
and non-Indian water rights concurrently with its assertion of rights on behalf of
certain Indian tribes).
195. See 463 U.S. at 127-29, 135 n.15, 139-43.
196. Id. at 127-29. The potential conflict of interest involved the Secretary
of the Interior being "responsible for the supervision of the Indian tribes and
the commencement of reclaimative projects in areas adjacent to reservation
lands." Id. at 128.
197. Id. at 136-37 n.15.
198. Id. at 137-38 n.15. Accord Arizona v. California, 460 U.S, 605, 628
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compromise within the executive branch of the various conflicting
interests, the resulting agreement was perhaps nothing more than
the type of policy decision which Congress routinely delegates
(and in this case de facto delegated) to administrative agencies.
Representation in the initial action was, therefore, acceptable in
the limited context of governmental litigation. 199 If the fifth
amendment due process clause 20 0 was not violated in the circumstances presented in Nevada, presumably the fourteenth amendment 20 1 would not be violated if litigation involving the state
20 2
courts presented analogous alleged conflicts of interest.
(1983) (Secretary of Interior retained broad power to represent rights of Indian
tribe in water dispute).
199. 463 U.S. at 136-38 n.15. It is this type of analysis concerning governmental representation that the Court relied on to distinguish Nevada from Hansberry. For a discussion of the Court's treatment of the applicability of Hansberry
in the instant case, see supra notes 192-96 and accompanying text.
200. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment applied in Nevada because only the federal courts were involved.
201. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
202. There is an interesting sidelight to the decision in Nevada. After the
conclusion of the first suit and long before the institution of the second, the
Pyramid Lake Tribe sued the United States before the Indian Claims Commission for damages, basing its claim of liability on the Tribe's receipt of less water
than it was entitled to. 463 U.S. at 135 n.14. In the course of its opinion in
Nevada, the Supreme Court indicated that the Tribe was bound by the merger
effects of the prior decree because in the original litigation it had been given,
vicariously by reason of the Government's representation, adequate notice and a
full and fair opportunity to be heard. Id. at 144 n.16. The Court indicated,
however, that "[i]f, in carrying out their role as representative, the Government
violated its obligations to the Tribe, then the Tribe's remedy is against the Government, not against third parties." Id. See also Arizona v. California, 460 U.S.
605, 627-28 nn.20-21 (1983) (Court was unwilling to express any view as to
whether Government's representation should be subject to attack in Court of
Claims and indicated that in Nevada the Government did not breach any alleged
duty to Tribe).
In the course of its discussion, the Nevada Court distinguished two cases
refusing to permit preclusion where "the complaining party would be left without recourse." 463 U.S. at 144 n.16 (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,
455 U.S. 422 (1982)); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306 (1950). For a discussion of Logan, see supra notes 147-48 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of Mullane, see supra note 146 and accompanying text.
Justice Brennan concurred in the result in Nevada on the basis that while the
mere existence of a formal conflict of interest did not deprive the United States
of authority to represent the Indians in litigation and bind them, if the Government breached its trust obligations, the Indians should have a remedy against it.
463 U.S. at 145-46 (Brennan, J., concurring).
All this can be taken to indicate that at least in some cases as long as there is
a subsequent adequate tort remedy against the representative for failure to vigorously prosecute the case, there is no constitutional basis for refusing to apply
merger principles on the basis of the lack of an adequate opportunity to be
heard.
For a discussion of the merits of the proposition that availability of a tort
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While some non-parties receive their opportunity to be heard
through the medium of a representative and are thus subject to
the effects of the preclusion doctrines, in other instances a nonparty may itself "control" the actual litigation and in this way receive the opportunity to be heard. 20 3 Due process concerns may
thus be satisfied and the controlling person or persons may be
20 4
legally bound.
What constitutes sufficient control is not an easy issue to resolve. In Montana v. United States20 5 the Government's participation in the first lawsuit (in state court) included: requiring the
filing of the lawsuit; reviewing and approving the complaint; paying the attorneys' fees and costs; directing the appeal to the state
supreme court; appearing and submitting a brief as amicus in that
court; directing the filing of a notice of appeal to the Supreme
Court; and effecting the abandonment of that appeal. 20 6 The
Supreme Court concluded that the United States, though not a
remedy justifies imposing preclusion on the non-party to a representative action,
see supra notes 179-85 and accompanying text.
It should be noted that the Nevada Court's retention of the preclusive effect
of a judgment where representation in the initial action may have been inadequate is a departure, though perhaps of limited applicability, from the general
treatment of judgments where there was no constitutionally adequate opportunity to be heard in the original action. See, e.g., supra note 175 and accompanying
text.
203. See Drummond v. United States, 324 U.S. 316, 318 (1945) (non-party
may be bound by prior judgment if it has "laboring oar" in controversy); American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 736 F.2d 317 (6th Cir.
1984) (where non-parties' involvement in previous action is at least as great as
expected from co-party, res judicata will apply); Inland Seas Boat Co. v. Buckeye
Union Ins., 534 F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1976) (insurer's substantial participation in
prior suit by insured could result in application of res judicata in subsequent
suit); Kreager v. General Elec. Co., 497 F.2d 468 (2d Cir.) (president and sole
stockholder who exercised control over suit by corporation was bound by judgment against corporation), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 861 (1974). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 39 comment a (1982). Compare id. with supra
notes 95, 139 & 179 and accompanying text (as long as interested person is
afforded opportunity to be heard, it is irrelevant whether he actually took full
advantage of it if he does appear to contest the issue).

204.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS

§ 39 (1982). The Restatement

provides: "A person who is not a party to an action but who controls or substantially participates in the control of the presentation on behalf of a party is bound
by the determination of issues decided as though he were a party." Id.
205. 440 U.S. 147 (1979).
206. Id. at 155. In Montana, a state tax imposed on public contractors
caused a Montana contractor to file suit in state court claiming tax discrimination against the United States in violation of the supremacy clause. Id. at 15051. While this state case was being litigated and directed by the United States,
the United States initiated the present action in federal court. Id. at 151. After
the state court upheld the tax law, the district court in the second suit found that
the Government was not bound by the state court decision and struck down the
tax as a violation of the supremacy clause. Id. at 151-52. The Supreme Court
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formal party, had a sufficient "laboring oar" in the conduct of the
first litigation to justify application of estoppel principles. 20 7 In
doing so the Court did not indicate which, if any, of these various
acts it deemed particularly crucial.
In its attempt to clarify what is required to constitute "control," the Second Restatement ofJudgments notes:
To have control of litigation requires that a person have
effective choice as to the legal theories and proofs to be
advanced in behalf of the party to the action. He must
also have control over the opportunity to obtain review
....
Whether his involvement in the action is extensive
enough to consider control is a question of fact, to be
resolved with reference to these criteria ....
It is not
sufficient, however, that the person merely contributed
funds or advice in support of the party, supplied counsel
20 8
to that party, or appeared as amicus curiae.
In addition, while the Court in Montana may be taken as suggesting that the allegedly controlling person must have a "direct
financial or proprietary interest" in the dispute,2 0 9 the Restatement
rejects this notion. 210 It finds that the existence of such an interest may be a factor evidencing whether control has been assumed,
but it is not dispositive. 2 1' In short, under both the Restatement
and federal case law, the totality of circumstances must be consid21 2
ered; no single fact is necessarily determinative.
Since it is through the "control" of the litigation that the
non-party is deemed to have received its opportunity to be
heard,2 1 3 federal constitutional law must limit the ability of state
law to define control for purposes of its preclusion doctrine.
reversed and held the Government bound by the results in the original suit. Id.
at 152-53.
207. Id. at 155.
208. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 39 comment c. For the text
of § 39, see supra note 204.
209. 440 U.S. at 154.
210. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 39 comment c (1982),
211. Id. For example, the person assuming control may be motivated by
the fact that he or someone he wished to protect is in a situation similar to the
party actually litigating an issue. Id. Thus, he assumes control to make a test
case out of that litigation. Id.
212. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 39 reporter's note to comment c. See also Del Mar Avionics v. Quinton Instruments Co., 645 F.2d 832 (9th
Cir. 1981) (whether non-party controlled earlier litigation is question of fact for
trial court and depends on variety of factors).

213. See supra notes 203-04 and accompanying text.
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However, neither Montana nor the cases it cites 2 14 purport to give
a clear indication of the scope of any such limits.
Moreover, neither the Supreme Court in Montana21 5 nor the
Restatement 2 16 purport to apply the doctrines of merger and bar to
the controlling person; only issue preclusion and its exceptions
are applicable.2 1 7 Allegedly this is "because the person controlling the litigation, as a non-party, is by definition asserting or de2 18
fending a claim other than one he himself may have."
Analytically this may be true. However, constitutionally, as long
as the controlling non-party could have asserted his own claims in
the proceeding along with the others, he had the opportunity to
2 19
be heard and can be precluded.
C. Issue Preclusion and Its Effects on Parties to the Initial Litigation
Section 27 of the Second Restatement ofJudgments states the general rule with respect to collateral estoppel, or what is now called
issue preclusion:
When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determi214. See 440 U.S. at 154-55 (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969); Schnell v. Peter Eckrich & Sons, Inc., 365 U.S.
260 (1961); Drummond v. United States, 324 U.S. 316 (1945); G. & C. Merriam
Co. v. Saalfield, 241 U.S. 22 (1916); Souffrant v. Compagnie des Sucreries, 217
U.S. 475 (1910); Watts v. Swiss Bank Corp., 27 N.Y.2d 270, 265 N.E.2d 739, 317
N.Y.S.2d 315 (1970)).
To the extent that the Supreme Court in Montana never refers to the Montana state law of preclusion, it disregards the command of 28 U.S.C. § 1738
(1982). For a discussion of the application of this statute, see infra notes 339-45
and accompanying text. However, the Court seemed independently, as a matter
of federal law, to determine if there was preclusion in a case where the substantive issue allegedly precluded was federal. For a discussion of federal nonconstitutional limitations on state preclusion law, which the approach in Montana may
to some extent support, see infra notes 308-37 and accompanying text. See also
Brown v. Felson, 442 U.S. 127 (1979) (when debtor asserts new defense of bankruptcy, res judicata will not bar creditor from offering evidence of fraud, even
though this issue was raised in earlier state court allocation suit).
215. See 440 U.S. at 154.
216. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 39 comment b (1982).
217. See Montana, 440 U.S. at 155, 158-64; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 39 comment b (1982) (referring specifically to lack of adequate opportunity to litigate). For a discussion of issue preclusion and its effect on parties to
the initial litigation, see infra notes 220-70 and accompanying text.
218. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 39 comment b (1982). See
Montana, 440 U.S. at 154-55.
219. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 39 reporter's note to comment b (1982). Compare id. with supra notes 155-58 & 164-65 and accompanying
text (when procedural format of first action meets due process requirements,
doctrines of merger and bar preclude litigation of matters not litigated).
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nation is essential to the judgment, the determination is
conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties
220
whether on the same or a different claim.
Section 28 of the Restatement lists various exceptions which
purport to authorize relitigation of an issue disposed of by a valid
and final judgment, including the following:
(1)

The party against whom preclusion is sought could
not, as a matter of law, have obtained review of the
judgment in the initial action;

(3)

A new determination of the issue is warranted by
differences in the quality or extensiveness of the
procedures followed in the two courts or by factors
relating to the allocation of jurisdiction between
them ....

(5)

There is a clear and convincing need for a new determination of the issue...
(c) because the party sought to be precluded, as a
result of the conduct of his adversary or other special circumstances, did not have an adequate opportunity or incentive to obtain a full and fair
221
adjudication in the initial action.

On their face, these exceptions, particularly (5), arguably reflect federal constitutional concerns having roots in the due process opportunity to be heard. On the other hand, they may be
intended to represent only what the drafters of the Restatement believed to be good policy. If the federal Constitution imposes no
restrictions on the doctrine of issue preclusion as it applies in the
intrastate context, it is likely that the latter is the case. These mat2 22
ters, therefore, require some examination at the outset.
Generally the legal effects of issue preclusion are more lim220.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OFJUDGMENTS

§ 27 (1982). See also Parklane

Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); Sea Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudit,
414 U.S. 573 (1974); Lawlor v. National Screen Serv., 349 U.S. 322 (1955);
Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876).
221. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28 (1982).
222. The discussion that follows applies whether or not the initial litigation
is expressly representative or not. See supra notes 170-75 and accompanying
text.
With respect to preclusion invoked against controlling persons, see supra
notes 203-19 and accompanying text. Note, however, that the fact that the controlling person exercised free choice in being associated with the initial action
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ited than those of merger and bar. Preclusion under this doctrine
applies only to matters that have in fact been litigated 2 23 and then
only to issues that were essential to the first judgment. 22 4 The
second suit in which preclusion is raised generally involves a different cause of action than that involved in the first. 2 25 This sec-

ond proceeding may, for example, result in ajudgment cutting off
the interest of one of the parties in certain property or in the issuance of a writ of execution or injunction. Therefore, the liberty
or property interests of the parties are directly at stake in the sec22 7
ond proceeding, 226 the protections of the due process clauses
may militate against application of the due process analysis set forth infra at
notes 242-51 and accompanying text.
223. See, e.g., Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d 1162 (4th Cir. 1982) (even
though issue was submitted to jury in prior action it was not clear whether it was
litigated and lack of proof by parties asserting issue preclusion resulted in denial
of preclusion); Community Nat'l Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 563 F.2d 1319
(9th Cir. 1977) (no preclusion of issue that was not litigated).
An issue is actually litigated when it is properly raised in pleadings or otherwise, is submitted for determination, and is determined. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27, comment d (1982). An issue may be submitted and
determined on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, for judgment on
the pleadings, for summary judgment, for directed verdict or their equivalents.
Id.
While traditionally preclusion only occurs when the issue "actually" has
been litigated, some authorities have suggested that the issue precluded has only
to relate closely to the original controversy. Under this approach the right of the
litigant is adequately protected while judicial economy is served. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 27 comment c (1982); Currie, ResJudicata: The

Neglected Defense, 45 U. CH. L. REV. 317, 342 (1978).
224. See Insurance Co. of North America v. Norton, 716 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir.
1983) (party will be prevented from relying on argument by collateral estoppel
only where argument was ruled on and was essential to judgment in prior action); NLRB v. W.L. Rives Co., 328 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1964) (statements made
in prior litigation concerning construction of collective bargaining agreement
were not necessary to decision, therefore collateral estoppel did not apply).
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 & comment h (1982) (if

issues are determined but judgment is not dependent upon determinations, relitigation of those issues in subsequent action between the parties is not precluded); id. § 27 comment i (ifjudgment of court of first instance is based upon
determination of two issues, either of which standing independently would be
sufficient to support the result, judgment is not conclusive with respect to either
issue standing alone); id. § 27 commentj (even when determination is necessary
step in formulation of decision and judgment, such determination will not be
conclusive between the parties if it does not relate to "ultimate fact" or issue of
law).
225. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982). But see id. comment b (issue preclusion where second action is brought on same claim as first is
sometimes referred to as direct estoppel as opposed to collateral estoppel).
226. For a discussion of the threshold requirement of a liberty or property
interest in due process analysis, see supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
227. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
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attach to the sUit,228 and there is a requirement for an adequate
opportunity to be heard on all relevant matters. 22 9 Accordingly,
if issue preclusion purports to bar litigation of a relevant issue of
fact or law, there must have been an adequate chance in the prior
litigation to be heard on the issue. If there was, the fact that the
litigation of the issue occurred in a different proceeding is and
230
should be irrelevant from a constitutional point of view.
Although it has not examined the matter exactly in these
terms, the Supreme Court has long taken the position that application of the doctrine of issue preclusion is subject to the requirements of the due process clauses. First in Hansberry v. Lee,2 3 1 and
later in dicta in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation,23 2 the Court indicated that precluding litigation of
an issue in subsequent suits is contingent on the existence of a
prior adequate opportunity to be heard. 23 3 The Hansberry Court
focused on a conflict of interest in the first suit which rendered
inadequate the representation of the interests of the defendants
involved in the second action and deprived them of their constitutionally required opportunity to be heard. 2 34 Hansberry has been
viewed as relevant outside the context of representative litigation
228. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
229. See, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 433-34 (1982).
230. Cf. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 348 (1948) (in collateral attack on
out-of-state divorce decree, Massachusetts was required to give full faith and
credit to prior decree where the husband appeared through counsel in original
proceeding, even though husband presented no evidence in his favor and did
not appeal). For a discussion of Sherrer, see supra notes 78-91 and accompanying
text.
231. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
232. 402 U.S. 313 (1971). See also Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456
U.S. 461 (1982). The Court in Kremer found the due process clause applicable,
even on the assumption that a matter of issue preclusion was presented. Id. at
481-82 n.22.
233. Hansberty, 311 U.S. at 40-41; Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 329. In
Blonder-Tongue, the plaintiff originally brought a patent infringement suit against
the first defendant in an Iowa federal court. 402 U.S. at 314. After losing the
suit on the ground that the patent was invalid, the plaintiff brought another patent infringement suit in an Illinois federal court against Blonder-Tongue Laboratories. Id. at 314-15. The district court in Illinois held that the patent was
valid and made a finding of infringement. Id. at 316. After this decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the United States Supreme Court held that the
plaintiff was estopped from asserting the validity of the patent that had been
declared invalid in the first suit, unless he could demonstrate on remand that he
had not had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the validity of the patent in the
first suit. See id. at 350. For a discussion of the facts of Hansberry, see supra note
172 and accompanying text.
234. For a discussion of the Court's analysis in Hansbery, see supra notes
176-78 and accompanying text.
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and has been applied to instances wherein the lack of the opportunity to be heard arises from defects other than the existence of
a conflict between a non-party and its representative. 23 5 In Hansberry, moreover, the impact of the second proceeding on the protected interests of the persons sought to be bound would have
involved depriving them of the ability to acquire certain property. 23 6 However, the applicability of due process protections

also extends to cases where the effect of the second judgment is
of a different nature, such as imposing personal liability on the
defendant. 23 7 Finally, it should be noted that in Hansberry the parties to the initial proceeding arguably had a constitutionally adequate opportunity to be heard. As to these individuals, therefore,
the original judgment was not invalid on due process grounds.
Unnamed members of the purported plaintiff class, however, who
were actually defendants in the subsequent action, lacked an adequate opportunity to be heard, and were not bound by the prior
judgment. Thus, Hansberry represents an instance wherein the initial opportunity to be heard was constitutionally adequate for
23 8
some purposes and inadequate for others.
Since, as we have seen, the application of issue preclusion is
subject to the constitutional constraints of due process, the Restatement exceptions 23 9 may similarly reflect, at least in part, constitutional concerns, even where the original judgment is valid
and binding for some purposes.2 40 Since the drafters do not ex235. For example, in Blonder-Tongue, questions concerning opportunity to
be heard arose where the plaintiff in a subsequent suit was a party to the first
suit. For a discussion of the facts of Blonder-Tongue, see supra note 233 and accompanying text. The Court in Blonder-Tongue, citing Hansbeny, stated that due
process prevents litigants who have not had a chance to present evidence and
argue their claim from being estopped despite one or more existing adjudications of the identical issue which stand against the litigants' position. 402 U.S. at
329 (citing Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 37-38).
236. 311 U.S. at 37-38.
237. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979)
(subsequent judgment would impose personal liability on defendant for issuing
false and misleading proxy statements).
238. Cf, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 64 comment a (1982)
(describing variety of circumstances in which valid judgment, or issue resolved
in valid judgment, may not have preclusive effect).
239. For a discussion of these Restatement exceptions, see supra note 221 and
accompanying text.
240. For example, § 28 of the Restatement applies even where the original
judgment is valid. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28 (1982).
Where the procedural format of the original action is constitutionally deficient
in view of the claims there presented, the judgment will be considered invalid
and no issue preclusion may attach. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 25 comment b (1971).
If, however, the person against whom preclusion is sought to be used could
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plicitly discuss the extent to which these exceptions are constitutionally mandated, 24 ' the manner in which due process limits the
application of issue preclusion remains to be ascertained. The results of this examination will suggest the extent to which the Restatement exceptions are or should be thought of as based purely
upon policy considerations.
As indicated previously, the courts currently employ a tri-factor analysis, which directs attention to the risk of error along with
the public and private stakes in a proceeding, to determine the
adequacy of judicial and non-judicial procedural formats under
the due process clauses. 2 42 The private stakes involved in actions
affected by issue preclusion may be substantially different (and
greater) than those presented in the first adjudication. To the
extent that the stakes at issue in the second or subsequent proceedings are considered much greater in weight or importance
than those in the first action, this should affect the due process
calculus for determining whether the procedural format applicable to the original action afforded an adequate opportunity to be
heard and therefore a basis on which to preclude further litigation
of the issue. 243 A rather elementary procedural framework such
as exists in some small claims courts might be considered constitutionally adequate to finally dispose of the first claim but inadequate to dispose of the second, weightier claim had it been
24 4
presented in the original proceeding.
However, the viability of this argument may differ depending
upon whether the party against whom preclusion is sought to be
used could reasonably have chosen, prior to the first action, a
court in the forum state with a procedural format constitutionally
adequate to accommodate the larger claim it now presents. If it
easily have chosen a court in the forum state for the litigation of the initial action
which did not suffer from constitutional procedural defects, there is an argument in favor of preclusion of that party. See infra note 245 and accompanying
text.
241. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28 reporter's notes to
comments a, d,j at 284-85, 287-88, 290-91 (1982).
242. For a discussion of the tri-factor analysis used to determine the parameters of the protection of the due process clauses, see supra notes 51-53 and
accompanying text.
243. For a discussion of the concern that the litigant have an opportunity to
be heard where the second suit raises a different cause of action than that involved in the first, see supra notes 225-30 and accompanying text.
244. Of the three constitutionally relevant factors only the private stake is
implicated in the proposed analysis. The same analysis in the text applies where
the stake in the second action is qualitatively more significant than that in the
first.
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could have, the party arguably had an adequate opportunity to
litigate the issue and due process should not prevent the application of issue preclusion. 2 45 An example might be helpful here to
illustrate the proposed analysis.
Assume that in the first suit the plaintiff sues for $100 for
property damage suffered when his motorcycle collided with the
defendant's car. Under the procedural rules applicable in the
court where the property damage action is filed, evidence must be
presented in written form rather than orally, and cross-examination is rarely permitted. The plaintiff may also have suffered serious personal injuries for which a reasonable jury verdict might
exceed $50,000.
Assuming merger does not apply, if the plaintiff wins the first
action by satisfying the trier of fact that the defendant was negligent, and if he then sues for personal injuries in a court offering
the full array of procedural opportunities, he will presumably rely
on issue preclusion to foreclose the defendant from again litigating the issue of negligence. If successful, the plaintiff will have
gone a long way toward obtaining a personal judgment against
the defendant, though he will still need to establish the extent of
his injuries.
Another situation may arise as well. Assuming again that the
defendant has lost the first action because the trier finds that he
was negligent, he may bring suit against the former plaintiff for
his own personal injuries arising out of the accident. The former
defendant alleges in this second action that his damages amount
to $100,000. The former plaintiff will presumably attempt to rely
on issue preclusion which, if applied, will foreclose any recovery
246
by the former defendant.
245. Compare text with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 comment
g (1982) and supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text. If it was not foreseeable
at the time of the original litigation that the issue would be relevant to future
actions, this choice of forum argument may be irrelevant. Compare RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 28(5)(b) (1982) with infra notes 254-55 and accompanying text.
The nature of the tri-factor analysis may make it difficult for a party to ascertain on its own what due process demands as to each claim. But as long as the
party sought to be precluded had the option of suing where it was afforded the
full panoply of constitutional procedures, the argument in the text has considerable weight. Where this choice-of-forum argument applies, any exception to issue preclusion for the party with the choice that is based on lack of full and fair
opportunity for a hearing must be based on nonconstitutional policy. For examples of this type of exception, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 28(1),
(3), (5)(c) (1982).
246. This discussion assumes that there is no compulsory counterclaim rule
applicable to the first action. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) ("A pleading shall
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In these and similar cases there is more at stake in the first
litigation than explicitly appears in view of the collateral effects
under ordinary preclusion principles of the initial determination
of certain issues. Arguably, therefore, the first litigation may satisfy due process to the extent that a judgment, valid for certain
purposes, results. It is not as clear, however, that when it comes
to applying issue preclusion in the later suit, the tri-factor due
process analysis will lead to the conclusion that, given the now
apparently greater stakes of the parties, there was in fact a sufficiently full and fair opportunity to be heard in the first action.
More precisely, a due process balancing analysis based on the private stakes at issue in the second proceeding might result in the
conclusion that procedural protections beyond those available in
the first suit are required. At least in the case where the plaintiff
sues the defendant a second time and the party sought to be precluded had no choice of forum in the first action, it can be argued
that the first opportunity to be heard was inadequate to justify
preclusion. However, this is not necessarily true in the second
case presented, where the defendant could arguably have sued
first on his claim and perhaps chosen a forum offering a procedural format adequate under the tri-factor constitutional
analysis .247
state as a counterclaim any claim ...the pleader has against any opposing party,
if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
opposing party's claim ...."). This discussion also assumes that the issue of
defendant's negligence toward the plaintiff is substantially the same as the issue
of defendant's contributory negligence concerning his own injury. Finally, in
the hypothetical jurisdiction of this discussion, contributory negligence is a complete defense.
247. In the first case there is no incentive for the plaintiff to inflate his or
her claim on account of the balancing approach set forth in the text. The larger
the claim is, the more likely preclusion, which favors plaintiff, would be denied.
This is not true in the second case, where the former defendant might try to
artificially inflate his claim to escape preclusion. This problem could perhaps be
effectively dealt with by requiring a prima facie showing by the former defendant
regarding the scope of his injuries early in the suit.
In practice, it would seem unlikely that issue preclusion would be relied
upon in more than one or two subsequent actions between the original parties.
The assumption of the analysis in the text is that during the second action there
will generally be a private stake at issue far in excess of that presented in the
initial proceeding. It might very well be, however, that in some instances there
is a possibility of many actions in which the same issue will be presented. While
the stakes involved in each are about the same and relatively modest in size, the
total amount at issue in all the suits may be very substantial and dwarf the stake
at issue in the first proceeding. To the extent that issue preclusion is applied
based on a finding that the procedural format of the original action is sufficient
under the tri-factor analysis to dispose of cases where the private stake directly
presented in each later proceeding is about the same as that at issue in the first,
the stake at issue in the first action in fact amounts to the sum of all the private
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In fact, the Second Restatement ofJudgments relies on similar reasoning in discussing the applicability of one of its exceptions to
the doctrine of issue preclusion. With respect to section 28(3),248
the commentary notes:
In other cases, however, there may be compelling reasons why preclusion should not apply. For example, the
procedures available in the first court may have been tailored to the prompt, inexpensive determination of small
claims and thus may be wholly inappropriate to the determination of the same issues when presented in the
24 9
context of a much larger claim.
While they did not invoke the prevailing due process analysis to
reach this conclusion, 250 the drafters of the Restatement may have
been unconsciously directed by a similar calculus of considerastakes presented in all the actions. To dispose of such a large private interest
under the tri-factor analysis could demand a procedural format much more elaborate than involved in the first action, thus suggesting that issue preclusion
should not be applied. Preclusion should be denied at that point where the
stake at issue in the present proceeding, combined with the stakes at issue in the
initial and later preceeding proceedings (where recovery was itself permitted
based in part on issue preclusion) requires a finding under the tri-factor analysis
that the procedural format of the initial action was insufficient to dispose of a
private interest of that combined amount.
Even if preclusion is disallowed under the analysis proposed in the text, this
does not mean that due process will necessarily demand more than the elemental procedures that might be available in the later action. The tri-factor analysis
used to determine what process is required to validly dispose of the claim there
presented will be conducted on the basis of the stake actually at issue there.
The exceptions to preclusion are based in part on a concern over perpetuating incorrect decisions. See, e.g., Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 23 n.18
(1980) ("The estoppel doctrine, however, is premised upon an underlying confidence that the result achieved in the initial litigation was substantially correct.").
Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29, comments f, g (1982). Implicit
in such exceptions is the recognition that given the application of issue preclusion, there is much more at stake in the first proceeding than appears, and where
there is a significant likelihood of error inherent in the original procedural format, preclusion should not perhaps be applied. As the above analysis demonstrates, this result is not simply good policy, but also may be constitutionally
mandated. The risk of error inherent in the original procedural format is, of
course, a factor in due process analysis. See supra note 53 and accompanying
text.
248. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(3) (1982). For a discussion of provisions of § 28 that purport to authorize relitigation of an issue which
has been disposed of by a valid and final judgment, see supra note 221 and accompanying text.

249.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS

§ 28 comment d (1982).

250. See id. See also infra notes 258-62 and accompanying text (§ 28's refusal
to give preclusive effect emphasizes differences in procedures in initial and subsequent action while due process emphasizes difference in private stakes at issue
in initial and subsequent actions).
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tions in drawing the parameters of the doctrine of issue
251
preclusion.
In sum, in the case of issue preclusion the due process requirement for an adequate opportunity to be heard may prevent
preclusive effects in the second or subsequent proceedings despite the validity of the first judgment. If the procedural framework applicable to the original proceeding meets due process
requirements even as to those claims that are later sued upon, the
federal Constitution does not interfere with the ordinary operation of the doctrine of issue preclusion, at least where the parties
fully utilized the available procedures in the first action. State law
may, of course, sometimes permit an exception to preclusion on
the basis that certain procedures available in the second action
were not available in the first.2 52 Any such exceptions, however, should be based purely on nonconstitutional policy
considerations.253

A more difficult problem arises where the first action was
brought in a court offering all the procedural protection constitutionally required to dispose of both the explicit and implicit stakes
presented but the parties failed to fully utilize available procedures because of their focus on the relatively small stakes immediately at issue. Absent incentive to litigate to the hilt initially, it
can be argued that it is unfair to preclude the parties from later
relitigating issues that relate to a much larger claim.2 54 However,
unless it is not reasonably foreseeable at the time of the original
suit that the larger claim might later be sued upon raising the
same issues as those involved in the first suit, there is a strong
argument that there should be no exception to preclusion on con251. See infra notes 263-70 and accompanying text.
252. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(3) (1982).
Any such exception must be based at least in part on a nonconstitutional
concern for fairness to the party who lacked choice as to the forum in which the
first action was brought and the possibility that it might be able to escape the
same outcome if the additional or different procedures are made available to it
in the second proceeding. Cf. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331
n.15 (1979) (application of collateral estoppel may be unwarranted where defendant in first action was forced to defend in inconvenient forum and therefore
was unable to engage in full-scale discovery or call witnesses); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 29, reporter's note to comment d (1982) (differences
between procedures available in first and second actions may warrant refusal to
carry over preclusion to action involving another party). See also infra notes 399404 and accompanying text.
253. See infra notes 258-62 and accompanying text.
254. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(5)(c) & comment j
(1982) (lack of incentive to litigate small amount in controversy in initial action
prevents preclusion in subsequent action).
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129

stitutional grounds, though an exception might be justified on
25 5
pure policy grounds.
Section 28(5) (c) of the Second Restatement ofJudgments uses language suggestive of constitutional limitations, 25 6 though the reporter's commentary indicates that denial of preclusive effect
based on this exception is a matter ofjudicial discretion. 2 57 While
the commentary to section 28(3) mirrors constitutional analysis to
some degree, 258 the wording of that provision suggests that the
drafters were basing it largely, if not entirely, on nonconstitu2 59
tional policy concerns.
Section 28(3) makes the differences in the procedures in the
initial and subsequent actions a basis for refusing preclusive effect. 2 60 But this is not the focus of constitutional due process
analysis, which, rather, emphasizes the differences in the private
255. Compare text with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(5)(b)
(1982). Section 28 provides in pertinent part:
Although an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid and
final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, relitigation of the issue in a subsequent action between the parties is not
precluded in the following circumstances:
(5) There is a clear and convincing need for a new determination of
the issue...
(b) because it was not sufficiently foreseeable at the time of the initial action that the issue would arise in the context of a subsequent action ....
Id. See also id. § 28 comment i (exception might be justified purely on policy
grounds).
256. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
257. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(5)(c) comment j
(1982). Perhaps the commentary here is unintentionally ambiguous. "Discretion" as used here may mean not power to choose whether to preclude but mere
ability to permit an exception from preclusion if circumstances warrant. This
would include instances in which due process demands an exception. The commentary does not expressly mention lack of certain procedures in the first action
as an example of an instance where this exception applies, but there does not
seem to be any reason to believe that the exception was intended to be inapplicable in that instance.
Even if the second proceeding does not offer procedural opportunities in
addition to or different from those available in the first action; compare id.
§ 28(3); the available procedures in the first action may present a sufficient risk
of producing an "incorrect" result that preclusion may not be allowed as a matter of policy or constitutional law. Cf, e.g., Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S.
10, 22-24 (1980) (because of restrictive rules of evidence and lack of opportunity
to appeal as well as other elements involved in criminal prosecution, it may be
unfair to preclude previously litigated issues). For an illustration of this problem, see supra note 247.
258. For a discussion of § 28(3) and its relationship to due process analysis,
see supra notes 248-51 and accompanying text.
259. For the text of § 28(3), see supra text accompanying note 221.
260. For a discussion of § 28(3) and the ability to refuse preclusive effect
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stakes at issue in the first and later actions. 26 1 The nature of the
procedural framework applicable to the second action is beside
the point when dealing with whether preclusive effect can be
properly given to an issue based upon the first judgment. Instead, the relevant constitutional inquiry is whether, given the interests at stake in the subsequent action, the procedures in the
initial action were adequate to dispose of the issues under the tri262
factor due process calculus.
Section 28(1) of the Restatement emphasizes the importance of
the right to appellate review. 263 While the commentary does not
suggest a constitutional basis for this exception, 26 at least with
respect to issues of subject matter and territorial jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court appears to regard the opportunity for appellate
review in the original action as an important factor in determining
if preclusion of relitigation of those issues should constitutionally
be permitted.2 65
According to the Supreme Court, one of the principal purposes of the due process opportunity to be heard is to minimize
266
mistaken or arbitrary deprivations of protected interests.
Therefore, the more likely it is that a given procedural framework
will lead to mistaken decisions by the tribunal, the more vulnerable it is to invalidation on constitutional grounds under the trifactor analysis. 267 Appellate review is designed to reduce the likelihood of substantive errors in the disposition of cases. 268 Under
based on differences in procedures, see supra notes 221 & 252 and accompanying text.
261. For discussion of the prevention of issue preclusion based on differences in the private stakes at issue in the first and later actions, see supra notes
242-47 and accompanying text.
262. Id. Of course, if it is found that the procedural format applicable to
the first action was insufficient to justify issue preclusive effect, attention will
turn to whether the applicable procedures in the second action satisfy due process standards in the context of the claim there presented. For a discussion of
due process requirements in the subsequent action where issue preclusion is
disallowed because of deficient procedure in the original action, see supra note
247.
263. For the relevant text of § 28(1), see supra text accompanying note 221.
264. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28 comment a (1982).
265. For a discussion of Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948), regarding
the importance of the availability of appellate review in order to preclude relitigation, see supra notes 84-94 and accompanying text.
266. For Justice Stewart's discussion of the purposes of the constitutional
right to be heard in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), see supra text accompanying note 46.
267. For a discussion of the tri-factor analysis used to determine the parameters of due process protection, see supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
268. See, e.g., Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 23 n.18 (1980) (in
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this analysis it may very well be that the private interests at stake
in the second proceeding may be such that the unavailability of
appellate review in the first proceeding should prevent attribution
of issue preclusive effects to the first adjudication even if the initial judgment is valid for purposes of disposing of the first suit. 269

Section 28(1) may thus have a constitutional basis, whether or not
2 70
the draftsmen considered this analysis.
D. Issue Preclusion and Non-Parties to the Initial Litigation
As indicated before, non-parties are generally not bound by
the rules of resjudicata. 2 7 1 However, in some circumstances they
can take advantage of a prior adjudication. With respect to issue
preclusion, section 29 of the Second Restatement of Judgments provides in relevant part:
A party precluded from relitigating an issue with an opposing party, in accordance with §§ 27 and 28, is also
precluded from doing so with another person unless the
fact that he lacked full and fair opportunity to litigate the
issue in the first action or other circumstances justify affording him an opportunity to relitigate the issue. The
circumstances to which consideration should be given include those enumerated in § 28 and also whether:
(2) The forum in the second action affords the party
against whom preclusion is asserted procedural opportunities in the presentation and determination of the issue
that were not available in the first action and could likely
result in the issue being differently determined ....272
Subsection 2 bears a clear family resemblance to subsection 3
of section 28.273 The reference in section 29 to "full and fair opabsence of appellate review, underlying premise of collateral estoppel doctrine-that correct result was reached in initial litigation-may be unwarranted).

269. Cf, e.g., Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 483-84
(1982) (availability of administrative and judicial review was factor in determination that procedures were sufficient under the due process clause). But see
Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 23 n. 18 (1980) (availability of appellate
review is not always essential predicate of estoppel).
270. Of course, the unavailability of appellate review in the first proceeding
may also render the first judgment invalid based on a tri-factor analysis. Section
28, however, assumes that the initial judgment is valid but issue preclusive effect
may still be refused.
271. See supra text accompanying notes 166-69.
272. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (1982).
273. Compare supra text accompanying note 272 (provisions of § 29(2)) with
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portunity to litigate" mirrors to some degree subsection (5)(c) of
section 28 with changes in phraseology which appear insignificant. 2 74 However, the commentary to section 29 implies that it is
referring here to constitutional limitations. 2 75 Moreover, the express adoption in section 29 of the provisions of section 28 assures that the right of appeal is an important precondition to the
application of issue preclusion 276 in a situation where mutuality is
absent. 27 7 This cross-reference also incorporates exceptions to
preclusion founded on section 28(5)(c) where nonconstitutional
2 78
policy is the motivating factor.
There are two basic types of non-mutual collateral estoppel-offensive and defensive. In the former situation issue preclusion is used to establish one of the elements necessary for
recovery in the second action. In the latter, issue preclusion is
used to establish one of the elements of the defense in the later
proceeding. Each in turn encompasses two sub-categories, one
where the prior adjudication is used against the party who
brought the first action and the other where it is used against the
supra text accompanying note 221 (provisions of § 28(3)). However, § 29(2), unlike § 28(3), requires that the differences between the procedures available in
each action be likely to cause a different result. Despite this difference, it is suggested that the foregoing analysis of § 28(3) applies with equal force to § 29(2).
See supra notes 252-53 & 258-62 and accompanying text.
274. For the relevant text of § 28(5)(c), see supra text accompanying note
221.
275. Comment b to § 29 begins by stating that "[a] party who has had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate an issue has been accorded the elements of due
process." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 comment b (1982).
276. See supra notes 263-70 and accompanying text. The Second Restatement
indicates that relitigation of an issue in a subsequent action between the same
parties is not precluded when "[t]he party against whom preclusion is sought
could not, as a matter of law, have obtained review of the judgment in the initial
action." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(1) (1982).
277. Historically, the use of collateral estoppel was limited by the mutuality
doctrine, which provided that a prior judgment could not be used as an estoppel
against one party unless both parties were bound by the judgment. See, e.g.,
Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127 (1912) ("It is a principle of general elementary law that the estoppel of a judgment must be mutual."). Criticism of the doctrine culminated with the Supreme Court's
pronouncement that "it is apparent that the uncritical acceptance of the principal of mutuality of estoppel ...is today out of place." Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971). The decline of
the doctrine of mutuality is chronicled in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439
U.S. 322, 326-28 (1979). For a discussion of Blonder-Tongue, see supra notes 280309 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Parklane, see supra notes 281309 and accompanying text.
278. For a discussion of the policy underlying § 28(5)(c), see supra notes
245 & 256-57 and accompanying text.
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defendant to the original proceeding. An example will be helpful
here.
A train collides with a truck. Ten passengers on the train,
along with the driver of the truck, are injured.
a. A passenger sues the railroad and wins, establishing that
the train engineer was negligent. A second passenger then sues
the railroad relying on the prior adjudication of negligence. This
is offensive issue preclusion against a former defendant.
b. Following the first suit described above, the railroad sues
the truck driver for property damage to the locomotive. The defendant here relies on the prior adjudication to establish the contributory negligence of the railroad. This is defensive issue
preclusion against a former defendant.
c. Assume, however, that the railroad brings the first suit
arising out of the accident and the defendant is the truck driver.
The latter raises the defense of contributory negligence and
prevails on that ground. A passenger then sues the railroad relying on the prior finding to establish its case in part. This is offensive issue preclusion against a former plaintiff.
d. Finally, after the railroad's loss against the truck driver in
(c) above, the railroad sues the employer of the driver on a theory
of vicarious liability. The latter relies on the prior adjudication of
the railroad's negligence. This is defensive issue preclusion
2 79
against a former plaintiff.
In at least certain types of cases, the Supreme Court in the
recent past has approved the use of the first and fourth instances
of non-mutual estoppel in federal courts. Defensive use against a
former plaintiff was involved in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v.
University of Illinois Foundation,2 0 a patent infringement suit. Offensive use against a former defendant was sanctioned in Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 28 ' which dealt with an action based on an allegedly false and misleading proxy statement. In both cases, the
Court conditioned the application of preclusion on there having
279. See generally Developments in the Law-ResJudicata,65 HARV. L. REV. 818,
862-65 (1952) (discussing mutuality requirements in offensive and defensive use
of judgments against former defendants and plaintiffs).
280. 402 U.S. 313 (1971). See also Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110
(1983) (defensive use of res judicata against former plaintiff). Cf. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980) (proposed defensive use of collateral estoppel against
former defendant). For a discussion of Blonder-Tongue, see supra notes 280-309
and accompanying text. For a discussion of Nevada, see supra notes 186-202 and
accompanying text.
281. 439 U.S. 322 (1979). For a discussion of Parklane,see supra notes 281309 and accompanying text.
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been a "full and fair opportunity to litigate" the issues in the original proceeding.2 8 2 Following these cases the Court refused to
28 3
permit defensive collateral estoppel in Standefer v. United States,
a prosecution of an alleged aider and abettor after the principal
had been acquitted of the offense charged. One of the reasons
given for this refusal was that in a criminal case the Government
is often without the kind of full and fair opportunity to litigate
28 4
that is a prerequisite to issue preclusion.
Since in Standefer it was the Government against which preclusion was attempted, there was no basis for a contention that
the perceived lack of an adequate opportunity to litigate implicated constitutional concerns, 28 5 though the analysis in that opinion may shed light on what the federal constitution requires in
other contexts. 28 6 In private litigation such as Blonder-Tongue and
Parklane, however, where constitutionally protected interests were
clearly at stake, the due process clauses2 8 7 guarantee an adequate
opportunity to be heard to the parties.2 8 8 Therefore, the question
282. See Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 333; Parklane, 439 U.S. at 332-33.
283. 447 U.S. 10 (1980). In Standefer, the petitioner, who was the head of a
corporation's tax department, had been convicted of aiding and abetting an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agent in accepting unlawful compensation. Id. at
11. Prior to petitioner's indictment, the IRS agent was acquitted on several
counts of the charged violations. Id. at 13. Petitioner appealed his subsequent
conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, arguing
that the Government should not be allowed to relitigate the issue of whether the
principal had accepted unlawful compensation. Id. at 14. The court of appeals
affirmed the conviction and petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court. Id. at 25.
The Supreme Court affirmed as well, reasoning that the criminal case before it
involved " 'competing policy considerations' that outweigh[ed] the economy
concerns that undergird the estoppel doctrine." Id. at 25 (citations omitted).
284. Id. at 22-24. Specifically, the Court noted that the constitutionally and
prudentially limited discovery rights, the unavailability of a directed verdict or
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and the inability of the Government to
obtain appellate review after an acquittal, all of which are limits on the prosecution in criminal cases, may effectively deny the Government an opportunity to
litigate. Id. at 22.
285. There was arguably no interest on behalf of the Government in "life,
liberty or property" presented in the case and thus no due process protections
attached. See supra text accompanying notes 47-50. Moreover, since the suits at
issue were both in federal court, any due process limit on preclusion had to be
rooted in the fifth amendment; the purpose of that amendment was to protect
against the federal government, not to provide protection for the federal
government.
286. See 447 U.S. at 22. For a discussion of Standefer with respect to this
issue, see supra notes 283-84 and accompanying text. The factors outlined by
the Court as relevant to a determination of the opportunity to litigate in the
criminal law context may have some significance in the determination of the opportunity to litigate afforded in a civil context as well.
287. U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1.
288. For a discussion of issue preclusion and the due process requirement
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arises regarding the extent to which the exception to non-mutual
estoppel in these or other instances has constitutional roots.
It is true that where mutuality has been abolished the impact
of issue preclusion is substantially magnified. However, the mere
fact that the subsequent litigation involves non-parties, rather
than parties to the original proceeding who are relying on the determinations reached in the earlier adjudication, should not
change the constitutional analysis set forth in the preceding section.2 8 9 Without repeating all that was argued there, suffice it to
say that even when mutuality has been abolished, constitutionally
protected interests will be at stake in subsequent actions, triggering the right to an adequate opportunity to be heard. If there is
more at stake in the subsequent proceeding than in the original,
the due process tri-factor calculus 2 90 may suggest that the original

hearing procedures were insufficient to justify preclusion of further litigation of issues. 29 1 This analysis is applicable at least to
offensive use of issue preclusion against a former defendant.
However, where the party to the first action, against whom preclusion is sought, could reasonably have sued in a court in the
forum state which did not suffer from the alleged procedural defects, and effected this choice prior to the adjudication on which
issue preclusion is based, there is an argument for permitting is29 2
sue preclusion to be invoked against the party.
The result of the proposed constitutional analysis may be
that while the initial judgment in some instances is valid for some
of an adequate opportunity to be heard, see supra text accompanying notes 22338.
289. For an analysis of constitutional limitations on issue preclusion when
parties to the initial litigation are involved, see supra text accompanying notes
242-44. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF JUDGMENTS § 29 comment b (1982) ("If
issue preclusion is inappropriate as between the original parties, it is likewise
ordinarily inappropriate when invoked by a non-party.").
290. For a discussion of the due process tri-factor analysis, see supra text
accompanying notes 51-53.
291. For a variation of this analysis in certain types of cases, see supra note
247. This variation may be more likely to exist where mutuality has been
abolished.
292. For a discussion of the adequacy of due process when the party seeking to avoid issue preclusion could have chosen a more favorable forum for the
initial litigation, see supra note 244 and accompanying text and supra text accompanying note 245. In some instances of attempted use of issue preclusion
against a former plaintiff, the choice-of-forum argument might fail, for example,
where the original plaintiff had to bring the first suit in a particular court (given
subject matter jurisdiction limitations) which lacked certain procedures, and issue preclusion is later used offensively against it. Yet here it could be argued
that the plaintiff could have refrained from suing and waited for the larger claim
to be brought.
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purposes and entitled to issue preclusive effect in subsequent
suits between the original parties, issue preclusion may not be invoked in some instances where mutuality is absent. Finally, the
same constitutional analysis applies to both federal and state
2 93
judgments in the intrasystem and intersystem context.
While the references in Blonder-Tongue and Parklane to the
need for a full and fair opportunity to be heard 294 invoke language reminiscent of constitutional considerations, neither opinion expressly suggests that an exception of this nature to issue
preclusion in the case of non-parties may be mandated by the due
process clauses when the original judgment is valid for purposes
of disposing of the original controversy. In Blonder-Tongue the
Court noted that "[i]n the end, [the] decision will necessarily rest
on the trial courts' sense ofjustice and equity." 29 5 It thus appears
that the Court may have believed that when the initial judgment is
valid, the exception is largely discretionary and based on nonconstitutional policy analysis. 29 6 Earlier in its opinion the Court
noted that there were no due process problems presented in the
case. 29 7 However, this was in the context of its observation that
Blonder-Tongue was not an instance in which non-parties were
sought to be bound without having had any opportunity to be
heard. 2 98 In fact, according to the Court, the patent holder had
been afforded the "opportunity for full and fair trial." 29 9 This
may be taken to further suggest that the Court assumed that if the
initial litigation could validly dispose of the matters raised there
for certain purposes, due process did not further limit the application of issue preclusive effect to that adjudication. Moreover, in
Parklane the Court indicated that the requirement for "full and
fair" opportunity to litigate may not be satisfied if, inter alia, "the
293. This is true even where mutuality has not been abolished.
294. See supra text accompanying note 282.
295. 402 U.S. at 434.
296. Compare text with supra text accompanying note 245 (if party initially
could have chosen forum adequate to accommodate the larger claim, it arguably
had opportunity to litigate the issue, and due process should not prevent preclusion; supra text accompanying note 254 (unless reasonably unforeseeable at the
time of the original suit that larger claim subsequently might be sued upon,
there is strong argument against exception to issue preclusion on constitutional
grounds, though exception might be justified on pure policy grounds); and supra
text accompanying note 257 (reporter's commentary to § 28(5)(c) of Second Restatement of Judgments indicates that denial of preclusive effect based upon this
exception is matter of judicial discretion).
297. 402 U.S. at 330.
298, Id. at 329-30. For the facts of Blonder-Tongue, see supra note 233.
299. 402 U.S. at 330.
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second action affords the defendant procedural opportunities unavailable in the first action that could readily cause a different result."3 0 0 As noted before, such an approach is not based upon
30 1

constitutional analysis.
However, because it is difficult to see how any viable due process argument could have been made in either Blonder-Tongue or
Parklane, the Court did not have to confront that constitutional
issue. While the stake for the defendant in the second (class) action in Parklane may have been significantly greater than that involved in the earlier SEC injunctive proceeding, and even though
the plaintiff in Blonder-Tongue did not have a free choice of forum
in bringing the first suit,3 0 2 all the litigation involved took place in

the federal courts. Given the elaborate procedural protections of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and other applicable federal
procedural statutes, it is difficult to conceive of a case in which
such a procedural format could be deemed constitutionally defective for insufficiency regardless of the size or type of stakes
presented.
In Standefer, Blonder-Tongue, and Parklane the Supreme Court
pointed to certain procedural mechanisms, which if inadequate or
lacking in the initial litigation, might justify a finding of lack of a
full and fair opportunity to litigate, and thus a denial of issue
preclusive effect in later litigation with non-parties. Specifically,
preclusion might be denied where there existed in the original
proceeding:
30 3
a. lack of mechanisms for discovery;
b. restriction on the type of evidence that could be
04
received;3
c. restriction on the ability to obtain a directed verdict
or a new trial; 305 or
30 6
d. lack of access to appellate review.

300. 439 U.S. at 330-31.
301. See supra text accompanying notes 248-53 & 258-62.
302. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1982). This statute vests exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases in the federal district courts. Id. But see Blonder-Tongue,
402 U.S. at 332 (Court noted that patentee was plaintiff in first litigation and
chose time and place of first litigation).
303. See Standefer, 447 U.S. at 22; Parklane, 439 U.S. at 331 n.15; BlonderTongue, 402 U.S. at 332-33.
304. See Standefer, 447 U.S. at 23-24.
305. Id. at 22-23.
306. Id. See also supra text accompanying notes 263-70 (discussing § 28(1)
of Second Restatement of Judgments and its emphasis on importance of right to appellate review, and suggesting that § 28(1) may be constitutionally based).
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While the Court may have based its conclusions in these cases on
nonconstitutional policy analysis, 30 7 arguably such gaps in the
procedural scheme applicable to the original action might in
some instances preclude a finding that, considering the private
stakes involved in later suits, there was a constitutionally adequate opportunity for hearing in the first case sufficient to justify
issue preclusion in subsequent actions. This is so regardless of
whether the doctrine of mutuality has been abolished.
E.

FederalNonconstitutional Limitations on State Preclusion Law

As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment30 8 limits the operation of
state preclusion law in various respects through the requirement
that there have been an adequate opportunity to litigate in the
initial action. Federal law here controls the effects of judgments
in the courts of the original forum state itself. Moreover, given
31 0
the full faith and credit clause 30 9 and its implementing statute,
constitutional limitations accompany such judgments when their
recognition or enforcement is sought in sister states. 3 1 1 Beyond
these constitutional limits, of course, a state may on policy
grounds impose additional procedural prerequisites to the
merger, bar, and collateral estoppel effects of the judgments of its
courts. 3 12 These prerequisites likewise have extraterritorial appli307. For a discussion of the nonconstitutional policy analysis involved in
Blonder-Tongue, see supra notes 294-303 and accompanying text. For a discussion
of the nonconstitutional policy analysis involved in Parklane, see supra notes 294
& 300-03 and accompanying text. For a discussion of nonconstitutional policy
analyses involved in Standefer, see supra note 285 and accompanying text.
308. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
309. Id. art. IV, § 1. For the text of the full faith and credit clause, see supra
note 13.
310. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982). For the relevant text of § 1738, see supra
note 1.
311. There is no reason the "law" referred to in § 1738 should not be taken
to encompass constitutional, statutory, and common law, both state and federal.
Compare Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Erie interpreted the word
"laws" as used in the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982), to include
common law. The latter Act refers to the "laws of the states" while § 1738 refers to "law" without specification as to its source, federal or state. Both statutes
were originally enacted at about the same time (1789-1790).
Where the due process clause limits the preclusive effect of a judgment domestically, it likewise, of its own force, limits the preclusive effect of that judg-

ment in other states. See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 104

comment a (1971).
312. For an example of such an additional procedural requirement, see
supra text accompanying notes 253-55. The states may grant rights to individuals that are greater than those established by the federal Constitution. See, e.g.,
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (although federal
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cation in view of the full faith and credit obligations of other
states. 31 3 It is also true that federal nonconstitutional law, statutory or common, can impose limitations on state domestic preclu314
sion law.
If, in the initial litigation in state court, one of the parties
raised or could have raised contentions that its federal statutory
or constitutional rights were violated, such contentions may be
relevant to subsequent suits in the courts of the same state. In
five recent cases, Allen v. McCurry,31 5 Kremer v. Chemical Construction
Co.,316 Haring v. Prosise,3 17 Migra v. Warren City School District Board
of Education,3 1 8 and Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons,3 1 9 the Supreme Court dealt with questions regarding the
effect of state court adjudications on the ability to litigate federal
constitutional and statutory issues and claims in later proceedings. The Court, however, limited its discussion to the intersystem context, specifically where the subsequent action was filed in
federal court. Accordingly, no mention was made of the effects of
Constitution does not guarantee individual right to distribute leaflets at shopping center, state's constitution may expand right of free speech to protect this
activity); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967) (fact that search of automobile was not unreasonable under fourth amendment does not affect states'
power to impose more stringent search and seizure standards than those imposed by federal Constitution).
313. See supra note 311. See also, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAwS § 105 & comment b (1971) (when procedural requirement of judgment-rendering state has not been complied with, court of enforcement will look
to local law of rendering state to determine whether judgment is void for lack of

competence or merely erroneous). But see

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDG-

§ 86 comment g (1982) (suggesting that sister state may give more
preclusive effect than accorded under law of state of rendition in some situations). For a discussion of the proposition that a state may accord more preclusive effect to a judgment than the state of rendition would accord, see infra note
355-57 & 377-80 and accompanying text.
MENTS

314. See generally FEDERAL

PRACTICE,

supra note 25, § 4467 (suggesting that

state courts may be required to follow federal procedure when adjudicating federal questions if important federal interest is implicated); Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal Common Law: A General Approach,
71 CORNELL L. REV. 733 (1986) [hereinafter cited as Burbank, A General Approach]; Burbank, InterurisdictionalPreclusion and Federal Common Law: Toward a
GeneralApproach, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 625 (1985). Cf., e.g., Dice v. Akron, C. & Y.
R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952) (because Federal Employers' Liability Act provides for
jury trials in suits arising under Act, state court judge erred in taking from jury
determination of certain factual questions); R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY,
supra note 63, at 985-87 (discussing extent to which state courts must adhere to

federal procedures when hearing cases based on federal law).
315. 449 U.S. 90 (1980).

316. 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
317. 462 U.S. 306 (1983).
318. 456 U.S. 75 (1984).
319. 105 S. Ct. 1327 (1985).
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state court adjudications on the ability to litigate or relitigate federal issues and claims where the subsequent action is filed in a
court of the same state. Pursuant to the explicit language of the
statute implementing the full faith and credit clause,3 20 the Court
32 1
explicitly examined the law of the rendering state in Kremer,
Haring32 2 and Migra,32 3 though not in McCurry.324 In Marrese, it
directed the trial court to undertake its responsibility of initially
considering the preclusion law of the state rendering the judgment.3 25 The state law referred to in these cases dealt almost exclusively with preclusion where the parties to the second litigation
were litigating or attempting to litigate nonfederal claims and issues. 3 26 Where, however, there is a federal issue or claim raised
in the second or later actions in the courts of the rendering state,
there are federal interests at stake3 27 which in some contexts
should be seen as justifying limits on that state's ability to apply
3 28
its merger, bar, and collateral estoppel doctrines.
320. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982). For the text of § 1738, see supra note 1.
321. For discussion of this aspect of Kremer, see infra text accompanying
notes 446-49.
322. For discussion of this aspect of Haring, see infra text accompanying
notes 428-29.
323. For discussion of this aspect of Migra, see infra text accompanying
notes 435-36 & 439.
324. For discussion of this aspect of McCuny, see infra text accompanying
notes 403 & 405-06. But see infra text at 453-57 (suggesting that McCurry Court
assumes that imposition of federal limitations upon preclusive effect of state
court judgments would operate as implicit amendments to dictates of § 1738).
325. 105 S. Ct. at 1335.
326. A "federal issue" of fact is one which is relevant to a claim governed
by federal law. The state law examined by the Court in Kremer, Haring, and Migra
arose from cases involving, for example, the competency of a testatrix, Haring,
462 U.S. at 315 (citing Eason v. Eason, 204 Va. 347, 131 S.E.2d 280 (1963)), and
the malpractice of an attorney, Migra, 465 U.S. at 86 (citing Henderson v. Ryan,
13 Ohio St. 2d 31, 233 N.E.2d 506 (1968)), and therefore did not deal with
preclusion of federal claims and issues.
The federal character of an issue may appear in the initial adjudication or
only in later actions. For instance, in Blonder-Tongue, the first litigation was a
patent infringement act so that the federal character of the fact issues litigated
was obvious at the outset. 402 U.S. at 314. However, in Migra, the first action
was for breach of contract. 465 U.S. at 78. Assuming no claim preclusion, the
federal character of issues of fact adjudicated there would become obvious only
when the second suit, a constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), was
brought, assuming the relevancy of those fact issues to the constitutional claim.
327. There is a "federal interest" in the sense used in the text where, inter
alia, a federal substantive policy or purpose exists whether of constitutional or
statutory origin. For a definition of "substantive" policy or purpose, see supra
note 34. Cf. Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959
DUKE L.J. 171, 178. This may require protection by the fashioning of federal
common law exceptions to state preclusion law.
328. See Burbank, A GeneralApproach, supra note 314, at 808, 809, 812-13,
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In other words, even outside the intersystem context,3 2 9 preclusion in the courts of a state of federal issues and claims must
be seen as raising federal questions subject to the determination
of the United States Supreme Court, and governed in some instances by the principles of federal common (or statutory) law
that differ from state domestic preclusion law. Operative within
the rendering state, this nonconstitutional federal law limits the
recognition and enforcement ofjudgments in other states, and in
the federal courts, under the statute implementing the full faith
and credit clause. 33 0 Such federal common law has its sources in
federal statutes and in some instances in the federal Constitution. 33 1 The Second Restatement of Judgments appears to implicitly
acknowledge this type of restriction on domestic preclusion
2
law.33
These federal nonconstitutional limitations can be of various
kinds.3 3 3 For present purposes, however, it is important to note
820. Cf. Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940). In Kalb, the judgment of a
state court was subject to collateral attack because of a peremptory prohibition
by Congress that no state court had jurisdiction over a petitioning farmer-debtor
or his property. Id. at 438-39. The Court noted that "[s]tates cannot, in the
exercise of control over local laws and practice, vest state courts with power to
violate the supreme law of the land." Id. at 439. For a further discussion of Kalb,
see supra notes 124 & 139.
329. For definitions of intersystem and intrasystem preclusion as used in
this article, see supra note 6.
330. For a discussion of the effect of nonconstitutional federal law on the
recognition and enforcement of judgments in federal courts and the courts of
other states, see supra note 311 and accompanying text.
331. See supra note 327.
332. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 26(1)(d) (1982) (exempting from general rule barring splitting of claim those cases in which "[t]he
judgment in the first action was plainly inconsistent with the fair and equitable
implementation of a statutory or constitutional scheme"); id. § 29(1) (in deciding whether to apply issue preclusion in subsequent litigation with third party,
court should consider whether doing so would undermine applicable scheme of
remedies devised for such actions); id. § 86(1) (litigation of claim in state court
does not preclude litigation in federal court of related federal claim arising from
same transaction, if federal claim arises under scheme of federal remedies which
contemplates that federal claim should not be precluded by prior state court
adjudication).
333. An example might resemble § 28(2) of the Restatement:
Although an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid and
final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, relitigation of the issue in a subsequent action between the parties is not
precluded in the following circumstances:

(2) The issue is one of law and (a) the two actions involve claims that
are substantially unrelated, or (b) a new determination is warranted in
order to take account of an intervening change in the applicable legal
context or otherwise to avoid inequitable administration of the laws....
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only that if preclusion is to apply in the second action, these limitations may mandate a more elaborate procedural framework in
the first action than would otherwise be necessary. That is to say,
the first opportunity for hearing may have to be fuller and fairer
than required by due process in order for certain claim or issue
preclusive effects to attach to the judgment. The additional or
different procedures may be judged necessary in order to improve the accuracy or trustworthiness of the fact-finding or lawapplying process, 3 34 and in this way relevant federal interests are
protected. 335 While the states have interests in judicial efficiency
and consistency of decisions and perhaps in the merits, even
where federal matters are presented, 33 6 these state interests may
be outweighed in many instances by the federal interests at stake.
A comparison with the approach to issue preclusion found in
ParklaneHosiery Co. v. Shore33 7 is illuminating here. While approving offensive issue preclusion in the federal courts in certain types
of cases, the Parklane Court indicated that, as a matter of policy
discretion, the district courts could deny issue preclusion if they
believed that the defendant had not been given a sufficient opportunity to be heard in the initial action, even if the due process
clause itself did not demand this result. 33 8 The Parklaneapproach
constitutes federal common law which applies in the federal
courts. That particular nonconstitutional limit on preclusion is
based largely on concerns about fairness to the party against
Id. § 28(2). Cf. Limbach v. Hooven & Allison Co., 104 S. Ct. 1837 (1984) (state
tax commissioner not barred by collateral estoppel from assessing certain taxes
because, in years since first determination involving same parties, intervening
decisions of court revealed error in law applied in first decision).
334. Both due process and the analysis underlying the creation of the type
of federal common law discussed in the text are concerned with the accuracy of
the fact-finding process. See supra text accompanying note 46 and supra text following note 53. However, while the risk of error inherent in a certain procedural format may be acceptable for constitutional purposes, it may not be
considered acceptable as a matter of policy, in view of the federal interests at
stake. But see infra note 404.
335. For a discussion of federal interests and their protection when conflicts of laws arise, see infra note 404. See generally Burbank, A General Approach,
supra note 314, at 808, 810, 812-13, 820.
336. Compare text with R. CRAMPTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, supra note 63, at
985 ("Is it correct to say that the question in a case like Dice [v. Akron, C. & Y.
R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952)] is the extent to which state interests in the efficient
administration of state courts should be allowed to impinge upon federal
policy?").
337. 439 U.S. 322 (1979). For a discussion of the facts of Parklane, see supra
note 252 and accompanying text.
338. For the reasoning of the court in Parklane, see supra text accompanying
notes 294-303.
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whom preclusion is invoked.3 39 To the extent there is a federal
common law that limits state preclusion law based on notions of
"full and fair opportunity to litigate," it must find its source not
merely in concerns regarding fairness to the parties but in the
need to advance or protect distinctive federal interests.
If the existence of these nonconstitutional federal limitations
on domestic state law is overlooked, the only way to assure protection of federal interests is to carve out exceptions to the mandate of section 1738340 and to permit litigation of the federal
claims or issues in the federal district courts following state court
adjudication regardless of the preclusive effects mandated by
state domestic preclusion law. This approach has been suggested
by language in some recent Supreme Court opinions.3 41 It is not
satisfactory for a number of reasons. It implicitly adopts an unnecessarily restrictive reading of the language of section 1738342

3 4 3 of
and on this basis requires the finding of an implied repeal
that statute in order to protect federal interests. Discovering an
"implied repeal" is in most cases a purely fictional exercise with
few accurate guideposts.3 4 4 Moreover, original federal subject
matter jurisdiction may not be sufficient to encompass later suits
raising federal issues where preclusion is urged.3 45 Even where

339. See 439 U.S. at 330-31 & n.15. See also supra text accompanying notes
252-53 & 300-301 (discussing nonconstitutional policy-based exception to preclusion based upon availability of certain procedures in second action which
were not available in first); infra text accompanying note 402 (noting that Second
Restatement ofJudgments suggests that it would be unfair to preclude party who did
not have original choice of forum from enjoying procedural advantages available
in second forum which were unavailable in the first).
340. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982). For the text of § 1738, see supra note 1.
341. See, e.g., Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306 (1983); Kremer v. Chemical
Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980). For a
further discussion of the Court's reasoning in Haring, see infra text accompanying notes 423-29. For a further discussion of the Court's reasoning in Kremer,
see infra text accompanying notes 448-452. For a further discussion of the
Court's reasoning in McCurry, see infra text accompanying notes 405-07.
342. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982). For a discussion of a less restrictive analysis
of § 1738, see supra note 311 and infra text accompanying notes 453-77.
343. See, e.g., Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148 (1976)
(venue statute in National Bank Act not repealed by implication by conflicting
venue statute in Securities Exchange Act) (cited in McCurry, 449 U.S. at 99 (doctrine of collateral estoppel applicable to actions brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1983
in absence of clear expression by Congress of intention to override 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738 and common law rules of collateral estoppel)).
344. See 0. HETZEL, LEGISLATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 291, 294-96 (1980).
345. For a discussion of original federal subject matter jurisdiction, see
generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 144, §§ 17-18 (discussing federal courts' jurisdiction over federal questions and requirement that federal question must appear on face of complaint).
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the federal courts have jurisdiction to consider the issues and
claims raised in later suits, however, it is certainly consistent with
the respect due the ability of the state judicial systems to safeguard federal rights3 46 and the desire to relieve the federal courts
of some of their docket load3 4 7 to have a federal nonconstitutional common law limiting the intrastate effect of state preclusion law in matters of concurrent jurisdiction. In this way, parties
will not seek a federal forum merely to take advantage of what is
seen as a more favorable law.
Further insight into these matters is gained by an examination of recent decisions dealing with the full faith and credit
clause and its implementing statute. It is, therefore, appropriate
to turn attention to the opportunity to be heard in the context of
intersystem claim and issue preclusion.
III.

INTERSTATE PRECLUSION: FULL FAITH AND CREDIT AND THE
OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD

A.

Introduction

The constitutional obligation of each state to give "full faith
and credit" to the judgments of the sister states of the federal
union3 48 is much more inflexible than the obligation to give "full
faith and credit" to the laws of those same states.3 49 Rarely can
the enforcement or recognition of a valid sister state judgment be
resisted outside the state of rendition.3 5 0 Section 1738 of the Ju346. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 n.35 (1976) (rejecting argument that state courts are not fair and competent forums to protect fourth
amendment rights).
347. Rehnquist, supra note 11 (discussing overload of federal dockets). See
Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516-17 (1982) (O'Connor & Rehnquist,
JJ., concurring) (requiring exhaustion of state administrative proceedings could
resolve many claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, thereby easing excessive
caseloads in federal courts).
348. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. For the text of the full faith and credit clause,
see supra note 13.
349. Id. See, e.g., Sterk, Full Faith and Credit More or Less, to Judgments: Doubts
About Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 69 GEO. L.J. 1329, 1339-51 (1981).
350. The strength of the full faith and credit clause when the enforcement
of a judgment of the courts of a sister state is at issue is illustrated by the language of the Supreme Court in Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co.:
The very purpose of the full faith and credit clause was to alter the
status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties ... and
to make them integral parts of a single nation throughout which a remedy upon a just obligation might be demanded as of right, irrespective
of the state of its origin.
296 U.S. 268, 276-77 (1935). See also Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908)
(judgment of Missouri court on cause of action arising in Mississippi must be
given full faith and credit in Mississippi, despite fact that underlying claim was
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dicial Code3 5' is the statutory implementation of the constitutional provision. 35 2 It also extends to the federal courts the same
obligations that apply to the state courts.3 53 By the terms of the
statute the judgment of the court of one state is to have "the same
full faith and credit in every court within the United States ... [as
it has] by law or usage in the courts of . . . [the rendering
state]. '3 54 Despite some arguments3 55 and dicta to the contrary, 356 there is substantial case law to the effect that "the same"
means "the same and no more preclusive effect." '3 5 7 Thus, both
the purely state and the federal components of the law of preclusion 358 of the state of rendition become, by the force of federal
law, the body of governing law that determines the preclusive effect of a judgment in every other state and in the federal
based on gambling debt and would not have been enforced by Mississippi
courts); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 103 comments a, b
(1971) ("[flull faith and credit requires, almost invariably, that a valid State judgment be recognized in sister States").
351. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982).
352. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
353. See generally R. CRAMPTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, supra note 63, at 661
(suggesting that 28 U.S.C. § 1738 exceeded authorization of full faith and credit
clause in requiring federal courts to respect state judgments).
354. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982).
355. See, e.g., Casad, Intersystem Issue Preclusion and the Restatement (Second)
of Judgments, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 510, 521-24 (1981) (considering whether
state court violates full faith and credit requirements when it accords judgment
of court of sister state greater preclusive effect than it would have had in state of
rendition).
356. See, e.g., Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 109 (1963) (full faith and credit
requires states to give judgment "at least the resjudicata effect which the judgment would be accorded in the State which rendered it").
357. See, e.g., Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 105
S. Ct. 1327, 1334-35 (1985) (Supreme Court refused to allow federal court to
give more preclusive effect to state court judgment than would be given by state
rendering judgment); Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S.
75, 88 (1984) (White, J., concurring) (citing Union & Planters' Bank v. Memphis,
189 U.S. 71, 75 (1903) for proposition that "federal court 'can accord [a state
judgment] no greater efficacy' than would the judgment rendering State");
Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas Co., 309 U.S. 4, 7-8 (1939) (application
of res judicata determined by state law rather than federal statute); Wright v.
Georgia R.R. & Banking Co., 216 U.S. 420, 429 (Supreme Court accords no
more effect to state court judgment than that accorded it by court of state in
which it was rendered); City of Covington v. First Nat'l Bank, 198 U.S. 100, 107109 (1905) (federal courts can accord state judgments no greater preclusive effect than would the rendering state). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 86 comment g (1982) (state judgment is to have "the same" faith and
credit as would be accorded by rendering state, no more or less). See also infra
text accompanying notes 561-69.
358. For a discussion of the state and federal components of state preclusion law, see supra notes 311 & 314-47 and accompanying text. See also Burbank,
A General Approach, supra note 314, at 800.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1986

65

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [1986], Art. 2
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31: p. 81

courts,3 5 9 notwithstanding the peculiarities of the preclusion law
36 0
that otherwise applies in those courts.
Obviously section 1738 does not represent the only defensible approach that could have been devised. For example, the language of the constitutional provision36 l leaves sufficient leeway
for Congress itself to create or perhaps to authorize the federal
courts to create3 62 a body of purely federal preclusion principles
without any reference to state law. Such principles would control
363
the effect of state court judgments in the courts of other states.
The approach in fact adopted in 1790 with the predecessor of
section 1738364 had the apparent advantage, however, of building
upon existing state preclusion law and thus avoiding the delay
and confusion which would have accompanied the formulation of
an independent body of federal rules in this area. More importantly, the requirement that the law of the rendering state govern
the preclusive effect of its judgments in other states and federal
courts was necessary in order to protect the sovereignty of each
state, acting in its judicial capacity, in those cases and controversies preserved for its jurisdiction by the federal Constitution3 65 or
federal statute.3 6 6 That sovereignty is undercut to the extent that
purely federal principles or the law of other states determines the
36 7
effect of a judgment of a sister state.
359. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJuDGMENTS § 86 comment b (1982)
(discussing preclusive effect of state court judgments and certain narrow
exceptions).
360. But see FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 25, § 4467, at 626 (questioning
whether all details of preclusion law of judgment-rendering state need be
honored); infra text accompanying notes 381-85 (discussing situations where
second state has strong countervailing substantive interest that weighs against
enforcement of valid judgment of sister state).
361. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
362. Unlike the federal common law previously discussed, see supra text accompanying notes 314-37, which applies even in the intrasystem context, the
federal common law created pursuant to such a delegation would not have to be
related to substantive federal policies because it would be founded on the distinct grant of power in § 1 of article IV.
363. Section I of article IV of the United States Constitution authorizes
Congress to prescribe the effect of sister state judgments. See generally FEDERAL
PRACTICE, supra note 25, § 4467 (discussing full faith and credit clause and its
implementing statute).
364. See generally Reese & Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 153, 153-55 (1949) (discussing history of full faith and
credit).
365. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
366. Most of federal jurisdiction is concurrent rather than exclusive. See,
e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (1982) (governing federal question and diversity
jurisdiction, respectively).
367. Cf. Degnan, Federalized ResJudicata, 85 YALE L.J. 741, 768-69 (1976)
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These considerations create a very strong presumption in
favor of looking to the law of the judgment-rendering state to determine preclusive effect. Section 1738 embodies this presumption though it is not phrased as such. The case law and
commentary indicate, however, that this presumption can be
overcome in at least some instances by a strong showing of countervailing federal3 68 or even state interests. 369 On the other hand,
to ensure that the assertion of judicial power by one state will not
unduly infringe on the judicial authority of others,3 70 section
1738 has been interpreted to refer to the purely internal law of
preclusion of the judgment-rendering state.3 7 1 That is to say, the
principles adopted by reference are those developed by a state's
law-making authorities for its courts without direct reference to
the extraterritorial effect of its judgments.3 72 If a state is willing
(suggesting that federal judgments should be given same full faith and credit in
state courts as they have in rendering court). See also Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 105 S. Ct. 1327, 1334 (1985) (concerns of comity
reflected in § 1738 generally favor states' determination of preclusive scope of
their own courts' judgments). A further rationale for the reference to rendering
state law is provided in FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 25, § 4467, at 367 ("As to
some matters, there might be significant variations in state law that could undermine any certainty if preclusion must be determined by the law of whatever
court should hear the second case."). In some cases, however, federal substantive interests may require a limit on state preclusion law and thus a limit on state
sovereignty. See supra text accompanying notes 314-37.
368. For examples of such situations, see infra notes 535-39 and accompanying text. Compare id. with supra text accompanying notes 314-37 (dealing with
instance where federal interests operate to condition judgment in intrasystem
context, as opposed to intersystem context).
369. For a discussion of when the state of recognition or enforcement can
disregard the effect of a valid judgment of a sister state, see supra notes 381-85
and accompanying text; infra notes 484-534 and accompanying text; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 103 (1971).
370. Cf. Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1980)
(state permitted to determine extraterritorial effect of its judgments only indirectly by determining effect of its judgments within state).
371. Cf, e.g., Sumner, Full Faith and Creditfor JudicialProceedings, 2 UCLA L.
REV. 441, 446-51 (1955) (suggesting that state of recognition or enforcement
should look to domestic law of state that rendered judgment). I would agree
with Professor Burbank, however, that the reference directed by § 1738 is to
whatever preclusion rules would be applied by the courts of the rendering state,
whether those rules are similar to those applied in wholly domestic controversies
or modelled on the preclusion law of other states where multi-state elements
exist in the transaction or occurrence at issue. See Burbank, A GeneralApproach,
supra note 314, 798-99.
372. See Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1980)
(state may not directly determine extraterritorial effect of its own workmen's
compensation awards). See also infra note 469 (presenting argument that where
subsequent litigation raising claim could not be brought in state court because
of exclusive jurisdiction, there cannot be relevant state law of preclusion).
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to live at home with a particular rule of preclusion, then it can
export it with its judgments to other states.
With respect to limitations on the preclusive effect of state
court judgments based on the need for a "full and fair opportunity to litigate," several situations involving the full faith and
credit obligations of the states can arise:
1) The relevant federal constitutional and federal nonconstitutional principles may eliminate entirely, or reduce to some
degree, the permissible preclusive effects of the judgment within
the state that rendered it. In this situation, all other states are
similarly restricted in assigning preclusive effect to that judgment
even if in other contexts section 1738 were to be interpreted to
permit a state to give more preclusive effect to a sister state judgment than allowed by the law of the forum of rendition. 37 3 That
this is the case should be obvious where the due process clause3 74
acts as a limit on the preclusive effect of the judgment.3 7 5 The
procedural inadequacy of the initial action remains regardless of
the forum of the second suit. Where some federal interest requires relitigation of a particular claim or issue, 3 76 this interest
can be fully served only if no state can attach the prohibited
preclusive effect to the judgment.
2) If the limitation on the preclusive effect of the initial
judgment is grounded solely in the policy of the rendering
state, 37 7 it is arguable that the interest of the state where recognition or enforcement is attempted in terms of, inter alia, judicial
efficiency can justify application of the latter state's more preclusive principles, 378 assuming there is no unfair surprise to the parties. 379 As before noted, however, the language of section 1738
373. For a discussion of the power of states to accord greater preclusive
effect to a judgment than the rendering state would have accorded, see supra
notes 355-57 and accompanying text.
374. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
375. For a discussion of the limiting effect of the due process clause on
state preclusion law, see supra note 311 and accompanying text.
376. For examples of situations where there is a federal interest in relitigating of a claim, see supra notes 314-37 and accompanying text.
377. For a discussion of the effect of preclusion limitations grounded solely
in the policy of the rendering state, see supra text accompanying notes 252-62 &
312-13.
378. For example, under the law of the rendering state, lack of discovery in
the first action may prevent preclusion. This may not be the case under the law
of the state of recognition.
379. See, e.g., Casad, supra note 355, at 517-28 (suggesting that enforcement
state may afford greater preclusive effects to judgment than rendering state, but
recognizing that it would be unfair to do so when such preclusive effects were
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and existing case law may prevent this resultA8 0°
3) Preclusion may be required by the internal law of the
rendering state and may be consistent with existing federal constitutional and federal nonconstitutional requirements for an "adequate opportunity to be heard." Can the state of recognition or
enforcement refuse to follow the law of the state of rendition on
the basis that this second state believes as a policy matter that still
more of an opportunity to be heard is appropriate? Probably not,
or at least not in all cases. The instances in which the state of
recognition or enforcement can disregard the effect of a valid
judgment under the law of the rendering state are relatively
few. 3 8 ' These might include situations wherein the second state

possesses a strong countervailing substantive interest which may
very well not be implicated by the situation posed.3 8 2 What is
likely involved here is merely a difference of opinion between the
states regarding the merits or demerits of certain procedural devices in arriving at a correct decision. 38 3 Arguably this disagreement alone should not overcome the interests of repose and
finality sought to be advanced by the full faith and credit
clause. 38 4 If, however, the substantive law of the second state was
applied in reaching the decision in the first forum, there is a more
compelling case that the second state's preclusion law should prevail. The argument here is similar to that presented where federal interests limit the effects otherwise attributed to a judgment
3 85
under state law.

Let us now turn to several recent cases in which the Supreme
not reasonably forseeable during first litigation and might deny party due
process).
380. See supra notes 355-57 and accompanying text and infra notes 561-79
and accompanying text.
381. For a discussion of the inflexible nature of the obligation of each state
to give full faith and credit to the judgments of sister states, see supra note 350
and accompanying text. But see supra note 360 (questioning whether all details of
preclusion law of rendering state need be honored).
382. Cf. Yarborough v Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 213 (1933) (Stone, J.,
dissenting) (nothing in first state's award of child support suggested intention to
regulate or control duties flowing from parent-child relationship outside that
state).
383. Compare text with Ely, supra note 36, at 723 (discussing conflicting rules
of procedure when rules are designed not to further substantive goals, but to
promote process of finding truth).
384. Compare supra notes 373-77 and accompanying text (where interest vindicated by state of recognition is consistent with concerns underlying full faith
and credit clause).
385. For a discussion of issue preclusion under state law where federal interests are involved, see supra notes 333-36 and accompanying text. Compare id.
with infra text accompanying notes 506-34 (where lack of opportunity in first
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Court has dealt with preclusion law in the full faith and credit
context. While the decisions involve the effect of state judgments
in federal courts, much of what is discussed below applies where
3 86
only state courts are involved.

B. Preclusion in Civil Rights Cases
38 7
1. Allen v. McCurry

The plaintiff in Allen sued local police officers for damages in
federal district court arguing that his fourth amendment rights
had been violated. 3 88 He had previously been convicted in the
state court of Missouri for possession of heroin and assault with
intent to kill.3 8 9 In that earlier proceeding he had raised the
3 90
search and seizure issue by suppression motion and lost.
The opinion of the Supreme Court in Allen is almost as remarkable for what it does not say as for what it does say. 39 ' It is,
in fact, no mean task to formulate the exact holding of the case.
Taken by itself, the case seems to stand for the proposition that as
a general matter there is no reason to consider actions in the federal courts brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1871392 and
commenced after state proceedings that did deal or could have
dealt with the same issues or claims at issue in the federal suits as
necessarily exempt from the "normal rules" 39 3 of preclusion.
Since the second action in Allen was brought in federal court,
section 1738 was applicable and the Court's opinion acknowledges as much.3 94 The majority attempts to make the point that
forum to obtain relief under law of second state is reason in some instances to
allow further litigation in second forum in order to permit "full recovery").
386. For a discussion of the constitutional obligations of each state to give
full faith and credit to the judgment of sister states, and the extension of that
obligation to the federal courts, see supra notes 348-53 and accompanying text.

387. 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
388. Id. at 91-94.
389. Id. at 92.

390. Id.
391. For example, the Court stated that only the broad question of the applicability of collateral estoppel to suits brought by similar plaintiffs under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 was before the Court. Id. at 93 n.2. It expressly declined to rule
on "the scope of collateral estoppel with respect to the particular issues in this
case," or on "whether any exceptions or qualifications [to the doctrine of collateral estoppel] might ultimately defeat a collateral estoppel defense in this case."
Id. at 92, 95 n.7. Nor did the Court rule on "how the body of collateral-estoppel
doctrine or 28 U.S.C. § 1738 should apply in this case." Id. at 105 n.25 (emphasis supplied).
392. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
393. 449 U.S. at 95 n.7.
394. Id. at 96.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol31/iss1/2

70

Luneburg: The Opportunity to Be Heard and the Doctrines of Preclusion: Fede

19861

OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD

an exception from the dictates of section 1738 requires a clear
statement from Congress,3 9 5 which apparently would be satisfied
by a showing of a substantial federal interest based upon a federal
statute.3 9 6 The Court then seems to suggest that there might be a
basis in nonconstitutional federal law for permitting an "exception" to the "usual rules of preclusion" in the case of section
1983 actions:
In reviewing the legislative history of § 1983 in Monroe v.
Pape, the Court inferred that Congress had intended a
federal remedy in three circumstances: where state substantive law was facially unconstitutional, where state
procedural law was inadequate to allow full litigation of a
constitutional claim, and where state procedural law,
though adequate in theory, was inadequate in practice.
In short, the federal courts could step in where the state
courts were unable or unwilling to protect federal rights.
This understanding of § 1983 might well support an exception to res judicata and collateral estoppel where
state law did not provide fair procedures for the litigation of constitutional claims, or where a state court failed
to even acknowledge the existence of the constitutional
principle on which a litigant based his claim. Such an
exception, however, would be essentially the same as the
important general limit on rules of preclusion that already exists: Collateral estoppel does not apply where
the party against whom an earlier court decision is asserted did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate
3 97
the claim or issue decided by the first court.
The reference here to the absence of a "full and fair opportunity to litigate" in the state courts as a reason to disregard the
preclusive effect of a state court judgment is apparently not
solely, if at all, a reference to constitutional defects in the procedures in the original action. An exception to resjudicata and collateral estoppel, if there were such defects, would not be a matter
of legislative grace and statutory intent. 398 However, the latter is
395. Id. at 99.
396. Id. at 99-101. For a discussion of "federal interests," see supra note
327. The legislative policy or purpose of a statute, if reliably ascertainable, may
be helpful in ascertaining legislative intent. See R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 86-102 (1975),
397. 449 U.S. at 100-01 (citations omitted).
398. See supra text accompanying notes 373-75.
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suggested by the quoted language from the opinion as the basis
of a possible exception to preclusion in section 1983 cases.
What the Court in Allen seems to be saying is this: Congress
intended that where state procedures were inadequate to protect
federal rights, even though they might meet constitutional standards, the reliability and trustworthiness of the procedures applicable in the federal courts could guarantee the adequate
vindication of such rights. In determining the inadequacy of state
procedures for the purpose of determining whether preclusive effect should be attributed to a state judgment, presumably an independent federal standard would apply so that federal rights
would be fully protected.
It is interesting to compare the approach to the "full and fair
opportunity" test here and in the Parklane case. In Allen there is
no express suggestion that in determining the adequacy of the
procedural format of the first action, the federal court should use,
as a point of comparison, the procedures available in federal
court.3 9 9 The Parklane approach to exemption from preclusion,
on the other hand, calls explicitly for a comparison of the procedures available in the first and second actions. 40 0 So, too, does
the Second Restatement ofJudgments with respect to issue preclusion
in sections 28(3) and 29(2).401 The Restatement approach seems to
be rooted, at least in part, in the perception that it would be unfair, regardless of the correctness of the initial judgment, to preclude a party which did not have the original choice of forum, if in
the second action such party could likely reap some benefit from
procedures unavailable in the first forum. 40 2 The approach in Allen is not so motivated, though it may lead to similar results in
practice. Its focus is on the adequacy of the first proceeding,
viewed independently, in assuring reliable vindication of federal
rights. 40 3 As to that inquiry, while the risk of error inherent in the
state procedures may be acceptable for due process purposes, it
399. See 449 U.S. at 100-05. Ultimately, however, that determination
might, as a practical matter, turn in some degree on such a comparison.
400. For a discussion of the Parklane approach, see supra text accompanying
notes 300-301.

401. For a discussion of the approach set forth in
OFJUDGMENTS

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

§§ 28(3), 29(2) (1982), see supra text accompanying notes 221 &

272.
402. See supra note 252. An aversion to enshrining incorrect findings also

seems implicit in the Restatement approach. See
MENTS

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDG-

§§ 28 comment d, 29 comment d (1982); supra text accompanying notes

248-51.
403. Compare text with supra text accompanying notes 333-36 (suggesting
that in some cases federal interest may require more elaborate procedural pro-
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might not be deemed acceptable as a matter of federal policy,
40 4
though distinctions of this nature may be subtle indeed.
The internal law of the judgment-rendering state may, on
policy grounds alone, fashion exceptions to the ordinary rules of
preclusion, more stringent than constitutionally mandated, based
on the lack of a full and fair opportunity to litigate.4 0 5 The
Supreme Court does not expressly acknowledge this in Allen despite the reference in section 1738 to state law of preclusion. 40 6
This, in conjunction with other parts of the opinion, gives the impression that the Court envisioned these federal nonconstitutional limitations on state preclusion law as exceptions to section
40 7
1738 and operative only when suit is brought in federal court.
Since the case arose in the intersystem context, the Court's
language in Allen unnecessarily and perhaps unwittingly obscured
the fact that where these federal nonconstitutional limitations on
state preclusion law exist, they apply generally in both the federal
courts and state courts possessing concurrent jurisdiction over
the second or subsequent proceedings. 40 8 Such is the case, for
example, in section 1983 actions. 40 9 There is no need to talk in
terms of exceptions to the commands of section 1738 because
these limitations are part and parcel of "the law" of the rendering
state and, according to the express terms of that statute, control
the effects of a state judgment in the courts of other states and in
4
federal tribunals. 10
tections than required by due process in order to assure accuracy or trustworthiness of factfinding).
404. See supra text accompanying note 334. If the federal character of the
interests at stake is relevant to due process analysis and makes the private stakes
"weightier" in the tri-factor balance, a matter which is not clear, the distinction
in the text may evaporate entirely.
405. For an example of such an exception to preclusion, see supra text accompanying notes 253-55. For a discussion of the effect of such exceptions, see
supra notes 312-13. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28 (1982).
406. See 449 U.S. at 96. With respect to the "full and fair opportunity exception," the Court referred only to federal case law. Id. at 95. For a discussion
of the Court's treatment of this issue in Kremer, see infra notes 453-57 and accompanying text.
407. For example, the Court's discussion regarding the limitation on the
rules of preclusion based on a "full and fair opportunity to litigate" in the prior
action, see supra text accompanying note 397, follows soon after the Court's suggestion that repeals by implication are disfavored. See 449 U.S. at 99-101.
408. See supra text accompanying notes 327-47.
409. See, e.g., Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283-84 n.7 (1980) (act of
Congress creating cause of action without specifying remedy for enforcement
may be sued upon in state court).
410. For a discussion of what constitutes "the law" referred to in § 1738,
see supra note 313 and text accompanying note 376.
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Of course, if state procedures applicable to a second or subsequent suits are also inadequate under federal standards, 4 1' a
federal forum may be the only one in which the claims and issues
can be adequately litigated. 4 12 In this circumstance, it is accurate
to focus, as did the Allen Court, on the preclusive effect of the
state court judgment in later federal proceedings. In the Allen
case itself, however, the "unfairness" justifying an exception from
preclusion may have rested largely on the attempted use of preclusion there against a former defendant, who had not had the
opportunity to choose the initial forum and who, when he initially
raised the issue of unlawful search and seizure, was faced with
institutional pressures to rule against the contention that would
not exist in a suit for damages. 41 3 In other words, a suit in the
state courts for damages based upon the Civil Rights Act of
1871414 could remedy the perceived lack of a full and fair opportunity for hearing in the first proceeding. In this instance, federal
common law could, if due process4 15 or state law did not, limit the
preclusive effect of the first judgment in order to ensure full protection in the forum of choice 4 16 of the substantive federal consti411. There is, however, the possibility that in some cases where preclusion
is disallowed on federal principles, federal common law will mandate that the
state courts follow the additional procedures deemed necessary to fully vindicate
federal interests, even where those procedures are not otherwise available under
state law. Cf. Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952); Brown v. Western Ry., 338 U.S. 294 (1949).
412. While federal common law may eliminate or reduce the legal effect of
the first judgment on the basis of the lack of sufficient procedures, the parties to
the second or subsequent suit may choose (in the case of concurrent jurisdiction) or be forced (in the case, for example, where the federal courts lack original jurisdiction) to litigate the federal issue in a state forum lacking the
procedure(s) whose absence resulted in the denial of preclusive effect. The argument in favor of the existence of a federal common law which mandates that
the state courts follow additional procedures deemed necessary by federal standards, see supra note 411, is stronger in the latter instance.
413. See 449 U.S. at 115-16 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
414. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
415. There is no suggestion in the majority opinion that due process would
prevent issue preclusion in Allen and, in fact, some discussion in the opinion
suggests that the Court, if directly confronted with the issue, would find due
process satisfied. See 449 U.S. at 103-04.
416. See supra text accompanying notes 340-47; Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S.
306 (1983). In Hating, the Court rejected, in a § 1983 action in federal court, an
argument that it preclude issues not precluded under the law of the rendering
state. The Court wanted to preserve the option of suing to vindicate federal
rights in federal court. Id. at 322-23. If such a rule were adopted, arguably it
should not bind the state courts because the impact of additional litigation
would be felt by them and no substantive federal interest would be undermined
in most cases. See infra note 429.
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tutional rights, the violation of which gave rise to the claim. 4 17
2.

Allen's Progeny

Since Allen, the Supreme Court has handed down three decisions in which it has wrestled with preclusion issues in civil rights
cases in the intersystem context. The first was Kremer v. Chemical
Construction Corp.,418 followed by Haring v. Prosise4 19 and Migra v.
Warren City School District Board of Education.420 For the purpose of
this article, the significance of the latter two cases is more limited
and easily stated than that of the first. Moreover, in discussing
Kremer last, various difficulties with the Court's current approach
to intersystem preclusion can be highlighted. Haing and Migra
will, therefore, be examined first.
In Hating, a Virginia trial court accepted a plea of guilty to
one count of manufacturing a controlled substance. The lawfulness of the search leading to the discovery of the incriminating
evidence was not litigated in this proceeding. 42 ' Thereafter, the
former criminal defendant brought a section 1983 action in federal court against the officers who conducted the search. 42 2 Relying on what it saw as the holding of Allen, the Supreme Court
noted that the federal court was bound by section 1738 to apply
Virginia's law of preclusion except where the party raising the
federal claim had not had a full and fair opportunity to litigate in
the state courts, or other federal policies required a limit on the
preclusive effect of the state court judgment. 4 23 As in Allen, the
Court glossed over the fact that state preclusion law might itself
contain a full and fair opportunity limitation not based on due
process considerations. 4 24 As in Allen, the Court seemed to assume, unnecessarily, that federal nonconstitutional limitations on
state preclusion law, where they exist, must be seen as exceptions
417. However, the majority in Allen did not say that it would find preclusion
improper in the circumstances here presented. See supra note 415. The Court
refused to rule expressly on this issue. See 449 U.S. at 93 n.2, 95 n.7, 105 n.25.
418. 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
419. 462 U.S. 306 (1983).
420. 465 U.S. 75 (1984).
421. 462 U.S. at 316. Resolution of the fourth amendment issue was not
necessary in light of the defendant's guilty plea. Id.
422. Id. at 308.
423. Id. at 313-14 (citingAllen, 449 U.S. at 95, 96, 101). Compare Haringwith
infra text accompanying note 458 (Kremer, decided before Haring, does not approve concept of federal nonconstitutional limitations that are based on notions
of "full and fair opportunity to be heard").
424. See 462 U.S. at 313-14. For a discussion of this aspect of Allen, see
supra notes 405-06 and accompanying text.
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to the commands of section 1738.425
The Court never had to rely on such federal exceptions to
state preclusion in Haring because Virginia law did not attribute
any issue preclusive effect to the first court proceeding; the lawfulness of the search had not, after all, been litigated, decided,
and necessary to the result there. 4 26 Moreover, mutuality was still
the rule in Virginia. 42 7 It would seem to be clear from Haring,
therefore, that in section 1983 cases as in others, to the extent
that state preclusion law limits the issue preclusive effect of a
judgment on the basis of lack of a full and fair opportunity for a
hearing in instances where due process does not demand this result,4 2 8 the federal courts as well as the courts of other states may
and perhaps must 42 9 likewise accept, under section 1738, the
state judgment as thus limited.
In Migra, a supervisor of elementary education was rehired
and then terminated by a local board of education. 4 30 The supervisor first sued in state court in Ohio for breach of contract, which
resulted in a judgment in her favor. 43 1 She then brought a section
1983 action in federal court arguing that the termination violated
her federal constitutional rights. Claim preclusion was raised as a
defense. 4 32 Again relying both on what it perceived to be the
holding in Allen and on section 1738, the Court announced that
4 33
Ohio law governed whether the federal claim was precluded.
Since it was not clear whether the district court had in fact applied
425. See 462 U.S. at 313-14.
426. Id. at 314-16. The federal plaintiff had pleaded guilty in the state action before such time as the suppression had been litigated. Id. at 308.
427. Id. at 316 n.10.
428. For a discussion of the forum state's power to limit the preclusive effect of its judgments, see supra notes 312-13 and accompanying text.
429. For a discussion of whether a state may give more preclusive effect
than the rendering state, see supra notes 355-57 & 377-80 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of the operation of this notion in federal courts, see infra
notes 561-69 and accompanying text. The Court in Haring also rejected the option of adopting a federal rule of preclusion to the effect that since the issue
could have been litigated in the first action, litigation of it in a subsequent action
would be foreclosed. See 462 U.S. at 317-23. While the Court cited authority
indicating that it would be improper to give more preclusive effect to ajudgment
than that accorded by the law of the rendering state, id. at 313 n.6 (citing Union
& Planter's Bank v. Memphis, 189 U.S. 71, 75 (1903)), that authority was not the
express basis for refusing to fashion a federal rule of preclusion. See supra notes
404-16.
430. 465 U.S. at 78.
431. Id. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the decision in favor of the
supervisor in an unreported opinion. Id. at 79.
432. Id. at 80.
433. Id. at 80-85. The Court held that state preclusion law governs whether
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Ohio law, the case was remanded for additional proceedings. 43 4
Migra thus established that in the section 1983 context, as in
other types of cases, the Court will generally not distinguish, for
purposes of section 1738, between claim and issue preclusion. 43 5
State law applies as to both including, presumably, limitations to
preclusion related to the lack of a full and fair opportunity for a
hearing not derived from the fourteenth amendment due process
clause. 4 36 The Ohio decisions on preclusion referred to in the
Court's opinion dealt predominantly with suits raising state issues
and claims. 4 37 The Migra Court did not ascertain, nor did it necessarily have to at this stage of the proceeding, 4 38 the existence of
any federal nonconstitutional limitations on state preclusion law,
though on its face the opinion might be interpreted to suggest
4 39
erroneously that none exist.
3.

Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp.

The Supreme Court in Kremer 4 40 was confronted with a suit
in federal court based upon a title VII employment discrimination
claim 441 which followed the dismissal by the New York State Divithe effect is to foreclose litigated or unlitigated matters; that is, whether the effect is issue or claim preclusion. Id.
434. Id. at 87.
435. Id. at 83.
436. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The propriety of a court's giving
more preclusive effect to a judgment than is accorded by the law of the original
forum is the subject of some debate. See supra notes 355-57, 377-80 & 429 and
accompanying text.
437. See 465 U.S. at 85-87 (citing Whiteland v. General Tel. Co., 20 Ohio
St. 2d 108, 254 N.E.2d 10 (1969) (common law negligence); Henderson v. Ryan,
13 Ohio St. 2d 31, 233 N.E.2d 506 (1968) (attorney malpractice); Sharp v.
Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 15 Ohio St. 2d 134, 239 N.E.2d 49 (1968) (breach of contract and wrongful garnishment); Rush v. Maple Heights, 167 Ohio St. 221, 147
N.E.2d 599 (1958) (common law negligence), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 814 (1958);
Vasu v. Kohlers, Inc., 145 Ohio St. 321, 61 N.E.2d 707 (1945) (common law
negligence); Norwood v. McDonald, 142 Ohio St. 299, 52 N.E.2d 67 (1943)
(ejectment)). But see Johnson's Island, Inc. v. Board of Townships Trustees, 69
Ohio St. 2d 2411, 431 N.E.2d 672 (1982) (federal constitutional challenge to
zoning ordinance); Stromberg v. Board of Bratenahl, 64 Ohio St. 2d 98, 413
N.E.2d 1184 (1980) (federal constitutional challenge to dissolution of school
district).
438. State law itself might not have precluded litigation of the matters here.
See 465 U.S. at 86-87 (suggesting that question of what constituted "cause of
action" for purposes of claim preclusion was unsettled in Ohio courts).
439. See id. at 80-87 (suggesting that rule requiring application ofjudgment
state's law is without exception); id. at 81 ("in the absence of federal law modifying the operation of § 1738, the preclusive effect in federal court of petitioner's
state-court judgment is determined by Ohio law").
440. 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
441. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(1)-(17) (1982).
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sion of Human Rights for lack of probable cause of a similar claim
under state law. 4 42 This dismissal was upheld by the Appellate
Division of the New York Supreme Court. 44 3 New York statutory
law endowed the dismissal with claim preclusive effect. 4 44 Discovering no clear statement of congressional intent to the contrary, 445 the Court found that section 1738 required the federal
district court to hold that the title VII claim was barred, 4 46 despite
the possible exclusive subject matter jurisdiction of the federal
44 7
courts over these suits.
It was argued that the New York proceeding was so seriously
flawed that it should be denied recognition even if section 1738
otherwise applied. 4 48 Acknowledging that it had utilized the concept of "full and fair opportunity to be heard" in various cases,
including Allen v. McCurry and Blonder-Tongue,44 9 the Court noted
that the prior decisions had not specified the source or defined
the content of this requirement. 450 The Court continued:
But for present purposes, where we are bound by the
statutory directive of § 1738, state proceedings need do
no more than satisfy the minimum procedural requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause in order to qualify for the full faith and credit
guaranteed by federal law. It has long been established
that § 1738 does not allow federal courts to employ their
own rules of res judicata in determining the effect of
state judgments. Rather, it goes beyond the common
442. 456 U.S. at 464.
443. Id.
444. Id. at 466-67 (citing N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 300 (McKinney 1972) (final determination, via state statute, excludes any other civil or criminal action based
on same grievance of concerned party).
445. 456 U.S. at 468-76. For a discussion of the effect of a federal statute
indicating congressional intent to modify the operation of § 1738, see supra
notes 394-96 and accompanying text.
446. 456 U.S. at 476-80.
447. Id. at 479 n.20. For a discussion of the relevance of exclusive federal
subject matter jurisdiction in cases involving § 1738 questions, see infra notes
468-71 and accompanying text.
448. 456 U.S. at 480. The plaintiff argued that administrative proceedings
followed by judicial review are per se insufficient to merit recognition under
§ 1738. Id.
449. Id. at 480-81. The Court indicated that this requirement, at least
where constitutionally based, applied to both claim and issue preclusion and
therefore the characterization of which was involved in the case at bar was irrelevant. Id. at 481 n.22. For a discussion of the Court's holding with respect to this
issue, see infra text accompanying notes 478-79.
450. 456 U.S. at 481.
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law and commands a federal court to accept the rules
45
chosen by the State from which the judgment is taken. '
The Court then went on to find that the New York proceeding
4 52
had fully satisfied the demands of due process.
For present purposes, four things are significant about
Kremer:
1) On its face the Supreme Court's opinion rejects, at least
in title VII litigation, the notion that there is a federal nonconstitutional law of "full and fair opportunity to be heard" that can be
relied upon to limit the preclusive effects otherwise attributed to a
state court judgment under state law in those instances where section 1738 applies. 4 5 3 This is apparently based on the assumption
found in Allen that imposing federal limitations would operate as
an amendment to the dictates of section 1738, which requires a
clear statement from Congress. 4 54 This is in turn premised on
the mistaken belief that section 1738 refers solely to those principles of claim and issue preclusion that, within the restrictions imposed by the due process clause, find their source in the lawmaking branches of the states. That assumption is found rather
4 56 and implicitly in Allen. 4 57
clearly in both Haring45 5 and Migra
451. Id. at 481-82 (citing McElmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312, 326
(1839); Mills v. Duryee, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 481, 485 (1813)).
452. Id. at 483-85. For a discussion of the Court's due process analysis, see
infra text accompanying notes 474-86.
453. See supra text accompanying note 451. Since § 1738 applies to state as
well as federal courts, the opinion in Kremer, as an interpretation of that provision, presumably was intended to apply to both federal and state tribunals and
in fact relies on cases where the second suit was brought in state court. See 456
U.S. at 483 n.24. By the same token, since § 1738 is not limited to particular
types of cases, the Kremer approach could be taken to apply to all types of litigation, not just title VII litigation, absent an implied repeal of § 1738. See infra
note 472. In Haring, a § 1983 case decided after Kremer, the Court suggested
that federal nonconstitutional limitations on state preclusion law, including
those based on a "full and fair opportunity to be heard," may exist in some
circumstances, presumably where a federal substantive interest suggests an implied repeal of § 1738. For a discussion of this aspect of the Haring decision, see
supra text accompanying notes 423-25.
454. For a discussion of this assumption in the Allen opinion, see supra notes
394-96 and accompanying text. See also Marrese v. American Academy of
Orthopaedic Surgeons, 105 S. Ct. 1327 (1985) (even where second action is
within exclusive subject matter jurisdiction of federal court, refusal to give
preclusive effect to state court judgment should be seen as "exception" to
§ 1738). For a discussion of Marrese, see infra note 469.
455. For a discussion of relevant aspects of Haring, see supra note 423 and
accompanying text.
456. For a discussion of relevant aspects of Migra, see supra note 430 and
accompanying text.
457. But see supra notes 405-06 (with respect to "full and fair opportunity
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While both Allen 4 58 and Haring4 59 (the latter decided after Kremer)
seem to approve the concept of federal nonconstitutional limitations in principle, Kremer does not where those limitations are
4 60
based on notions of "full and fair opportunity to be heard."
Just as federal constitutional law can act to limit the operation of state law 46 1 within the state, as the Court in Kremer conceded, so can federal statutory and common law. 4 62 As previously
noted, it is the body of law thus fashioned by which the express
terms of section 1738 accompany a state judgment to federal and
other state courts. 46 3 Let us assume, for a moment, that the
Supreme Court did not proceed in Kremer on the mistaken assumption that section 1738 refers only to purely state law. If it
wanted to be taken as saying that there should be no federal common law of preclusion (at least in title VII cases) operating within
the states, would not the Court have made this point more expressly than it did in Kremer?4 64 It should be noted, moreover,
that in support of the proposition that compliance with the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment is all that is required
for full faith and credit, 4 65 the Court cited a variety of precedents
which involved preclusion of nonsubstantive federal or state isexception," Court referred explicitly only to federal case law). The assumption
also seems to be implicit in § 86 of the Restatement. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF JUDGMENTS

§ 86 & comments b, c, d (1982).

458. For a discussion of relevant aspects of Allen, see supra notes 394-98
and accompanying text. Both Allen and Haring were § 1983 cases.
459. For a discussion of relevant aspects of Haring, see supra notes 423-25
and accompanying text.
460. See supra text accompanying note 451.
461. For a discussion of the operation of § 1738 on state preclusion law,
see supra notes 358-60 and accompanying text.
462. For a discussion of "the law" referred to in § 1738, see supra note 311.
See also Burbank, A GeneralApproach, supra note 314, at 805.
463. For a discussion of the effect of federal constitutional standards on the
law of preclusion in the states, see supra notes 308-11 & 358-60 and accompanying text.
464. For a discussion of the Kremer Court's treatment of § 1738 where federal jurisdiction is arguably exclusive, see infra note 469. The Kremer Court did
disclaim the existence of a federal common law limiting state judgments when
that operated as an exception to § 1738. See 456 U.S. at 481-82.
The recent case of Marrese v. American Academy of OrthopaedicSurgeons did not
have to address the matter of federal common law of preclusion operative in the
state courts. 105 S.Ct. 1327 (1985). The second action there was within the
exclusive subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. Id. Nevertheless, the
language of the opinion indicates that the Court is still under the impression
that the reference in § 1738 is to purely state law principles as long as they are
consistent with due process. Id. at 1332.
465. For a discussion of the Court's holding with respect to this issue, see
supra notes 451-58 and accompanying text.
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sues-cases wherein there was arguably less of a federal interest
in the creation of nonconstitutional controls on state law. 46 6 The
Court's mistaken reasoning in Kremer will, hopefully, be corrected
or qualified in the future and the specific result in Kremer may then
467
be rejected.
If the federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction to hear title
VII claims, a matter the Court in Kremer expressly refused to clarify, 4 6 8 it might be argued that it makes little sense to talk in terms
of federal controls on domestic state preclusion law that bind
under section 1738 in the title VII context since the subsequent
litigation in which the preclusion defense would be raised may be
brought only in federal court. Nevertheless, even if any federal
limitations that would be created here are considered "exceptions" to section 1738,469 the strong federal substantive interest
466. See 456 U.S. at 483 n.24 (citing Underwriters Nat'l Assurance Co. v.
North Carolina Life & Accident Health Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 455 U.S. 691 (1982)
(class action consisting of insurance policyholders seeking adjudication of rights
to trust fund); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948) (declaratory judgment
action regarding marital status); Magnolia Petroleum v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430
(1943) (Workmen's Compensation action); Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32 (1938)
(divorce action); Baldwin v. Iowa Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931)
(insurance contract dispute); Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 244 U.S. 25 (1917)
(insurance contract dispute)).
467. For a discussion of the Kremer Court's reasoning in regard to the application of state preclusion law where federal jurisdiction is exclusive, see infra
note 469.
468. See 456 U.S. at 479 n.20.
469. Where the subsequent litigation raising the federal issue or claim
could not be brought in state court because of the exclusive jurisdiction of the
federal courts, it might be argued that there can be no relevant state law of
preclusion covering a situation that cannot, as a matter of law, arise. Thus, refusal to accord preclusive effect to a prior state court judgment does not require
the disregard of applicable state law and thus there is no exception to the literal
commands of § 1738. See, e.g., Burbank, A GeneralApproach, supra note 314, at
823-25. But cf. Morris v.Jones, 329 U.S. 545 (1947); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v.
Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 444-46 (1943). See generally Sumner, supra note 371, at 44951. Compare id. with infra text accompanying notes 506-29.
Even if this argument is rejected, the substantive federal interest at issue
may perhaps be deemed fully protected only by the procedural format available
in the federal court. The perceived ability of federal procedures to insure an
accurate result may in fact be the reason or a reason for the exclusive nature of
the jurisdictional grant. See C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 314,
§ 4470.
Recently, in Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 105
S. Ct. 1327 (1985), the Court indicated that even if the second action is within
the exclusive subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts, a refusal to accord
preclusive effect to a state court judgment should generally be seen as an "exception" to § 1738. Id. at 1332-33. This is because the reference in § 1738 is to
the general principles of preclusion that exist under the law of the rendering
state. Id. Their operation, however, usually assumes the applicability of forum
state substantive law with respect to the claim or governing issues and does not
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at issue should not be undermined, as the Allen and Haring cases
4 70
recognized.
It should be noted that even if federal subject matter jurisdiction over title VII claims is exclusive, the discrimination issue litigated in the state court in Kremer 4 7 1 might later arise in other New
York proceedings that present state or perhaps even federal
claims. If the latter, there might in fact be a federal common law
rule relating to preclusion that does apply in the state courts and
that might be relied upon in title VII litigation.
2) Kremer reiterates one of the fundamental principles of
full faith and credit law: a violation of federal due process limitations in the rendition of ajudgment deprives it of preclusive effect
in the rendering state.4 72 Since the court of recognition or enforcement, federal or state, need only give (under section 1738)
the same effect to the judgment as would the rendering court,
refusal of the recognition or enforcement court to attribute
preclusive effect to the judgment is entirely consistent with the
4 73
statutory language.
directly address intersystem situations. See also infra text accompanying notes
371-72.
The Court in Kremer never determined whether title VII jurisdiction was exclusive. Thus it did not expressly ascertain whether the exclusive nature of the
jurisdiction, if such it was, suggested a repeal of § 1738. Since it must have dealt
with the preclusion issue on the assumption that the jurisdiction might be exclusive, the Kremer opinion can be taken as determining that even if there is exclusive federal jurisdiction in title VII cases, no implied repeal exists in the
circumstances presented in Kremer. Accord Marrese, 105 S. Ct. at 1335.
Along the way, however, the majority in Kremer acknowledged the doubts
expressed in Congress concerning the adequacy of state remedies. Then it
noted, in apparent contradiction of the clear reasoning of Allen: "It does not
follow, however, that an implied repeal of § 1738 has been demonstrated....
Similar expressions of congressional concern with state remedies were unsuccessfully mustered in Allen ....
456 U.S. at 472 n.10. This statement is inconsistent with the later reasoning of Haring and its view of Allen. See supra text
accompanying notes 423-25.
In short, Kremer did not find an implied partial repeal of § 1738 on the basis
of the evidence mustered regarding concern over adequacy (nonconstitutional)
of state remedies. Moreover, whether or not federal jurisdiction over title VII
actions is eventually found to be exclusive, this part of the opinion may be taken
to suggest that the Court may not impose in title VII, and perhaps in other cases,
common law restrictions on state preclusion law based on full and fair opportunity to be heard even if its misreading of § 1738 is eventually corrected.
470. For a discussion of the Allen and Haring Courts' concern for the protection of federal interests, see supra notes 394-98 & 423-25 and accompanying
text.
471. See supra notes 440-452 and accompanying text.
472. See 456 U.S. at 482-83. For a discussion of this limitation on preclusion, see supra note 17 and accompanying text.
473. See 456 U.S. at 482-83. For a discussion of the operation of § 1738
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3) The Court determined that the New York proceeding
was procedurally adequate under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment for the purpose of determining the existence of statutorily proscribed determination, 4 7 4 noting that "no
single model of procedural fairness, let alone a particular form of
procedure is dictated by the Due Process Clause". 4 75 In so doing
it cited prior cases in which a balancing analysis similar to the one
4 77
previously discussed 4 76 was applied.
Characterization of the applicable preclusion doctrine as
claim or issue preclusion was not deemed crucial in the context of
Kremer.4 78 In fact, the Court suggested that the constitutional
"full and fair opportunity" test, whatever it might entail, applied
479
to both claim and issue preclusion.
From all appearances, the stakes at issue in both the first and
second proceedings were basically the same. This was not a case
where there was a small stake at risk in the first case and a very
large one in the second that would impact on the tri-factor balancing analysis. 48 0 To the extent, therefore, that the procedures
utilized in the first proceeding met the due process requirement
for a valid judgment, they also met the due process requirement
necessary to attribute preclusive effect to the same type of claim
48 1
or issue when raised in the later federal proceeding.
4) The opinion in Kremer overlooks or at least fails to expressly acknowledge the fact that the nonconstitutional law of the
where the rendering court limits the preclusive effect of its judgments, see supra
text accompanying notes 309-11.
474. 456 U.S. at 483-85.
475. Id. at 483 (citing Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 610 (1974);
Inland Empire Council v. Millis, 325 U.S. 697, 710 (1945)).
476. For a discussion of this balancing analysis, see supra notes 51-53 and
accompanying text.
477. See 456 U.S. at 483 (citing Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600,
610 (1974) (no due process violation because "the State [had] reached a constitutional accommodation of the respective interests of [the parties]"); Cafeteria
Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (due process analysis "must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental
action")).
478. See 456 U.S. at 481 n.22.
479. Id.
480. For a discussion of the tri-factor balancing analysis, see supra notes
242-51 & 289-93 and accompanying text.
481. Even though Mr. Kremer might be classified as a plaintiff in the first
action, arguably he lacked free choice of the initial forum, given the federal requirement that a title VII claimant first invoke state remedies. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(c) (1982). For a discussion of the relevance of choice of forum to the
issue of preclusion, see supra text accompanying notes 245.
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state of rendition may require more than the due process clause
with respect to the opportunity to be heard in order for certain
preclusive effects to follow. 48 2 To the extent it does, those limitations may accompany the judgment to other state and federal
courts by the very terms of section 1738 that Kremer so
stressed.

48 3

C.

FederalExceptions to Intersystem Preclusion

We have already discussed the federal constitutional and
nonconstitutional limitations based on full and fair opportunity to
litigate that operate internally on domestic state preclusion law
and are operative extraterritorially by virtue of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause and its statutory implementation. We have yet to
examine whether there are any federal limits of that kind that operate solely in the intersystem context. To this end let us consider: Are there instances where federal law imposes limits on
state domestic law of preclusion only when the judgment is enforced or recognition of it is sought in another state or federal
court? Arguably there are. The plurality opinion of Justice Stevens in Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co. 48 4 purported to recognize one such instance, though a majority of the Court rejected
his reasoning. 4 8 5 It is a truly fascinating case and deserves examination here.
The petitioner, a resident of the District of Columbia and an
employee there, was injured at work in Arlington, Virginia. 48 6 He
received an award of disability benefits under the Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act, which award under the domestic law of
Virginia excluded "all other rights and remedies ... at common
482. For a discussion of the operation of nonconstitutional state preclusion
rules, see supra note 312 and accompanying text.
483. For a discussion of the extraterritorial operation of state rules of preclusion under § 1738, see supra notes 313 & 377-80 and accompanying text.
484. 448 U.S. 261 (1980).
485. Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Blackmun joined in the Stevens' opinion. Id. at 263. Justice White concurred in an opinion joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Powell. Id. at 286 (White, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist
wrote a dissent joined by Justice Marshall. Id. at 290 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
An approach similar to that of the Thomas plurality is found in Justice Stone's
famous dissent in Yarborough v. Yarborough. See 290 U.S. 202, 222-23 (1933)
(Stone, J., dissenting) (even though Constitution does not deny Georgia power
to foreclose all inquiries into child maintenance, "it by no means follows that it
gives to Georgia the privilege of prescribing that policy for other states in which
the child comes to live"). See also Reese & Johnson, supra note 364, at 171-78.
See generally R. CRAMPTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, supra note 63, at 672-75.
486. 448 U.S. at 264.
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law or otherwise." 48 7 He then sought a supplemental award in
the District of Columbia. 48s The administrative law judge of the
United States Department of Labor, which administers the District's program, found that further recovery was not precluded in
Virginia and thus the requirement of section 1738 to give the
same effect in the District as the first award had in Virginia did not
forbid supplemental relief.48 9 Not only did the Virginia award by
its terms appear to contemplate further awards in Virginia, but
the statutory merger doctrine of that state was construed as
merely covering "common law and other remedies under Virginia
law." 4 90 When the case reached the Supreme Court, seven members agreed with the proposition that the District could, in the
491
circumstances of this case, award additional relief.
Prior to Thomas, it should be noted, the Court had handed
down two decisions dealing with this type of case. In Magnolia
Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 4 9 2 the Court had held that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause barred a supplemental workmen's compensation
award in Louisiana when Texas law attributed merger effect to
the first award in Texas. Then three years later, in IndustrialCommission of Wisconsin v. McCartin,49 3 the Court refused to find an Illinois award preclusive of further relief in Wisconsin absent "some
unmistakable language by [the Illinois] state legislature orjudiciary" to the effect that the first state's law was "designed to pre'49 4
clude any recovery by proceedings brought in another state.
Both the administrative law judge4 95 and three members of
the Supreme Court 4 96 in Thomas basically adopted the McCartin
4 97
approach, though the concurring Justices appeared to agree
with the Thomas plurality that McCartin departed from accepted
full faith and credit principles to the extent it permitted the state
of rendition to directly determine the preclusive effect of its judg487. See VA. CODE § 65.1-40 (1980).
488. 448 U.S. at 264-65.
489. Id. at 265.
490. 448 U.S. at 277-86.
491. These included ChiefJustice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Brennan,
Powell, Stevens, Stewart, and White. For a list of the various opinions filed in
Thomas, see supra note 485.

492. 320 U.S. 430 (1943).
493. 330 U.S. 622 (1947).
494. Id. at 627-28.

495. 448 U.S. at 265-66.
496. Id. at 289-90 (White, J., concurring).
497. Id. at 289 (White, J., concurring).
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ments in another state.4 98 To Justice White, who wrote this concurrence, Magnolia represented a sounder approach, 49 9 but
McCartin had been on the books for over thirty years and he was
not willing to overrule it.500
The plurality opinion authorized by Justice Stevens rejected
both the approach in Magnolia,50 1 for reasons to be discussed
presently, 50 2 and also the part of McCartin which allowed a state to
fashion its preclusion doctrine in such a way as to directly control
the extraterritorial effect of its judgments. 50 3 Instead, the plurality reached the same result as in McCartin, but by utilizing in part
reasoning rarely found in credit-to-judgment cases (though at
one time found in the constitutional choice-of-law area). 504 Specifically, the plurality balanced the interests of Virginia and the
District of Columbia and concluded that the latter had a sufficient
interest to ignore whatever preclusive effect attached to the award
in Virginia under Virginia law. 50 5 Along the way, the opinion employed a method of analysis of particular significance for current
purposes.
First, the plurality noted that the supplemental award gave
full effect to the factual determinations of the first tribunal and
50 6
allowed full credit for payments pursuant to the earlier award.
It did not undermine the obligation of the employer to pay the
Virginia award. 50 7 Thus Virginia's interest in the integrity of its
award was protected.5 0 8 Justice Stevens then observed:
To be sure, . . .the factfindings of state administrative
tribunals are entitled to the same res judicata effect in
the second State as findings by a court. But the critical
differences between a court of general jurisdiction and
498. Id. at 269-70 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
499. Id. at 289 (White, J., concurring).
500. Id.
501. Id. at 272-77, 286 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
502. See infra text accompanying notes 506-34.
503. 448 U.S. at 269-72.
504. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 n.10 (1981) (discussion of balancing of interests analysis in choice-of-law cases).
505. 448 U.S. at 277-86.
506. Id. at 281. For this reason, the plurality noted that "[t]here is neither
inconsistency nor double recovery." Id.
507. Id. at 284.
508. Although the plurality recognized that Virginia had a "separate interest" in limiting the liability of employers doing business in the state, it reasoned
that this interest "would inevitably impinge upon the substantial interests of the
second jurisdiction in the welfare and subsistence of disabled workers." d. at
284-85.
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167

an administrative agency with limited statutory authority
forecloses the conclusion that constitutional rules applicable to court judgments are necessarily applicable to
workmen's compensation awards.
A final judgment entered by a court of general jurisdiction normally establishes not only the measure of the
plaintiff's rights but also the limits of the defendant's liability. A traditional application of res judicata principles
enables either party to claim the benefit of the judgment
insofar as it resolved issues the court had jurisdiction to
decide. Although a Virginia court is free to recognize
the perhaps paramount interests of another State by
choosing to apply that State's law in a particular case, the
Industrial Commission of Virginia does not have that
power. Its jurisdiction is limited to questions arising
under the Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act. Typically, a workmen's compensation tribunal may only apply
its own State's law. In this case, the Virginia Commission could and did establish the full measure of petitioner's rights under Virginia law, but it neither could
nor purported to determine his rights under the law of
the District of Columbia. Full faith and credit must be
given to the determination that the Virginia Commission
had the authority to make; but by a parity of reasoning,
full faith and credit need not be given to determinations
50 9
that it had no power to make.
At this point in the opinion, justice Stevens cited what is now section 26(1)(c) of the Second Restatement of Judgments,5 10 which provides various exceptions to merger, including the situation where,
in the first proceeding, the court lacks authority to give the plain51 1
tiff all of the relief to which he deems himself entitled.
Nowhere did the Thomas plurality try to establish that this
section of the Restatement or a similar approach represented Vir509. Id. at 281-83 (citations omitted).
510. Id. at 283 n.29. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(c)(1)
(1982). For the text of § 26(c)(1), see supra note 160. The commentary to that
section refers to several intersystem instances (e.g., lack of personal jurisdiction
over the defendant) as well as purely domestic instances, where merger exceptions may be applicable. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(c)(1)
comment c & reporter's note at 246-47 (1982).
511. For a discussion of the relevance of the first court's competence to
adjudicate all theories of recovery, see supra notes 156-60 and accompanying
text.
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ginia domestic preclusion law. 5 12 The plurality therefore seemed
to be saying that, regardless of the merger effect of the first award
under Virginia law and the substantive compensation policy
5 14
adopted by Virginia, 5 13 section 26 reflects a federal exception
to claim preclusion that operates in the intersystem context. This
exception allows someone in the petitioner's position to obtain an
opportunity to be heard on all aspects of his claim. It allows him
to obtain "full recovery" to the extent, of course, that other states
have laws that might provide him with additional relief.5 15 The
Stevens opinion is not clear whether this approach, operating
solely in the intersystem context, has constitutional or nonconstitutional sources. Justice Stevens expressly acknowledges the
power of Congress acting under the Full Faith and Credit Clause
"to increase the measure of faith and credit that a State must accord to the laws or judgments of another state," 51 6 suggesting
perhaps that the plurality approach could be rejected by Congress. The only substantive interests relied upon during the
course of the opinion, it must be remembered, are state and not
5 17
federal.
The plurality's reasoning clearly applies to judicial judgments since, had there been an appeal in Virginia, the court reviewing the administrative decision also would have had to apply
Virginia law. It would, moreover, make little sense to have the
merger effect of a judgment turn on whether the employer exercised his right to judicial review. 51 8 Nor is the reasoning neces512. See 448 U.S. at 283 n.29 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 61.2(c) (Tent. Draft No. 5 1978) (current version at § 26(c)(1))).
513. 448 U.S. at 285-86. The plurality stated:
[Ilt is for each State to formulate its own policy whether to grant
supplemental awards according to its perception of its own interests.
We simply conclude that the substantial interests of the second State in
these circumstances should not be overridden by another State through
an unnecessarily aggressive application of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause ....

Id. at 285.
514. The exception apparently is designed to vindicate state, not federal,
substantive policies. See infra text accompanying note 517. The exception itself,
however, must be deemed federal in origin, since the plurality does not look to
the law of preclusion of any state to support it. See 448 U.S. at 285-86.
515. Accord Cheatham, ResJudicata and The Full Faith and Credit Clause: Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 44 COLUM. L. REV. 330, 344 (1944).
516. 448 U.S. at 272 n.18.
517. Id. at 277.
518. See, e.g., id. at 286 (White, J., concurring). Justice White noted:
If the employer had exercised its statutory right of appeal to the
Supreme Court of Virginia and the Court upheld the award, I presume
that the plurality's rationale would nevertheless permit a subsequent
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sarily relevant only in the workmen's compensation context, since
it is conceivable that a legislature could require in other cases that
the courts of the state apply domestic forum law whenever constitutionally permissible.
Moreover, the emphasis on the ability of the parties in a court
52 0
of general jurisdiction to argue for, 51 9 and the court to choose,
the application of other than forum domestic law is somewhat deceptive even where the choice of law is not dictated directly by
statute. Certainly a court can change its approach to choice of law
and the parties can argue for such a change. But, outside of that
unlikely prospect, in most cases the parties' arguments and the
ultimate court decision must operate within parameters already
5 22
52
established. These parameters limit, to a greater ' or lesser
degree, the court's choice of law. The applicable choice rules or
approach may in fact point to forum domestic law in many cases.
In fact, once the choice of applicable law has been made, in many
cases, though perhaps not in all, 5 2 3 the court will be applying the

law of one jurisdiction and the measure of recovery thereunder.
Ultimately, therefore, the authority of a court, like the agency in
5 24
Thomas, is limited in many cases in its ability to award relief.
award in the District of Columbia. Otherwise, employers interested in
cutting off the possibility of a subsequent award in another jurisdiction
need only seek judicial review of the award in the first forum.
Id.
519. See, e.g., Reese &Johnson, supra note 364. The authors note:
In the ordinary choice-of-law case, the interests of each state involved are protected by the opportunity afforded it, through the parties, of having the merits of its own particular law considered by the
tribunal before which the suit is brought. In the typical workmen's
compensation case, however, neither state nor litigant is afforded a day
in court on the question of which of two or more competing laws
should most appropriately be applied.
Id. at 176-77.
520. Thomas, 448 U.S. at 282-83 (plurality opinion). The plurality noted
that courts of general jurisdiction, unlike administrative agencies with limited
statutory authority, may choose to apply the law of the state that has a paramount interest in the dispute. Id.
521. See, e.g., Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws
Method, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227 (1958) (discussing rigidity of traditional conflict
of laws analysis in area of contracts).
522. See, e.g., Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54
CALIF. L. REV. 1584 (1966) (advocating more liberal approach to conflict of laws
questions which favors real policy concerns over arbitrary rules of decision).
523. See Reese, Dpegage: A Common Phenomenon in Choice of Law, 73 COLUM.
L. REV. 58 (1973) (discussing situations in which laws of different states are applied to govern different issues in same case).
524. In fact, the forum may choose to apply non-forum law that might be
less generous than forum law.
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For this reason alone the plurality approach seems to have farreaching impact where the laws of several states can constitutionally apply, at least when the merger doctrine is at issue.
In the purely domestic context, with no multistate complications, if a state provides for a certain measure of relief in its "substantive" law, it may not constitutionally enact subject matter or
other "procedural" limitations applicable to its courts to deny a
forum or fora for attempting to collect all the relief thus made
available. 52 5 If the law creates a substantive interest in liberty or
property, due process operates as an independent federal restriction on how that interest can be extinguished; it requires an adequate opportunity to be heard. 526 This is the constitutional basis
for section 26 of the Second Restatement of Judgments in the purely
domestic context. 5 27 However, where a transaction touches two
or more states in such a manner as to give each a sufficient interest to permit it to apply its own (perhaps different) law, 528 the
same situation is not presented. When the forum state applies its
own or another law via its choice-of-law methodology and, as a
result, the claimant's relief is more limited than that available
under the law of another interested jurisdiction, it is not taking
away without appropriate procedural protections what it explicitly
seems to grant. The forum state has allowed an opportunity to be
heard on the matters which the applicable substantive law makes
relevant and no more. The Thomas plurality's emphasis on the
lack of authority of the Virginia agency to provide "full" recovery
is an implicit rejection of the notion long accepted in the full faith
and credit area that the policies enforced by a valid judgment rendered by a sister state (whether those policies are embodied in the
substantive law or the choice-of-law methodology applied by the
original forum) cannot be disregarded by sister states by reason
5 29
of their differing policies.
The claimant in Thomas could have obtained all the relief he
wanted merely by suing first in the District, whose more generous
law could be constitutionally applied. 530 This makes the result
525. See supra text accompanying notes 155-58.
526. See supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
527. See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
528. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 307 (1981) ("a set of facts
giving rise to a lawsuit... may justify, in constitutional terms, application of the
law of more than one jurisdiction").
529. See, e.g., Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237 (1908). This is true
regardless of whether or not the forum court is restricted in its ability to choose
the applicable law.
530. The Thomas plurality recognized that the plaintiff initially had a choice
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reached by the plurality in this case, and the reasoning it employed along the way, seem even more unjustifiable as departures
from traditional full faith and credit principles.
The plurality thus fell back on its recognition that this claimant, and perhaps workmen's compensation claimants in general,
possess less than a free or fully informed choice of initial forum. 53 ' Here again is found an implicit emphasis on the lack of a
full and fair opportunity to be heard, with a somewhat different
twist. For a variety of reasons the claimant might have felt compelled to file, or was tricked or misled into filing his Virginia claim
first. 532 Thus, he did not have a full and fair opportunity for a
hearing governed by the more generous law. 53 3 This reasoning is
also not necessarily limited to workmen's compensation claims. If
the initial choice of forum is inhibited to such an extent and in a
manner found unacceptable, then the federal limit on the merger
53 4
effect under state law may come into effect.
There are, moreover, other instances in the intersystem context, involving lack of authority of the first tribunal, wherein the
plurality's reasoning regarding the opportunity to be heard may
apply. For instance, the first suit may raise a state law claim in a
state court that lacks authority to deal with federal claim because
it is within the exclusive subject matter jurisdiction of the federal
courts. Moreover, pendent jurisdiction 53 5 in the latter tribunals
over the state claim may not be available. 536 Given the federal
policy underlying the federal claim and the purposes of the grant
of forum. 448 U.S. at 279-80. However, the plurality reasoned that "[a] rule
forbidding supplemental recoveries under more favorable workmen's compensation schemes would require a far more formal and careful choice on the part of
the injured worker than may be possible or desirable when immediate commencement of benefits may be essential." Id. at 285. Compare id. with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 comment g (1982). See infra note 555.
531. See 448 U.S. at 284-85. See generally C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, supra note 314, at 639-42.
532. See 448 U.S. at 284-85 & n.31 (plurality opinion).
533. Compare text with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(5)(c)
commentj (1982).
534. Compare text with supra text accompanying notes 104-17 (in deciding
issues of constitutional limitations upon state territorial jurisdiction, Court is
concerned that plaintiffs have realistic opportunity to have their claims heard on
merits).

535. See, e.g., United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715
(1966).

For a discussion of pendent jurisdiction in the federal courts, see

Luneburg,Justice Rehnquist, Statutory Interpretation,the Policies of Clear Statement, and
FederalJurisdiction, 58 IND. L.J. 211, 233-52 (1982).
536. This may be because of lack of constitutional nexus or statutory authority, or as a matter of discretion. See Luneburg, supra note 535, at 233-52.
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of exclusive jurisdiction, there seems to be in many instances a
well-nigh conclusive argument to disregard, 5 37 in the intersystem
context, whatever merger doctrine exists under state law. 538 Conversely, when a federal court enters a judgment in a case based on
a federal claim, where pendent jurisdiction over a state law claim
would or could not be exercised, the state courts should generally
53 9
be allowed to hear that cause of action.
In its recent opinion in Marrese v. American Academy of
Orthopaedic Surgeons,5 40 the Supreme Court purported to resolve
some full faith and credit issues presented by exclusive federal
subject matter jurisdiction. Several orthopaedic surgeons, excluded from membership in the Academy, first filed actions in
state court in Illinois alleging that the defendant's action violated
associational rights protected by Illinois common law. 54 1 These
suits were dismissed on the basis of failure to state a cause of action. 54 2 A federal antitrust suit followed in the federal district
court in Illinois in which it was claimed that the defendant Academy possessed monopoly power, that the plaintiffs had been denied membership in order to discourage competition, and that
their exclusion constituted a boycott in violation of section 1 of
the Sherman Act. 543 The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh
537. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 25(1) comment e (1982):
id. § 26 comment c(1); id. § 86 comment f (1982). Compare Brown v. Felsen, 442
U.S. 127 (1979) (impliedly finding repeal of § 1738) with Kremer v. Chemical
Constr. Co., 456 U.S. 461 (1982) (finding no repeal where Court treated case as
involving at least issue but perhaps also claim preclusion). See also infra text
accompanying note 561 (suggesting that no repeal of § 1738 was found in
Kremer in part because the federal and state remedies at issue were equivalent).
In this situation, federal law prevents the application of federal law in the
state courts. This is in contrast to the situation in Thomas, where forum state law
prohibited the application of other state law in the initial forum. The principle
of federal supremacy applies in the situation discussed in the text; it was not
present in Thomas to justify the result there. The Restatement appears to suggest
that there is no preclusion, even where pendent jurisdiction would have existed
in the federal court over both claims, where the first action is brought in state
court. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26 comment c reporter's
note (1982). See also infra note 555.
538. For a detailed discussion of this argument, see supra note 467.

539. See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS

§ 25 comment e (1982).

540. 105 S. Ct. 1327 (1985).
541. Id. at 1329.
542. See Treister v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 78 Ill.
App. 3d 746, 396 N.E.2d 1225 (1979), appeal denied, 79 Ill. 2d 630 (1980).
543. 105 S. Ct. at 1329. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Section 1 of the Sherman
Act provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. Every person who
shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy
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Circuit, which had held that claim preclusion operated to bar the
544
federal action.
The principal ground for reversal was the failure of the lower
courts to consider Illinois preclusion law in determining whether
preclusion was called for.5 45 As in other recent cases involving a
suit filed in federal court following an earlier state court proceeding, 54 6 the opinion for the Court stressed that given section 1738,
the initial reference on the matter of preclusion must be to the
law of the judgment-rendering state. 54 7 If that body of law does
not suggest preclusion of the federal claim, the federal court is
not required to give the state judgment claim or issue preclusive
effect. 548 Given the exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over the
Sherman Act claim, 549 clearly there could be no state law directly
dealing with the matter of preclusion of the federal antitrust
claim. Nevertheless, the general principles of preclusion of Illinois law, to which reference is apparently made in section
1738,550 might embody an exception to preclusion similar to section 26(c)(1) of the Second Restatement of Judgments:5 5 1 Claim preclusion does not follow where the plaintiff was unable to rely on a
certain theory of the case or to seek a certain remedy because of
hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million
dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand
dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said
punishments, in the discretion of the court.

Id.
544. 105 S. Ct. at 1330.
545. Id. at 1335.
546. For discussion of these cases, see supra text accompanying notes 387483.
547. 105 S. Ct. at 1332. If the federal courts could generally attribute more
preclusive effect to a state judgment than required by state law, initial reference
to rendering state law might seem superfluous in many instances. However, the
Court in Marrese indicated its general disapproval of the federal courts' giving
more preclusive effect to a state court judgment than required by the rendering
state's law. Id. at 1333. Moreover, initial reference to state law, if it indicates no
preclusive effect, obviates the difficult problem of determining an implied repeal
of § 1738. See id. For a discussion of the propriety of a federal court giving
more preclusive effect than the rendering state court would, see infra text accompanying notes 561-69.
548. 105 S. Ct. at 1332-33. See infra notes 561-69 and accompanying text.
549. See, e.g., General Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry., 260 U.S. 261, 28688 (1922) (federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over claims brought under

Sherman Act).
550. For a discussion of the "law" to which § 1738 applies in this context,
see supra notes 468-70 and accompanying text.
551. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 26(c)(1) (1982). For the text
of § 26(c)(1), see supra note 160.
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the limitations on the subject matter jurisdiction of the court rendering the first judgment. 5 52 If domestic Illinois law so provided,
and would be found by the Illinois courts applicable in the case of
a claim within the exclusive subject matter jurisdiction of a particular court, no claim preclusion would follow in the federal antitrust action by virtue of section 1738. 5 53

Unlike the Thomas

plurality, 554 therefore, the Court concerned itself in Marrese with
the preclusion law of the rendering state and the extent to which
it reflected a jurisdictional competency limitation.
In his concurrence, Chief Justice Burger pointed out that
even if the law of Illinois did embody an exception to claim preclusion similar to section 26(c)(1), a state court in Illinois might
hold that as long as the plaintiff could have in the original action
sought a remedy based on a particular statute, he should be foreclosed from seeking a remedy based on a different statute if the
elements necessary to recovery and remedies available under
both statutes were largely the same. 5 55 If this was in fact the law in
552. For a discussion of this exception, see supra notes 155-63 and accompanying text.
553. See 105 S. Ct. at 1333.
554. For a discussion of the relevant reasoning of the Thomas plurality, see
supra text accompanying notes 512-15.
555. 105 S. Ct. at 1336 & n.3 (Burger, CJ., concurring). Alternatively, if
Illinois preclusion law adopted the general preclusion principle that a party cannot split a cause of action between a court of limited jurisdiction and one of
more general jurisdiction, preclusion of the antitrust claim might be called for to
the extent that the plaintiff in Marrese could have initially sued in the federal
court on the federal claim, joining the state claims under pendent jurisdiction.
This assumes there is no diversity. Id. Compare id. with supra text accompanying
notes 162-63 (discussing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 24 comment g
(1982)). The majority opinion in Marrese notes that this principle is usually applied when the plaintiff could have sued in the same system of courts for all the relief
requested. But as long as § 1738 directs attention to the general principles of the
rendering state's domestic law of preclusion (which the majority does accept),
Illinois' adoption of the general principle embodied in § 24, comment g, is dispositive absent a federal exception to § 1738.
It is interesting to note how the Second Restatement ofJudgments often fails to
explore (or ignores) the significance of § 1738 in its comments regarding instances where there are both federal and state theories of recovery but only the
state theory is relied upon in the first suit. Section 25, comment e, poses two
situations of relevance here: (1) where the first action is in state court that has
concurrent jurisdiction over the state and federal claims and (2) where the federal claim is within the exclusive subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts.
It suggests that preclusion should follow in the former situation since there was a
full opportunity to be heard in the initial action on all theories and that no preclusion should occur in the second, presumably on the basis of a lack of such an
opportunity. Id. § 25 comment e. While the second action in both instances
may, or must, be brought in federal court, the commentary fails expressly to
mention the relevance of the law of preclusion of the judgment-rendering state.
The same omission occurs in § 26, comment c(l), which also deals with the case
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Illinois, preclusion would follow in the federal court under section 1738.
Where the state and federal causes of action are so substanwhere the first action is in state court and the second in federal where there is
exclusive federal subject matter jurisdiction. See id. § 26(c)(1) reporter's note.
But see id. § 86 comment e (discussing situations in which state adjudicatory proceedings are challenged in federal court).
Where the state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the federal and
state claims, it is conceivable that there might be directly relevant state preclusion law to which reference can be made under the terms of § 1738 if the second
action is in federal court or the court of a sister state. See supra notes 308-47 and
accompanying text. There may be instances where the first suit was filed on the
state claim in state court and then, later, a second suit was filed in a court of the
same state on the federal claim. In those circumstances, state law may or may
not seek to preclude the second suit. Whether that preclusion is effective depends on federal constitutional and nonconstitutional law, which is operative
both in the courts of the judgment-rendering state, in the federal courts, and in
the courts of sister states. See supra text accompanying notes 308-47.
Where the second action is within exclusive federal jurisdiction, the state
courts will never have specifically addressed the relevant problem of preclusion,
so that there will be no state preclusion law directly on point. Moreover, as the
majority in Thomas recognized, the law of the rendering state may not, as a general matter, directly specify the preclusive effect of the judgment of its courts in
the courts of other sovereigns. For a discussion of the rule limiting a state
court's power to directly determine the preclusive effects of its judgments in
foreign courts, see supra notes 370-72 & 497-503 and accompanying text.
Therefore, as the Court in Marrese correctly assumed, the reference directed
by § 1738 must in these circumstances be to the general principles of preclusion
of the judgment-rendering state. See 105 S. Ct. at 1332-33; id. at 1335-36 (Burger, CJ., concurring). These principles might in fact provide for preclusion in
instances where a claim is split between courts of limited and general jurisdiction. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 comment g (1982).
Yet, as noted above, both the Restatement and the majority in Marrese expressly indicate that the approach of comment g to § 24 applies "in the same
system of courts," suggesting that it was not intended to apply when the second
suit is initiated in a different system. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 24 comment g & reporter's note at 209 (1982); id. § 26(c)(1) & reporter's note
at 246. See also Marrese, 105 S. Ct. at 1333 n.3. Accordingly, these sources suggest no preclusion even if suit could originally have been commenced in the
federal court based on state and federal theories. But this may ignore the teaching of Thomas, and the balance of the Marrese decision, to the effect that the
reference in § 1738 is to the general principles of domestic preclusion law of the
judgment-rendering state and that a state may not directly determine the extraterritorial effect of its judgments.
Of course, there may be some room left by the Thomas plurality, where the
rendering state wants to eliminate the claim preclusive effect of its judgment
extraterritorially. But the state of original suit may adopt the general principle
that where a party has a forum in which all the relief desired is available and it
nevertheless brings suit in a forum where less than full relief can be given, preclusion should follow. For a discussion of this rule, see supra notes 163-65 and
accompanying text. In that circumstance § 1738 would seem to dictate preclusion unless an exception along the lines proposed by the Thomas plurality
applies.
The plurality in Thomas ignored any approach to this problem that Virginia
may have adopted domestically. See supra notes 512-15 and accompanying text,
This confirms that the Thomas plurality's suggested exception to claim preclu-
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tially the same that success on one would provide the same relief
as success on the other, and where the likelihood of success in the
first (state) action is not, as a matter of substantive or procedural
law, less than the likelihood of success in the second (federal) action, there is no need to call into play the federal exception to
state claim preclusion law suggested by the Thomas plurality even
if federal jurisdiction is exclusive. 5 56 In such circumstances there
is arguably a full and fair opportunity to be heard, according to
Chief Justice Burger, who suggested this as the appropriate federal approach where state preclusion law is unclear. 5 57 While the
majority in Marrese did not indicate whether it would fashion an
exception to preclusion where that approach was clearly state law,
it indicated it would not, as a matter of federal law, impose preclusion on this theory where the rendering state rejects this approach, and perhaps even where it is not clear whether or not the
state would adopt it.558 The majority observed, however, that
where claim preclusion is suggested by state law, an "exception"
to section 1738 will be fashioned where the concerns underlying a
particular grant of exclusive jurisdiction justify a finding of an implied partial repeal of section 1738. 559 The primary consideration here will be the intent of Congress. 5 60 At least where the
federal and state claims substantially overlap, the Court might
adopt the Burger approach and find no partial repeal on the theory that there was a full and fair opportunity to be heard and that
561
any federal interests have been fully served.
The Court in Marrese further observed that, to the extent that
state law did not call for preclusion, the federal courts should not
generally give the judgment more preclusive effect. 562 Preclusion
sion was intended to be applicable regardless of Virginia law, and to operate, if
necessary, as an exception to the dictates of § 1738.
556. For a discussion of the Thomas plurality's creation of a federal exception to state preclusion law, see supra notes 506-17 and accompanying text. The
procedural equivalence is necessary to protect federal substantive interests in
the way they are protected by federal common law where there is concurrent

jurisdiction and in order to fulfill the purposes of the congressional grant of
exclusive jurisdiction. See supra note 469. See also supra notes 308-47 & 411-12
and accompanying text.
557. Marrese, 105 S. Ct. at 1337 (Burger, C.J., concurring).

558. Id. at 1333 n.3.
559. Id. at 1335.
560. Id.
561. See supra notes 535-38 and accompanying text. This might be the case
whether or not there could have been pendent jurisdiction over the state claims
in federal court.
562. 105 S. Ct. at 1334-35.
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of the federal antitrust claim might be justified on the theory that
the plaintiff could have sued first in federal court, joining the
Sherman Act claim with state claims within the pendent jurisdiction of the federal courts. Having failed to do so, the plaintiff
should be foreclosed on the federal claim. 5 6 3 In short, there was

or might have been one forum where all the desired relief was
available and where there was, accordingly, a full opportunity to
be heard. The Court, however, rejected such an approach 564 (as
does the Restatement 5 65 ), reasoning that "the concerns of comity
reflected in § 1738 generally allow States to determine the preclusive scope of their own courts' judgments." 56 6 In indicating that,
at least in the type of case at bar, 56 7 the federal courts should not
give preclusive effect to a judgment as to which the rendering
state would not give such effect as a matter of policy, the Court
was acting consistently with some older precedents 56 8 that have
569
been cited in recent full faith and credit cases.
The general principles of preclusion of the judgment-render563. Id. at 1334.
564. Id.
565. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26 reporter's note at 246
(1982).
566. 105 S. Ct. at 1334.
567. The reasoning of the Court here is phrased in general terms and
therefore seemingly applies whenever § 1738 applies.
568. For cases holding that federal courts may afford no greater preclusive
effect to a state court judgment than would the rendering court, see, e.g., Union
& Planter's Bank v. Memphis, 189 U.S. 71, 75 (1903). The same rule is applied
when the second court is a state court. See, e.g., Board of Public Works v. Columbia College, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 521, 529 (1873). Both of these cases are based at
least in part upon the statute (§ 1738), which suggests that this may not be the
result required by article IV, § 2 of the Constitution. But see Durfee v. Duke, 375
U.S. 106, 109 (1963) (dictum suggesting that courts must give at least the res
judicata effect that judgment would be accorded in rendering state). Given the
constitutional language and the power of Congress to prescribe the effect of
state court judgments, it would be hard to believe that Congress itself could not
change the statute, if need be, to permit the court of recognition or enforcement
(federal or state) to give more preclusive effect to the judgment of another state.
569. See, e.g., Migra, 465 U.S. at 86-88 (White, J., concurring) (citing Union
& Planter's Bank v. Memphis, 189 U.S. 71 (1903); Board of Public Works v.
Columbia College, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 521 (1873)); Haring,462 U.S. 306 at 313
n.6 (citing Union & Planter's Bank v. Memphis, 189 U.S. 71 (1903)). The logic
of interpreting § 1738 to read "the same and no more" rather than "at least the
same" preclusive effect was questioned by Justice White in Migra. See 465 U.S. at
88 (White, J., concurring). However, because of the case law interpreting
§ 1738 in the former way, even he would leave to Congress the job of changing
the'rule. See id. Interestingly, however, Justice White's concurrence did not
even cite Durfee v. Duke, which uses the phrase "at least" in interpreting § 1738.
See Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 109 (1963) (federal courts must give "at least
the resjudicata effect which the judgment would be afforded in the state which
rendered it") (dictum).
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ing state may suggest that a plaintiff may not split a claim between
courts of limited and general jurisdiction when the latter could
grant all the relief desired. 5 70 In this situation, section 1738
would require preclusion where the claimant pursued the state
claim first in state court, instead of initially suing in federal court
on the federal claim within exclusive federal subject matter jurisdiction and joining as pendent the state claim. 57 1 This would be
the case even if the federal remedy were different or more gener57 2 it
ous than the state remedy. Unlike the situation in Thomas,
would in most circumstances be difficult to argue that the plaintiff
lacked a free choice of initial forum. Therefore, the Supreme
Court might find that there had been a sufficient full and fair opportunity to be heard and that federal interests were sufficiently
protected. Thus, there would be no implied repeal of section
1738. 5 7 3 That the majority in Marrese was not willing to adopt the
availability of pendent jurisdiction as the basis for a federal rule of
preclusion more stringent than that of the judgment-rendering
state does not necessarily suggest that it would not permit preclu57 4
sion where a state did adopt this general approach.
The refusal of the Court in Marrese to adopt a federal rule of
preclusion is consistent, at any rate, with emphasis on the lack of
authority of the initial forum to provide relief under all applicable
law, which is one of the important elements in the plurality's reasoning in Thomas. 5 75 Indeed, since it is difficult in most instances
to argue that a plaintiff's choice of state over federal court for the
first suit is restricted to any substantial degree, the majority in
570. For a discussion of the rule against splitting a cause of action between
courts of limited and general jurisdiction, see supra note 555.
571. Pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion as well as of statutory
and constitutional law. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
Whether or not pendent jurisdiction can be exercised in a particular case, therefore, may not be clear to litigants. See Luneburg, supra note 535, at 233-38. See
generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 25 comment e & reporter's
note at 228 (1982). But even if in a particular case it is not clear that the court's
discretion would have been exercised to hear the state claim, it may be argued
(and in fact, state law preclusion principles may suggest) that the plaintiff should
have at least tried to obtain a federal adjudication of both claims. Had it done so
and been rebuffed as to the state claim, the claimant could have proceeded in
state court on the state claim on conclusion of the suit on the federal matter. See
supra text accompanying note 549. See generally Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v.
Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 404 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 411 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
572. For a discussion of relevant aspects of Thomas, see supra notes 530-34.
573. Compare text with supra text accompanying notes 535-38.
574. See 105 S. Ct. at 1333 n.3.
575. For a discussion of relevant aspects of the Thomas plurality opinion,
see supra text accompanying notes 509-29.
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Marrese might be construed as extending the plurality's logic in
Thomas, albeit under the felt compulsion of the language and case
law interpreting section 1738.576
D.

The Effects of FederalJudgments

Neither the Full Faith and Credit Clause nor its statutory implementation appears to apply to federal judgments. 5 77 It has
been argued, however, that federal law should determine the
preclusive effects of federal judgments in state courts. 578 Accepting that argument as a correct statement of what the law
should be, how does the discussion in this article relate to recognition and enforcement problems of federal judgments? The
short answer is that, as a general matter, the same constraints apply to federal and state judgments. The federal constitutional requirements for a full and fair opportunity to be heard may either
invalidate the judgment, 57 9 limit merger 58 0 or limit issue preclusive effects5 8 ' in the second proceeding, whether federal or state.
To the extent federal nonconstitutional limitations based on the
opportunity to be heard apply in the federal courts, the state
court should likewise be bound, 5 82 at least where the limits are
traceable to federal substantive interests and federal issues or
5 83
claims are raised in the subsequent state proceedings.
576. See supra text accompanying notes 567-69.
577. See generally Degnan, supra note 367, at 742-50.
578. Id. at 768-69, 773. See also Delaware Valley Citizen's Council for Clean
Air v. Pennsylvania, 762 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 57
(1985).
579. See supra text accompanying note 35 (absent compliance with applicable constitutional procedural constraints in original proceeding, any judgment
resulting from that judgment may be invalid in state of rendition and not entitled to recognition elsewhere).
580. For a discussion of the effects of merger and bar upon parties, see
supra text accompanying notes 140-65.
581. For a discussion of issue preclusion and its effect upon parties to the
initial litigation, see supra text accompanying notes 220-306.
582. Compare text with supra text accompanying notes 373-76 (relevant federal constitutional and nonconstitutional principles may eliminate entirely or reduce to some degree permissible preclusive effects ofjudgment within state that
rendered it).
583. Compare text with supra text accompanying notes 314-47 (discussing
federal nonconstitutional limitations on state preclusion law).
In the recent case of Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank, 106 S. Ct.
768 (1986), a suit was brought in federal district court in Alabama under the
Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1978 (1982). Defendant bank
succeeded in obtaining ajudgment n.o.v. that was affirmed on appeal. 106 S. Ct.
at 770. The former federal plaintiff then obtained a judgment in an Alabama
state court in its favor based on state law claims involving factual allegations and
damages similar to those involved in the federal suit. Id. The defendant bank's
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CONCLUSION

The notion of full and fair opportunity to be heard limits the
preclusive effects of both state and federal judgments based upon
constitutional and nonconstitutional premises. To date the
Supreme Court has not clearly distinguished the due process requirements for a valid judgment and the perhaps more demanding constitutional requirements for issue preclusion. 5 84 Nor has it
directly explored to any degree the extent to which and the circumstances under which federal nonconstitutional common law
resjudicata defense was rejected by the state court. Id. The bank then returned
to federal court to obtain an injunction against the successful plaintiff's further
prosecution of the state action. Id. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982) ("A court of the
United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in state court
except ... to protect or effectuate its judgments."). The injunction was granted
by the district court, which found that the state claims should have been included as pendent claims in the initial suit, and that the state judgment nullified
the earlier federal judgment. This result was affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit.
106 S. Ct. at 770.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, directing that the courts below must first consider the preclusive effect under Alabama state law of the Alabama state court's rejection of the res judicata defense. Id. at 773. If Alabama
law precluded relitigation of the issue of the preclusive effect of the federal judgment, § 1738 commanded that the federal court give it the same effect and,
therefore, that court would have to refuse the issuance of an injunction. In
other words, the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982) was not an exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1738. 106 S. Ct. at 772.
Since the first federal judgment was based on a federal cause of action, the
preclusive effect of that judgment should have been determined by federal common law, see supra text accompanying note 577, and the Supreme Court appeared to agree. See 106 S. Ct. at 773 ("Challenges to the correctness of a state
court's determination as to the conclusive effect of a federal judgment must be
pursued by way of appeal through the state-court system and certiorarifrom this
Court." (emphasis added)). Since the preclusive effect of the initial federal judgment was a matter of federal law, the preclusive effect of state court determination of that issue could be governed by federal common law which might limit
the preclusive effect otherwise attributed under state domestic law to a state
court determination of the federal issue regarding the preclusive effect of the
federal judgment. See supra text accompanying notes 308-47. If so, the reference in 28 U.S.C. § 1738 is to both the state and federal components of the
preclusion law of the judgment-rendering state, not solely to state law principles, as the Court has again in this case assumed incorrectly. See supra text accompanying notes 453-67.
With regard to the state court's determination of the preclusive effect of the
federal judgment, federal review via writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court
might be theoretically available to assure its correctness. However, practical
limitations on the Court's ability to review all such determinations might argue
in at last some instances for a federal common law rule eliminating in the state
courts any preclusive effect which might otherwise attach to the state court's
determination of the preclusive effect of the federal judgment, thereby ensuring
that the federal courts could independently determine the preclusive effect of
their judgments and protect them from being undermined by the state courts.
584. See supra notes 294-306 and accompanying text (discussing nonconstitutional analysis of opportunity to be heard in Parklane & Blonder-Tongue).
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limits the intrastate effect of state judgments. 58 5 The potential
scope of the federal exception to merger illustrated by the plurality opinion in Thomas remains unclear. 5 86 It is hoped that the
Supreme Court will, over the next few years, aggressively undertake to clarify the law in these areas.
585. See supra notes 453-67 and accompanying text (discussing and criticizing Kremer Court's analysis of § 1738, and suggesting that Kremer Court did not
reject notion of federal common law of preclusion).
586. See supra text following notes 418, 524 & 533 (suggesting that approach of Thomas plurality to preclusion has effects beyond area of workmen's
compensation).
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